Hemant Gupta, CJ.

1. A Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 19th February, 2018 has referred the following question for the opinion of the Larger Bench expressing prima facie disagreement with the view of the earlier Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagwan Das vs. Radhey Shyam Gupta and others on 8th March, 1976 in Misc. Petition No.473/1975.

2. In Bhawan Das’s case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court while examining Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 10-B of the M.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 (for short “the Rules”) framed in terms of Section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”) held that in terms of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10-B read with Rule 13 of the Rules, it is clear that the notice informing the parties of the first date of hearing of the dispute has to be given. Since the Labour Court fixed the date of first hearing of the dispute on 21st March, 1975 for 24th March, 1975, and that no information was given by the Labour Court to the employer of date of hearing in spite of the fact that the employer's counsel was not present on an earlier date, therefore the ex parte Award is not legal. The relevant extract from the judgment reads as under:-

“6. Sub-rule (3) of rule 10-B (hereinafter called the rules) requires the fixing of a date of hearing ordinarily within 6 weeks of the date on which the dispute was referred to it for adjudication. The proviso therein enables the Labour Court to fix a later date for reasons to be recorded in writing. Thus, this provision clearly requires the fixing of date for the first hearing of the dispute. Rule 13, which provides for the place and time for hearing, also requires information thereof to be given to the parties. From these provisions it is clear that a notice informing the parties of the first date of hearing of the dispute has to be given. From the undisputed facts of the present case, it is clear that this was not done by the Labour Court. It was only on 21-3-75 that the Labour Court, for the first time, fixed the date of first hearing of the dispute and that date was 24-3-75, i.e. only 3 days thereafter. Admittedly no information was given by the Labour Court to the employer of the date of hearing in spite of the fact that the employers' counsel was not present on 21-3-75, his presence being not necessary that day, the case being fixed on 24-3-75 only for filing of the employees rejoinder. Thus, the Labour Court could not proceed with the hearing of the case on 24-3-75 unless the employer was willing to participate in the same without any objection. In fact appearance on behalf of the employer was not necessary on 24-3-75, of which date no information had been given to him by the Labour Court. The position of the employer could not become worse merely because a junior counsel appeared on his behalf on getting information of the date from some other source, to seek adjournment. The non compliance of the provision already indicated renders the proceedings of the Labour Court on 24-3-75 and thereafter to be invalid. For this reason alone, this petition must succeed.”

3. A perusal of the said order shows that the appropriate Government made a reference on 25th February, 1974 to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court issued a notice to the employer to file its statement of claim. The Labour Court required the employee to file his rejoinder but the employee did not file the rejoinder. On 21st March, 1975, which was the date fixed for employees’ rejoinder, the employer’s counsel was not present and the case was fixed for recording of evidence of both parties on 24th March, 1975. No notice was given to the employer of the said date, which was said to be the first date of hearing, therefore, the Court held that the proceeding initiated against the employer was not legally sustainable.

4. In terms of Sub-section (c) of Section (10)(1) of the Act, if an appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is appre