The main legal point established is that the pendency of a representation before the concerned authority can exclude the time for filing an appeal, and the provisions of the Limitation act, 1963, can be invoked to determine the timeliness of the appeal.

JUDGMENT

Suvra Ghosh, J. - The order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata in appeal No. EPF-19 of 2019 passed on 20th September, 2019 dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioners against an order under section 14B and 7Q of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions act, 1952 passed on 7th May, 2018 is under challenge in the writ petition.

2. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that proceeding under section 14B of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions act, 1952 was initiated against the petitioner company by the first respondent for alleged delayed payment of provident fund contribution for the period 1st april, 1996 to 31st December, 2013. The authorised representative of the petitioner company participated in the proceedings and submitted before the authority that though the company's business closed down in 2008, the company somehow managed to deposit the contribution for the entire period in question as demanded by the provident fund authority and is not a defaulter. The company also prayed for waiver of damages under section 14B of the act of 1952 as claimed by the provident fund authority. The proceeding was disposed of by an order dated 7th May, 2018 determining damages payable by the petitioner company under section 14B of the act to the tune of Rs. 12,02,967/- and penalty payable under section 7Q of the act to the tune of Rs. 18,11,898/-. The petitioner company preferred an appeal against the said order before the Employees' Provident Fund Organisation, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India which is pending. Despite pendency of the appeal, the provident fund authorities took steps for recovery of the amount from the petitioner by issuing notice upon the latter. The petitioners filed an application under article 226 of the Constitution before this Court, being W.P. No. 9729(W) of 2019 challenging the order dated 7th May, 2018 passed by the assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Regional Office, Howrah and by an order dated 8th July, 2019, this Court directed the petitioners to file an appeal before the Tribunal within 14 days from the date of order and also directed the Tribunal to consider the application for condonation of delay in a liberal manner keeping in mind the principles of Rule 21 of the Employees' Provident Fund appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997.

3. It is further contended that in compliance with the said order the petitioners filed an appeal before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Kolkata being appeal No. EPF-19 of 2019 under section 7-I of the act of 1952 and the Learned Tribunal, by an order dated 20th September, 2019 dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon authorities in Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper & another v/s. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/assessing authority in Civil appeal No. 8278 of 2019, Mukri Gopalan v/s. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil aboobacker reported in (1995) 5 Supreme Court Cases 5 and P. Sarathy v/s. State Bank of India reported in (2000) 5 Supreme Court Cases 355 and has submitted that the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Limitation act, 1963 is applicable in this case as the petitioners initially preferred the appeal before a wrong forum and as such, the period of time from the date of institution of the appeal which is still pending should be excluded for computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal before the Central Government administrative Tribunal. according to the learned counsel, the Tribunal has ample jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal by invoking the provisions under section 5 and section 29(2) of the Limitation act, moreso, as the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation act has not been expressly excluded from the provisions of Rule 7(2) of the Rules of 1997.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for