2015 Supreme(Megh) 79
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
UMA NATH SINGH and T NANDAKUMAR SINGH, JJ.
Wonder M.Sangma – Petitioner
Versus
State of Meghalaya and Ors. – Respondents
WP(Crl) No. 16 of 2014
Decided On : 11-06-2015
Advocate Appeared:
For the petitioner: Mr. S.Dey, Adv., Ms. Q.B.Lamare, Adv.
For the respondents: Mr. K.S.Kynjing, AG., Mr. N.D.Chullai, Sr. GA., Mr. S.Sen Gupta, GA., Mr. R.Gurung, GA.
The judgment establishes the importance of strict adherence to constitutional safeguards in preventive detention, emphasizing the non-punitive nature of such detention and the requirement for the detaining authority to have subjective satisfaction based on reliable materials before passing a detention order.
Headnote:
Preventive Detention - Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 - Section 3(1), 3(3) - The judgment discusses the impugned detention order dated 15-01-2014 issued under Section 3(1) of the MPDA, 1995, and the subsequent approval and confirmation orders. The court emphasizes the non-punitive nature of preventive detention and the need for strict adherence to constitutional safeguards. Key legal provisions discussed include Article 22 of the Constitution, which provides minimum safeguards for preventive detention, and the requirement for the detaining authority to have subjective satisfaction based on reliable materials before passing a detention order.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner challenges the impugned detention order issued under the MPDA, 1995, for detaining his brother, who was already in judicial custody. The petitioner contends non-application of mind by the detaining authority and questions the subjective satisfaction of the authority regarding the possibility of the detenu obtaining bail and acting prejudicially.
Finding of the Court:
The court finds non-application of mind by the detaining authority in passing the impugned detention order and deems the satisfaction regarding the detenu obtaining bail as mere ipse dixit. Consequently, the impugned detention, approval, and confirmation orders are quashed and set aside, and the detenu is ordered to be set at liberty.
Issues: The issues revolve around the validity of the impugned detention order, including non-application of mind by the detaining authority and the subjective satisfaction regarding the detenu obtaining bail.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasizes the non-punitive nature of preventive detention and the need for strict adherence to constitutional safeguards, particularly the requirement for the detaining authority to have subjective satisfaction based on reliable materials before passing a detention order.
Final Decision: The impugned detention order, approval order, and confirmation order are quashed and set aside, and the detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case(s).
T. Nandakumar Singh, J.
Heard Mr. S.Dey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also Mr. K.S.Kynjing, learned AG, appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 2. None appears for the respondent No.3.
2. The petitioner is the brother of the detenu (Shri. Soul M.Sangma). By this writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the impugned detention order dated 15-01-2014 issued by the detaining authority i.e. the District Magistrate, South Garo Hills, Baghmara in exercise of his powers conferred upon him under Section 3 (1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, (for short MPDA), 1995, for detaining the detenu i.e. the petitioner’s brother (ii) the impugned order of the Government of Meghalaya dated 24-01-2014 under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the MPDA, 1995, for approving the impugned detention order dated 15-01-2014 and (iii) the impugned order of the State Government dated 13-03-2014 for confirming the impugned detention order dated 15-01-2014 and continuing the detention of the detenu for a period of 3(three) years w.e.f. 15-01-2014 to 14-01-2017.
3. The object of law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence. It is resorted when the Executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the persons detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The framers of the Constitution, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safeguards are required to be “zealously watched and enforced by the Court”. The Apex Court in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab: (1981) 4 SCC 481 observed that:
“….. May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralyzed the Indian economy. But the loss of preventive detention affords only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus…….” (Ref:- Para 4 of the SCC in Rattan Singh’s case (Supra).”
4. In Vijay Narayan Singh v. Bihar : (1984) 3 SCC 14, Chinnapa Redy, J observed “our Constitution does not give a carte blanche to any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter …. Preventive detention is considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilized thought and democratic polity that safeguards against undue exercise of the power to detain without trial have been built into the Constitution itself and incorporated as Fundamental Right ….. when demanded, where there has been any excessive detention, that is, whether the limits set by the Constitution and the Legislature have been transgressed. Preventive detention is not beyond judicial scrutiny.”
5. It is fairly settled that jurisdiction of preventive detention is “suspicious jurisdiction” based on suspicion and an action is taken with the view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the detention order. Interference by a court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharastra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande: (2008) 3 SCC 613 held that the Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that jurisdiction preventive detention is “suspicious jurisdiction” based on suspicion and an action is taken with the view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the detention order. Interference by a court of law at that stage, must be an exception rather than a rule because the exercise can be undertaken by a writ court with extreme care, caution and circumspe