The court cannot extend the statutory time limit for filing appeals under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and the principles of natural justice were not violated as the petitioner had ample opportunity to present their case.

ORDER :

Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.

1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing of an order dated 25.07.2023 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Hyderabad in an Appeal filed by the petitioner from an order dated 12.09.2014 passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Hyderabad, under section 7A of The Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, 'the 1952 Act'). The petitioner filed an application under Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 along with the Appeal for condoning the delay of 200 days in filing the Appeal.

2. The facts relevant to the present adjudication are as follows:

The petitioner, as the employer under the provisions of the 1952 Act received a notice dated 16.07.2010 for production of documents. Thereafter passed an order on 12.09.2014 under Section 7A of the Act i.e. for determination of amounts due from the petitioner as the employer. The petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court i.e. W.P. No. 10834 of 2015 challenging the order passed by the respondent-authorities. The said writ petition was disposed of on 16.04.2015 giving liberty to the petitioner to avail of the remedy of Appeal provided under the Act. The petitioner thereafter filed the Appeal on 01.03.2016 before the appellate authority with a prayer for condonation of delay. The Appellate Tribunal considered the matter and passed the impugned order on 25.07.2023.

3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the first impugned order dated 12.09.2014 passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner was in violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was not given an opportunity to place his case. Counsel submits that the petitioner is now ready to furnish all relevant documents to the respondent-authorities and participate in the proceedings.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent authorities relies on Rule 7 of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 to place the period of limitation for filing of an Appeal before the Tribunal/Appellate authority.

5. Upon hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties, it is clear that the writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 25.07.2023 passed by the Presiding Officer/Appellate authority under Section 7-I of the 1952 Act which provides for Appeals to Tribunal. Although the second limb of the prayer is concerned with the first order passed dated 12.09.2014 passed by the Provident Fund authorities, it is clear that the petitioner cannot re-agitate the order dated 12.09.2014 in view of the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench in the earlier writ petition against the same order. The Co-ordinate Bench by its order dated 16.04.2015 disposed of the writ petition giving liberty to the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy provided under the Act. The petitioner availed of this alternative remedy and approached the Tribunal. Therefore, the stage of assailing the first order dated 12.09.2014 is over and the petitioner cannot re-agitate the same any more.

6. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal/Appellate authority on 25.07.2023 is a reasoned order. The Appellate authority dismissed the Appeal on the ground that the Appeal was statutorily barred under Section 7-I of the Act and Rule 7(2) of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 1997.

The relevant part of Rule 7(2) of the 1997 Rules is set out below:

7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal.-

(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.

Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days.

Provided further that no appeal b