The declaration under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme serves as sufficient evidence of acquisition for Exotic animals, and subsequent legislation cannot revoke benefits conferred by the Scheme.

JUDGMENT :

Siddharth Mridul, CJ.

[1] The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been instituted by a practicing advocate of this Court, statedly in the public interest, and on the basis of articles in the public domain. The petitioner candidly admits that no representation has so far been addressed to the authorities in relation to the omnibus reliefs prayed for in the instant petition.

[2] The petitioner seeks directions for the enforcement and implementation of the provisions in Chapter V-B of the amended Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 , (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which became effective on 1st April, 2023.

[3] It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Exotic animals were hitherto not covered by the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 , till the amendment to the said Act took effect as above stated on 1st April, 2023. The petitioner would urge that meanwhile, international transfer of Exotic animals was governed by the Treaty known as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITIES) of Wild Fauna and Flora, which has been ratified by India.

[4] The amendment to the said Act, it is asserted aims to implement the provisions of the convention and to regulate issues in relation to ownership, possession and domestic transfers of Exotic animals. It is urged that the animals covered by the amendment are listed in Schedule IV of the Act, as amended, and correspond to those enumerated in the Appendices of the Convention.

[5] Before the amendment of 1st April, 2023, a time–limited Voluntary Disclosure Scheme was introduced on 11th June, 2020, by the Union of India, respondent No. 1 herein, inviting the public to declare their personal inventory of Exotic animals. This Scheme, it is asserted, was the subject matter of various petitions, including one before the Supreme Court, which has consistently held that the Scheme constitutes an amnesty providing immunity from coercive action for applicants who declare their inventory thereunder.

[6] Subsequently, the aforementioned amendment to the Act introduced Section 49-M, which stipulates that all owners of animals listed in the new Schedule IV must register them in accordance with the prescribed Rules. The Living Animals Species (Reporting and Registration) Rules, 2024, came into force in February, 2024, and Rule 3(3); which is central to the petitioner’s argument; requires that applicants for the registration of animals acquired prior to the amendment must submit ‘proof of acquisition’ of the animals.

[7] The petitioner would urge that the requisite proof must consist of a legitimate, verifiable document evidencing the lawful acquisition of the animal; in the absence of which, the animal is subject to seizure and repatriation to its country of origin or placement in state run rescue facilities.

[8] The petitioner has invited our attention to a judgment dated 11.09.2024 rendered by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the matter of Bhupesh Charan Vs. Union of India and another ( D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14968 of 2024 ). Additionally, the petitioner has referenced an interim order dated 29.08.2024 passed by the Kerala High Court in Aviculture Association Bhaskaram and others Vs. Union of India and others ( W.P. (C) No. 30031 of 2024 )

[9] Nevertheless, the petitioner would urge that the ruling of Rajasthan High Court in Bhupesh Charan (supra) and the interim order passed by the Kerala High Court in Aviculture Association Bhaskaram (supra) should not impede our independent interpretation of Rule 3(3). The petitioner has vigorously asserted that the Rajasthan High Court’s decision in Bhupesh Charan (supra) is flawed, inasmuch as, it fails to consider the Rules in their appropriate context and neglects the fundamental principles of interpretation. In other words, it is argued that the above judgment is not a binding authority on this Court.

[10] In our opinion, the central issue for deliberation is whether registration