The main legal point established in the judgment is the liberal construction of the term 'sufficient cause' in the context of delay condonation.

D.K. Paliwal, J.

The appellant Special Police Establishment, Indore had filed an application for confiscation of the property acquired by the respondents, which were prima facie found to be disproportionate to known sources of income of the respondents. Crime No. 80/2011 under section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been registered against the respondents. An application for confiscation of the properties has been submitted, which has been dismissed vide order dated 18-12-2014. The order was communicated on 18-12-2014. The certified copy was obtained on 20-12-2014. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor gave his opinion on 31-12-2014 to the SPE, Indore. It is submitted that thereafter entire copies of the case were collected and the case was sent to the Head Office of Special Police Establishment (Lokayukt), Bhopal. The Lokayukt Organization on 8-1-2015 has been forwarded the same to the General Administration Department from where the proposal was sent to the Law Department on 13-2-2015 and on 13-2-2015 the Law Department decided to prefer an appeal. Thereafter, this appeal was filed. It is submitted that during the aforesaid process delay of 44 days has occurred. The said delay is not intentional and is bona fide, hence prayed for condonation of delay in filing this appeal.

2. The prayer is opposed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitting the Special Courts Act, 2011 provides the limitation for every stage of the case and is a special law, therefore, the provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act are not applicable to the appeal filed under section 17 of the Special Courts Act. It is further submitted that the reasons stated by the applicant are hot sufficient or proper to condone the delay.

3. We have heard submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. The appellant/State has preferred an appeal against the order, whereby the learned trial Court has dismissed the application for confiscation of the property vide order dated 18-12-2014. Aggrieved person can prefer an appeal under section 17(1) of M.P. Vishesh Nyayalaya Adhiniyam, 2011 within thirty days from the order has been passed.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that there is a provision for appeal against the judgment and sentence passed by the Special Court under section 9 of the M.P. Special Courts Act. The appeal can be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of judgment. However, the proviso has been added to sub-section (3) of section 9 that High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded in writing that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal within the period. It is submitted that such proviso does not find place under section 17 of the Special Courts Act. Had the Legislature intended to condone the delay, there was no reason not to add a proviso in section 17 of the Special Courts Act like the proviso added in section 9 of the M.P. Special Courts Act.

5. However, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that in view of the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, this Court can condone the delay.

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides as under:-

"29 Savings.- (1) Nothing.......(9 of 1872).

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."

6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Manguram v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1976 SC 105, has observed as under :-

"There is an important d