( 1. ) "while the Rent Control Legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give the landlord also. For instance one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlords bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical".

Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161. In context with Delhi Rent Control Act, the Apex Court observed - this is a beneficial legislation, beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant. It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover possession on stated contingencies. Ganpat Ram v. Gayatri Devi, AIR 1987 SC 2016. tenants in all cases are not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords as well as the tenants. Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T. N. , AIR 1987 SC 2117. Only this much by way of prologue.

( 2. ) THE plaintiff-landlord, whose suit for ejectment of the defendant-tenant from the suit premises, residential one, was decreed by the trial Court but dismissed by the lower Appellate Court, has come up in appeal.

( 3. ) A brief resume of the relevant facts: The landlord-plaintiff-appellant is admittedly a bedini (country prostitute) by caste and profession. She owns the suit house having purchased the same from one Ramsingh under the registered deed of sale dated 21-12-1974. The tenant-defendant-respondent has been holding the house at a monthly rent of Rs. 22/- since 3-5-1973 from the ex-landlord under a written rent note. The case of the plaintiff is that she bona fide needs the suit accommodation for the residence of herself and her two sons, namely, Pooransingh and Anoopsingh, both studying in College and Higher Secondary School respectively. It was also alleged that she wanted to reconstruct the house which could not be done unless the premises were vacated. The defendant in his written statement denied the case of the plaintiff and submitted that the plaintiff was in possession of other alternative accommodation, hence her need was not genuine and that the requirement of illegitimate sons could not be considered.

( 4. ) THE trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal, the decree has been reversed by holding that the plaintiff was a country-prostitute and her sons were illegitimate, whose requirement bore no relevance under the law. The Lower Appellate Court relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Guljar Singh v. Motasingh, AIR 1965 SC 608 in holding that the illegitimate sons could not be considered to be members of the family of the landlord. It was also held that the plaintiff could not seek ejectment on the ground of need for reconstruction because she could not satisfy the requirements of section 12 (7) of the Act. It was also held that the plaintiff was possessed of other accommodation, enough to satisfy her requirements.

( 5. ) THREE questions arise for determination in this appeal:

i) Whether the Lower Appellate Court has rightly constructed the meaning of the term member of the family so as to exclude illegitimate sons of a bedini - country pros. ? ii) Whether the Lower Appellate Court has rightly held the plaintiff to be in possession of other alternative accommodation sufficient to satisfy her requirement? iii) Whether the plaintiff could have been denied a decree for ejectment on the ground of non-satisfaction of the requirements of section 12 (7) of the Act?

( 6. ) LET us first find out the factual floor as laid by the pleadings of the parties and the evidence adduced in the case. The plaintiff Mst. Sushiladevi has five sons of whom one is married. They all live together with the plaintiff. The sale deed, under which the plaintiff purchased the suit accommodation, is a registered d