The main legal point established in the judgment is that when a special Act itself provides for a limitation period and an extended period of limitation, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked.

ORDER : – This petition has been filed by the petitioner-Yug Dharma Public School under Article 226 read with 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 28-7-2022, passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT), Jabalpur wherein, the petitioner’s appeal filed under Rule 7 of the Employees’ Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 has been rejected solely on the ground of its limitation as according to Rule 7, the limitation of 60 days is provided which can be extended to further 60 days’ period, whereas, the appeal has been preferred after a period of 15 days of the extended period of limitation.

2. Shri Manoj Manav, counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act cannot be construed strictly as has been held by the Calcutta High Court in its decision rendered in the case of C D Steel Pvt. Ltd. and others vs. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, reported as 2022 SCC Online Cal 1665. (Relevant paras are 19, 20 and 21), and also in the case of Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and another vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority, reported as (2020) 17 SCC 692 (Relevant paras are 6, 20, 28 and 29).

3. The petition has been opposed by the respondent/Employees’ Provident Fund Organization and a reply has also been filed.

4. Shri Pankaj Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that no illegality has been committed by the Appellate Authority in rejecting the petitioner’s appeal on the ground of delay only. It is submitted that under the proviso of Rule 7 of the Rules, if the appeal is not filed within the original period of limitation of 60 days, the delay cannot be condoned beyond the extended period of 60 further days.

5. In support of his contention, Shri Jain has relied upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of as also a Constitutional Bench Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo India Private Limited and another, reported as (2009) 5 SCC 791 (Relevant paras are 16, 18 and 32).

6. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. So far as the Rule 7 of the Rules of 1997 is concerned, the same reads as under : –

“7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal. – (1) Every appeal filed with the Registrar shall be accompanied by a fee of Rupees five hundred to be remitted in the form of Crossed Demand Draft on a nationalized bank in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at the main branch of that Bank at the station where the seat of the said Tribunal situate. (2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days. Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75% of the amount due from him as determined under section 7-A. Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under section 7-O.” (emphasis supplied)

8. A perusal of the aforesaid Rule clearly reveals that the limitation to file an appeal is 60 days which can be extended for a further period of 60 days subject to sufficient cause being shown.

9. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no specific exclusion of Limitation Act, 1963 in the aforesaid provision and thus, the extended period of 60 days can still be extended to condone the delay and th