An order passed under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is not revisable under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

T.N. Singh, J.

1. The question of maintainability of the revision is the moot point to be decided in this matter and on that counsel are heard.

2. Against an order dated 30.10.1991 passed by the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mcrena, rejecting an application under Section 140, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the instant revision is preferred. On merits, nothing need be said on the validity of the order though it may still be mentioned that the Tribunal found no case of 'permanent disablement' made out to make order for interim compensation in favour of the applicant, the revisionist.

3. For the insurer, impleaded as non-applicant No. 3, Mr. V.K. Sharma has appeared and has challenged the maintainability of the petition. He has placed implicit reliance on this court's recent Full Bench decision rendered in the case of Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar 1992 ACJ 200 (MP). He has submitted that two of the Hon'ble Judges in clear and categorical terms held that no appeal against order passed under Section 140 was maintainable and at the same time it was also explicitly held that any aggrieved person would not be remediless and he can move this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the order. The learned counsel has, therefore, contended that it makes no difference if in the instant case the person aggrieved is the claimant and not the owner or insurer of the offending vehicle. According to him a wrong remedy is resorted to by the claimant-revisionist but he is not remediless.

4. However, Mr. K.B.Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for the revisionist, submits that the question is res integra and he has cited also case-law in support of his contention based indeed mainly on the provisions of Section 3, Civil Procedure Code. His contention is that the Claims Tribunal is 'court' and is subordinate to this court. Therefore, in terms of Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, this revision is maintainable.

5. Before I examine the case-law cited 1 found it necessary to remind myself that in terms of the provisions of the Act itself application whole-hog of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to any proceedings instituted before the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act is not contemplated. The Act is a special law and the Claims Tribunal is a creature of the Act and not of Civil Procedure Code. Chapter XII is captioned 'Claims Tribunals' and in terms of Section 165(1) the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette 'constitute' one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals "for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles". Obviously, for this short reason, Mr. Chaturvedi's contention based on Section 3, Civil Procedure Code, is legislatively rebuffed. In this regard reference only is to. be made to the well-known legal maxim 'generalia specialibus non derogant.

6. Reliance Mr. Chaturvedi has placed on this court's Full Bench decision in Sarmaniya Bai v. Madhya Pradesh Rajya Parivahan Nigam 1990 ACJ 862 (MP). In that case the point mooted and decided was of the competence of the Claims Tribunal to execute its own order exercising its inherent powers in virtue not of the provisions of Section 3, Civil Procedure Code but of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code. We do not think if the head-note (8) in JLJ has correctly stated the court's opinion that the Tribunal is a 'civil court'. There is reference in that head-note to paras 15 and 16 of the judgment wherein Apex Court's decision in State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi 1979 ACJ 205 (SC), is discussed. Indeed, Bhagwati Devi v. M/s. I.S. Goel 1983 ACJ 123 (SC), also decided by the Apex Court, is also discussed in that decision at para 15 of the reports. On both decisions as well Mr. Chaturvedi has relied.

7. In so far as Sarmaniya's case 1990 ACJ 862 (MP), is conce