MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT (GWALIOR BENCH)
J.P. Bajpai, J
SHARAD KASHINATH PANDIT AND ANOTHER – Appellant
Versus
SOBHARAM (DEAD BY L.R'S) AND OTHERS – Respondent
Second Appeal No. 298 of 1968
Decided on : 27-08-1979
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956 - SECTION 14 - PROPERTY OF A FEMALE HINDU TO BE HER ABSOLUTE PROPERTY - SUB-SECTION (1) AND (2) - INTERPRETATION - PRE-EXISTING RIGHT - ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY - RESTRICTED ESTATE - FULL OWNERSHIP.
Fact of the Case:
A Hindu female, Mst. Janki Bai, acquired a property at a partition effected by an award, which was later made a rule of the Court. The terms of the award prescribed only a life interest in the property. The question arose whether she became the full owner of the property by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which came into force after the partition.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that Mst. Janki Bai became the full owner of the property by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The court held that sub-section (2) of section 14, which provides an exception to the general rule of sub-section (1), does not apply to cases where the property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition, even if the terms of the partition prescribe only a life interest. The court held that sub-section (2) applies only to cases where the property is acquired by a Hindu female for the first time by way of grant under a gift, will or any other such instrument, award or decree conferring a limited estate without any pre-existing right.
Issues: Whether Mst. Janki Bai became the full owner of the property by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which provides an exception to the general rule of sub-section (1), does not apply to cases where the property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition, even if the terms of the partition prescribe only a life interest. The court held that sub-section (2) applies only to cases where the property is acquired by a Hindu female for the first time by way of grant under a gift, will or any other such instrument, award or decree conferring a limited estate without any pre-existing right.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and held that Mst. Janki Bai became the full owner of the property by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
J.P. Bajpai, J.—Sometimes, use of inapt language due to unhappy draftsmanship creates a situation which gives rise to endless confusion amongst the litigants and occasion for conflict in the opinion of the Courts. The same is the situation in respect of the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as reproduced below:
14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolue property--
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation.-- In this sub-section, "property" includes both moveable and immoveable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance, or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance, arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner what soever, and also any such property held by her as STRIDHANA immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.
What is further painful to note is that despite there being serious judicial conflict in construing the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 14 of the Act, no care was taken to make a suitable amendment for providing clarity, certainty and simplicity to the law in question and to put an end to fruitless litigation arising out of the conflict in judicial opinions. The legal position, however, now stands settled by the recent decision of the Supreme Court.
2. From the perusal of the aforesaid section, it is apparent that sub-section (1) intends to enlarge the limited estate of a Hindu female in respect of the property possessed by her whether acquired before or after the coming into force of the Act. Sub-section (2), however, has been added in the nature of a proviso for making exceptions to the scope of sub-section (1) in respect of certain properties acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument, decree or award conferring a restricted estate. By taking advantage of the language of sub-section (2) which appears to be wide enough and if literally construed to include all acquisitions of property by a Hindu female under an instrument, decree or award and if sub-section (2) is construed de hors the context and purpose of sub-section (1), it can be said that it may cover all such acquisitions whether at a partition or in lieu of maintenance if they have been recognised, incorporated in an instrument, decree or an award. In view of this, effort has been made to contend that even if a Hindu female had acquired some property at a partition effected by a deed, decree or award and the terms of the same prescribe only a life interest in the property, she would not become the full owner by virtue of sub-section (1) because such a case was fully covered by the language of sub-section (2). However such a contention cannot be accepted. The reason being that if the same was accepted, it would virtually emasculate sub-section (1) because according to the aforesaid construction, a large number of cases, though governed by sub-section (1) could be excluded from the operation of the said sub-section merely for the reason that the partition at which the Hindu female got some property in limited interest happened to be effected by executing a deed or was under a decree or award. The well-settled legal position prevailing today is that sub-section (2) has to be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large scope for operation to sub-section (1) as possible and if sub-section (2) is so construed, it would natu
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