IMPORTANT POINT
The duty of the Lower Appellate Court to consider all the issues and evidence before recording its findings, and the rejection of the mutation application by the Judge, District Council Court, in his earlier capacity as a Revenue Officer, was in limine without discussing the merits.

JUDGMENT

1. This Petition under Rule 6 of the Meghalaya High Court (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 2014 read with Article 227 has been filed against the order dated 25.09.2019, passed by the Judge District Council Court, Tura in T.S. Appeal No. 3 of 2014.

2. The brief facts are that the predecessor of the petitioner, namely one (L) Herison Ch. Momin, as plaintiff had instituted a suit being T.S. No. 4 of 2007, for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land situated at Chisrigre, P.O Garobadha, West Garo Hills, which stood in the name of the mother of the plaintiff (L) Roheni Ch. Momin which was covered by Periodic Patta No. 6, Dag No. 22. The claim of the plaintiff was that his parents having only two sons and no female issue, had adopted the grandmother of the respondent in the year 1950, who however, as per the pleadings, deserted the house of the plaintiff's parents. As such, after the death of the parents, the plaintiff had sought for mutation of the suit land before the Revenue Officer, GHADC, in his name, which however, was dismissed by order dated 28.06.2007. A Title Suit that is T.S. No. 4 of 2007, was then filed by the plaintiff (L) Herison Ch. Momin, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner, before the Subordinate District Council Court, Tura, which was decreed in his favour by judgment dated 25.02.2014, holding him to be the owner of the suit land. The defendant who is the predecessor in interest of the respondent herein, being aggrieved preferred an appeal before the Court of the Judge District Council Court, Tura, which was numbered as T.S. Appeal No. 3 of 2014. The learned Court of the Judge then by judgment dated 25.09.2019, which is impugned in the instant Revision Application, allowed the appeal, thereby sitting aside the order dated 25.02.2014 passed by the Trial Court.

3. Apart from other grounds that have been raised, with regard to the rights and claims of the petitioner over the suit land, and the contention that the Lower Appellate Court has not only misconstrued, but misinterpreted the practice prevailing amongst the Garos, as per customary law, the petitioner has raised a very pertinent ground with regard to the propriety of the Judge, District Council Court, Tura in taking up the appeal and passing the impugned order. This ground is based on the fact that the Judge, District Council Court, Tura who had decided the appeal, in his earlier capacity as the Revenue Officer of the Garo Autonomous District Council, had passed the order dated 28.06.2007, dismissing the application for mutation filed by (L) Herison Ch. Momin, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. This to the mind of the Court before embarking on the main issues is to be examined to determine as to whether the contention as raised by the petitioner has any substance.

4. In this context it has been submitted by Ms. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner that though the Judge, District Council Court, when passing the order dated 28.06.2007 in Case No. GDC/LR/56(M) of 2004 in his capacity as Revenue Officer of the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council, had recorded that the case was dismissed without going into the merits, the same is not borne out by the order itself. It is contended by the learned counsel that while dismissing the mutation application, the facts and circumstances surrounding the case were discussed by the Revenue Court and also the submissions of the objectors on the point of Garo customary law, as to inheritance were recorded. It is submitted that the Judge, District Council Court, therefore could not and should not have taken up the appeal to maintain judicial propriety, but instead, inspite of pointed objections being raised in the hearing of the appeal, disregarded the same by holding that the order dated 28.06.2007, did not discuss anything on merits, but had merely dismissed the case on default of the petitioner.

5. On the other grounds raised, the learned counsel