The main legal point established in the judgment is that a plaintiff is required to pay ad voleram court fee under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fee Act, 1878 for the relief claimed in the suit, based on the settled legal principles regarding the presumption of validity of registered documents and the determination of court fees.

S.A. Dharmadhikari, J.

This revision under Section 115 CPC arises out of order dated 15/03/2010 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Gwalior, whereby the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC has been rejected.

2. Facts necessary for disposal of this revision are that the plaintiff/respondent has filed a suit for declaration of the Partition Deed as null and void and for permanent injunction. Accordingly, to the petitioner/defendant suit was arbitrarily valued by the plaintiff for Rs.4,00,000/- as mentioned in the partition deed and had affixed Rs.2000/- fixed Court fee for declaration and Rs.100/- Court fee for permanent injunction. As such, ad veloram Court fee under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fee Act, 1878 (herein after referred to as "Act") was required to be paid in view of the fact that the partition deed dated 30/11/2000 has been registered with the Sub-Registrar office and the same is an admitted position.

3. In response to the aforesaid objection, the respondent/plaintiff submitted that the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC lacks bona fides and has been belatedly filed. He has properly valued the suit and has affixed appropriate Court fee and the Court has not directed regarding payment of Court fees and as such application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC is not maintainable. The suit has been properly valued and the Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

4. The Trial Court has rejected the objection and held that the plaintiff had not sought any declaration on partition of the property but has sought declaration of the partition deed to be null & void, therefore, the plaintiff is not required to pay ad veloram Court fee.

5. Being aggrieved, the petitioner/defendant has assailed the order dated 15/03/2010 questioning the legality, validity and propriety of the impugned order. It is inter alia contended that admittedly the partition deed dated 30/11/2000 is a registered document. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is a presumption that registered document was validly executed, unless such presumption is displaced by leading evidence to the contrary. Onus is upon the person alleging or disputing the factum of execution of the registered partition deed.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court (2006) 5 SCC 353, Prem Singh & Other v. Birbal & Others in which in paragraph 27 it has been held that :-

"There is presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, respondent has not been able to rebut the said presumption."

The petitioner has also relied on judgment of Apex Court reported in AIR 1968 SC 956, Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hirekurabar in support of this contention.

7. The contention of the petitioner appears to have force and the plaintiff being party to the partition deed, he is liable to pay ad-voleram Court fee under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fee Act.

8. With regard to determination or computation of Court fees the Apex Court has held that the question of Court fees must be decided having regard to the averments made in the plaint itself and the decision on merits can not affect the same ; AIR 1958 SC 245 Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar. Further, the Apex Court in Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prasad & Others AIR 1973 (2) 2384 has laid down the principle that (i) whether the plaintiff's suit will have to fail for failure to ask for consequential relief is of no concern to the Court at that stage and (ii) the Court should look into the allegations in the plaint to see, what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of court looking at the substance of the relief asked for.

9. Looking to the aforesaid settled principle of law, it can be concluded