The main legal point established in the judgment is that the disclosure of the source of obtaining a document and the name of the person who got the photocopy of the document prepared is not a mandatory requirement under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

JUDGMENT :

Sanjay Dwivedi, J.

1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally.

2. By the instant petition, the petitioners are assailing the order dated 22.07.2017 (Annexure-P/13) whereby their application filed under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1872'), has been rejected by the Court below mainly on two counts, firstly; that in their application, they have not disclosed the source of obtaining the document which is sought to be examined as a secondary evidence, and secondly; relying upon a judgment reported in AIR 2007 MP 157 (Haji Mohd. Islam & Another Vs. Asgar Ali & Another), it is held that name of the person who got the photocopy of said document done, has not been disclosed in the application.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that so far as the first ground is concerned, that is contrary to the record as the petitioners in paragraph-4 of the application have mentioned the source of obtaining the document, but the Court has ignored that fact and gave perverse finding and so far as the second ground is concerned, he submits that the provisions of Section 65 of the Act, 1872, do not provide any such requirement as has been observed by the Court and therefore, such observation is contrary to the provisions and rejection of the application on that count is also not sustainable.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that in the application itself, it is disclosed by the petitioners that on earlier occasion, they have filed an application of same nature, but that has been rejected by the Court, as is mentioned in paragraphs-4 and 5 of the application, therefore, rejection of the application filed by the petitioners/defendants, is proper. He further submits that the High Court while exercising the power provided under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot reappreciate the facts but can interfere in the order only in a circumstance when the Court below exceeds its jurisdiction. He submits that in view of the order passed by the Court below, it is apparent that the Court has not exceeded its jurisdiction, therefore, this petition is without any substance and deserves to be dismissed.

5. I have heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties.

6. In invocation of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have filed this petition calling in question the penetrability of the order dated 22.07.2017 (Annexure-P/13) passed by the Civil Judge Class-II, Satna, in Civil Suit No. 23130100959/2012, rejecting the petitioners' application preferred under Section 65 of the Act, 1872.

7. The facts of the case in nutshell are, that the plaintiffs/respondents have filed a suit for permanent injunction in respect of Shop Nos. 5 and 6 situated in Kirti Bazar, Semariya Chowk, Satna. The claim of the plaintiffs was based upon the fact that Shop Nos. 5 and 6 were allotted to them in auction and separate agreements were executed with them. The plaintiffs further submitted that Shop Nos. 7 and 8 adjoining to Shop Nos. 5 and 6 belong to he defendants and they are trying to get the suit shops forcibly.

The defendants No. 1 and 2 (petitioners herein) filed their separate written statement stating that Shop Nos. 7 and 8 are adjoining to the Shop Nos. 5 and 6 and Shop Nos. 7 and 8 were allotted by the Municipal Corporation, Satna, in favour of Shri Ramavtar Choudhary and Shri Radheshyam Sharraf, respectively. Ramavtar Choudhary and Radheshyam Sharraf are the elder brother and brother-in-law of plaintiff No. 1 (respondent No. 1 herein), respectively. Shop Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 are adjoining to each other and have been converted into one shop, in which, office of 'Santoshi Pipe Factory' was opened and suffering loss in the business, the said factory was closed. The defendants further submitted that the Memorandum of Understanding (for brevity 'MoU') dated 28.04.1995 was