The main legal point established in the judgment is the mandatory requirement for the plaintiff to prove their readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract for specific performance.

JUDGMENT : – This First Appeal under section 96 of Civil Procedure Code has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 26-3-2002 passed by 8th Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 61-A/1995 by which a decree of specific performance of contract has been passed in favour of the respondents.

2. In view of the controversy involved in the present case, it is not necessary to consider the facts of the case in detail. Suffice it to say that the respondents had filed a suit for specific performance of contract pleading inter alia that the defendant/appellant had executed an agreement to sell in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs in respect of a house for a consideration amount of Rs. 2,25,000/-. At the time of agreement, an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was given by way of advance and it was decided that the sale deed would be executed after the payment of the remaining amount. The respondents/plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of contract, but the appellant/defendant has failed to do so and, accordingly, the suit was filed.

3. From the proceedings of the trial Court, it appears that on 19-9-1996, the following order was passed : –

4. Thereafter, on 11-2-1997, 11-4-1997, 21-4-1997, 5-7-1997, 13-11-1997 and 16-10-1998 following orders were passed :

5. From the plain reading of the above mentioned order sheets, it is clear that the defendant/appellant had admitted that an agreement to sell was executed and the defendant/appellant is ready to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs had also agreed that they are ready and willing to execute the sale deed after making payment of the consideration amount. It is clear from the order sheet dated 19-9-1996 no dispute was raised by the appellant/defendant with regard to the averment that an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid at the time of agreement to sell. Thus it is clear that on 19-9-1996 the defendant/appellant had admitted the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents and similarly the plaintiffs/respondents had also agreed to perform their part of contract but later on it appears that the plaintiffs/respondents failed to perform their part of contract and the sale deed could not be executed and ultimately by order dated 16-10-1998, the trial Court proceeded further with the suit and issues were framed. Although in view of the statement made by the parties on 19-9-1996, the trial Court could have directed the parties to file an application for drawing a compromise decree but it appears that the trial Court in its wisdom had decided not to pass a compromise decree and granted at least two years time to the plaintiffs/respondents to perform their part of contract, however, the plaintiffs could not perform their part of contract. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that in view of the admission made by the defendant/appellant on 19-9-1996 it is held that an agreement to sell was executed by the defendant/appellant in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs. It was agreed by the appellant/defendant to sell the house for a consideration amount of Rs. 2,25,000/- and an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was given by the respondents/ plaintiffs by way of advance money. However, it is also clear that in spite of grant of opportunity of two years, the plaintiffs/respondents also could not perform their part of contract and failed to deposit the remaining agreed amount and thus the sale deed could not be executed. Under these circumstances, not only the execution of agreement to sell has been admitted by the defendant/appellant but at the same time, the plaintiffs had also failed to get the sale deed executed which is indicative of the fact that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of contract.

6. The Supreme Court in the case of Jawahar Lal Wadhwa and anr. vs. Haripada Chakroberty, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 76 has held as under : –

“4. …........The decision, however, nowhere lays down that whe