The legal point established is that the scope and effect of injunction orders must be interpreted strictly, and the party complaining of disobedience must establish that the order is unambiguous and the alleged disobedience was not bona fide.

JUDGMENT

DWARKA DHISH BANSAL, J. - This MCC/petition under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC has been filed by applicant//plaintiff/appellant -Vikram Shrivastava alleging disobedience of the temporary injunction order dtd. 13/12/2016 passed in FA No.174/2013 with the contentions that the applicant has come to know from the reliable sources that the respondent 1/RFC through Shri Kunal Shrivastava and Shri Yatin Shrivastava, has/have alienated the property in question to one 'Janta Tent and Events' through its proprietor Narendra Singh Jaggi and breached the order passed by this Court. It is also contended in the application that certain persons are carrying out the demolition and construction activities on the disputed property, which is still undivided Joint Hindu Family property. Supporting the said contentions, learned senior counsel prayed for punishing the respondents. In support of his submissions he also placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shaha Ratansi Khimji and Sons vs. Kumbhar Sons Hotel Private Limited and Ors. (2014) 14 SCC 1, which is in relation of lease, whereas in the present case, license agreement has been executed.

2. By filing reply to the application respondent 1(a)&(b)-RFC have denied from any breach of order of temporary injunction and prayed for dismissal of the application with the further submissions that the respondents have not alienated the suit property and the order of injunction passed by this Court is only in relation to the alienation/creation of third party right, therefore, there is no question of any breach of order of injunction.

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

4. Perusal of IA No.16313/2016 and 16316/2016 filed in FA No.174/2013 shows that the appellant/applicant has made prayer of temporary injunction only in respect of alienation of the suit property and has prayed injunction restraining the respondent from creating third party right.

5. Upon consideration of the aforesaid two IAs, this Court vide order dtd. 13/12/2016 had in presence of both the parties, ordered that "However, up to next date of hearing it is ordered that the respondent shall maintain status-quo in regard to 1/6th share of the suit property up to the extent of appellant."

6. With support of copy of agreement dtd. 16/1/2021, it has been stated in paragraph 22 of the application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC that the respondents have alienated the property in question but apparently the agreement dtd. 16/1/2021 is nothing but only an agreement of license for five years w.e.f. 20/1/2021, therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents have alienated the suit property. However, except this agreement (Annexure P/9), no document has been placed on record to show that the property has been alienated by the respondent(s).

7. So far as the argument of learned senior counsel, to the effect that in the light of order of status-quo the respondents were bound not to raise any construction and even to execute the agreement of licence, is concerned, this Court is of the considered opinion that when the order of status-quo is not specific, then it should be read and construed only in relation to the prayer made by way of application(s) for temporary injunction and the scope of order of status-quo cannot be expanded to the other things beyond the prayer made in the aforesaid two applications under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC.

8. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Limited vs. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 127 has held as under :-

'5. The expression 'status quo' is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty. According to the ordinary legal connotation, the term 'status quo' implies the existing state of things at any given point of time. The qualifying words 'as in the High Court' clearly limit the scope and effect of the status quo order. In the present case, the High Court determined only one question, namely, that slurry was not c