MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT - FULL BENCH)
A. M. Khanwilkar, C. J., Shantanu Kemkar and J. K. Maheshwari, JJ.
Technofab Engineering Ltd. (M/s) v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. and others
First Appeals No.514 and 1134 of 2012 and Miscellaneous Appeal No.1774 of 2011 (Jabalpur); Decided on 15.9.2015.
(1) Court-fees Act, 1870 [Amendment Act, 2008 (M.P.)] -- S.3 -- Sch.1, Art.1-A -- applicability of inserted amended provision -- by amended provision -- upper limit of court-fees introduced -- suit filed before amendment -- appeal after amendment -- though appeal is in continuation of suit -- even then appellant cannot be compelled for payment of ad valorem court-fees. [Paras 13, 18, 19 & 21
(2) Court-fees Act, 1870 [Amendment Act, 2008 (M.P.)] -- S.3 -- Sch.1, Art.1-A -- inserted by Amendment Act of 2008 -- whether authority AIR 1960 SC 980 has application to amended provision in State of M.P. -- held no.
Held : With utmost respect to the Division Bench, the decision in the case of State of Bombay (supra), is not an authority for interpreting the amended provisions introduced by the M.P. Amendment Act of 2008. Just as the Division Bench in the case of Fatehchand (supra), has relied on the principle stated in the case of State of Bombay (supra), even the other decisions referred to in Fatehchand’s case (supra), of Division Bench and Single Bench of this Court, proceeded on the same erroneous basis.
Whether the litigating public in the State of Madhya Pradesh must be compelled and strong-armed to pay court-fee on ad valorem basis without any upper limit, even though remedy of appeal became available to them after coming into force of M.P. Act No.6 of 2008 w.e.f. 2.4.2008. The answer is an emphatic “No”. In our opinion, the benefit of upper limit of court-fees prescribed by the Amendment Act, must be applied uniformly to all litigants instituting their claim after 2.4.2008.
Accordingly, the two questions articulated for our consideration, will have to be answered in favour of the appellants, who have or would institute appeal in the Civil Court or Revenue Court after coming into force of the M.P. Act No.6 of 2008 w.e.f. 2.4.2008, substituting Article 1-A of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as applicable to the State of Madhya Pradesh, irrespective of the fact that the original suit/proceedings instituted in relation to the said remedy was filed prior to the coming into force of the said Act.
As a result, we hold that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Fatehchand (supra), does not lay down the correct legal position. Further, we hold that the principle expounded by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay (supra), is inapplicable to the fact situation arising on account of the amended provisions, which are more beneficial to the litigating public in the State of Madhya Pradesh; (1989)1 Supp.SCC 696, AIR 1977 SC 879, (2004)8 SCC 1 and (2011)8 SCC 737 followed. 1981 JLJ 73, AIR 1957 SC 540, 1956 NLJ 382, AIR 1950 Nag. 177 (FB), AIR 1955 Bom. 287, AIR 1955 Bom.332 and AIR 1953 SC 221 referred to.
(3) Constitution of India -- Arts.14 and 21 -- Court-fees Amendment Act, 2008 (M.P.) -- S.3 -- Sch.1, Art.1-A -- by amendment -- providing for upper limit of court-fees instead of ad valorem court-fees -- not only measure of rationalization of court-fees -- but just and proper approach to expatriate and dissipate the cause of discrimination. [Para 11
(4) Official Language Act, 1957 (M.P.) -- S.3 -- English and Hindi version -- difference between -- applicability of -- as in English version use of “comma ( , )” -- but in Hindi version not contain such “ , “ -- Hindi version will be applicable -- same accepted as more authentic. 1983 JLJ 385 (FB) relied on. 1989 JLJ 675 (DB) referred to.
[Paras 22 to 24
(5) General Clauses Act, 1897 -- S.3(25) -- Court Fees Amendment Act, 2008 (M.P.) -- S.3 -- Sch.1, Art.1-A -- expression used in Article 1-A as “civil Court” -- meaning of -- in view of definition of High Court -- Article 1-A of Schedule-1 encompasses the High Court being highest civil Court of appeal for Madhya Pradesh. [Paras 25 & 26
Khanwilkar, C.J. -- 1. These matters have been referred by the Division Bench for reconsideration of the principle expounded in the decision of Division Bench of our High Court in the case of Fatehchand v. Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Officer and others [2009(4) MPLJ 50].
2. The questions to be considered by the Full Bench have been formulated by the Division Bench in First Appeal No.514/2012 and First Appeal No.1134/2012 vide order dated 28.11.2014, as follows :
“1. Whether the ratio of the decision in Fateh Chand (supra), is correct ?
2. Whether the decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Limited [AIR 1960 SC 980], has application to Article 1A of Schedule I to the Court-fees Act, 1870 as amended by Court-fees (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2008 ?”
3. Miscellaneous Appeal No.1774/2011 has been ordered to be heard analogously with the two appeals vide order dated 1.9.2015, hearing whereof was already in progress on the aforesaid two questions. As similar question was ordered to be considered by the Larger Bench even in the said appeal, request made by the counsel for the appellant in this appeal was acceded to on clear understanding that the appellant in this appeal will not ask for adjournment of the case which was already in progress before the Full Bench, merely because his appeal has now been ordered to be heard analogously. That condition was accepted by the counsel for the appellant in the said appeal.
4. Accordingly, hearing in all the three appeals finally concluded on 7.9.2015 and was reserved for recording opinion on the two questions referred to us for consideration.
5. The questions posed by the Division Bench, are in the appeals filed before this Court, arising from the judgment and decree or order passed by the subordinate Court in suit/proceedings instituted prior to 2.4.2008 before coming into force of the Court-Fees (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2008 (No.6 of 2008). In each of these cases, the suit/proceedings so filed have been decided by the subordinate Court after coming into force of the Amendment Act. In that background, the appellant claims that since the cause to present the appeal before this Court arose after coming into force of Amendment Act of 2008, which is more beneficial legislation to the appellant, providing for upper limit of court-fees to be paid on the memorandum of appeal, the appellant cannot be charged court-fees on the basis of un-amended provisions.
6. This very question was considered by the Division Bench of our High Court in the case of Fatehchand (supra). The Division Bench opined that the Amendment Act was not made retrospective in nature either expressly or impliedly. In absence thereof, it was required to be treated as prospective in nature. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. [AIR 1960 SC 980], and the decision of the Division Bench of our High Court in the case of Smt. Supriya Kathand and others v. Shri Lal Singh and others [Miscellaneous Appeal No.2110/2008; decided on 25.6.2008], and two Single Judge judgments in Dinaji Tukaram Pawar v. Jiwanlal Pawar [1981 JLJ 73=1980 MPLJ 801], and Chairman, Gramin Vidyut Sahkari Samiti and others v. Rajesh Kushwaha and others [2002(1) MPLJ 168], held that the amended provision had no applicability to appeals filed after the amendment arising out of the suit instituted prior to the amendment. The Division Bench distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Ammal v. K.M. Madhavakrishnan and others [(1978)4 SCC 15], and answered the issue against the appellant holding that the appellant, who incidentally files the appeal, after the Amendment of 2008, was not entitled to get the benefit of upper limit of court-fees. But, would be liable to pay ad valorem court-fees as per the un-amended provisions. The correctness of this view is the subject matter before us.
7. Concededly, the
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