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MADRAS HIGH COURT
K. Ravichandra Baabu, J.
Kottar Chettu Nainar Desika Vinayagar Devaswom Trust & Ors. —Petitioners
versus
Assistant Commissioner, HR & CE Department & Ors. —Respondents
C.R.P. (MD) Nos.525 and 526 of 2007 and M.P. (MD) Nos.1 & 1 of 2007
Decided on 25.1.2016
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner in C.R.P. (MD) Nos.525 and 526 of 2007:J. Anandavalli, Advocate
For the Respondent Nos.1 and 4 in C.R.P. (MD) No.525 of 2007:Mr. K. Chellapandian Additional Advocate General and Mr. V.R. Shanmuganathan, Special Government Pleader for Respondent Nos.1 & 5 in 526 of 2007
IMPORTANT POINT
State or a Public body or an Entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude in matter of limitation.
Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Limitation—Condonation of delay in filing appeal— Delay cannot be condoned mechanically, merely because the Government is seeking to condone such delay—However, liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice—in order to render substantial justice, technical consideration should not be given undue importance—Adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief resulting in failure of justice—There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay—Courts are not supposed to legalize injustice but are obliged to remove injustice—State or a Public body or an Entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. (Paras 12 and 14)
(B) Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Limitation—Condonation of delay in filing appeal— Once Appellate Court accepts reasons stated as sufficient cause and condoned delay by exercising its discretion, High Court normally should not disturb such finding unless such exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or in an arbitrary or perverse manner—Role of revisional or appellate Court is very limited while considering such revision or appeal filed against order condoning delay, since lower judicial forum, based on facts and circumstances of case, has accepted reasons, exercised its discretionary power and condoned delay—Unless such order exhibits any perversity on face of it, interference against that order is not at all warranted. (Para 17)
Result:Civil Revision Petition dismissed.
K. Ravichandra Baabu, J.—C.R.P(MD)No.525 of 2007 is filed challenging the order made in I.A.No.142 of 2005 in A.S(SR)No.1398 of 2005 dated 29.01.2007 on the file of District Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, wherein and whereby, the delay of 539 days in filing the appeal was condoned. The said appeal was filed with such delay against the Judgement and Decree passed in O.S.No.1208 of 1993 dated 15.12.2003 on the file of II Additional District Munsif Court, Nagercoil. The said suit was filed seeking for the relief of a declaration, declaring that the Kottar Chettu Samudayam Vagai Nainar Desika Vinayagar Temple and its properties in Vadiveeswaram Village, Agasteeswaram Taluk, a constituted religious denominational institution, is entitled to protection under Article 26 of the Constitution of India and that the H.R. & C.E., Department has no manner of right to interfere with the affairs of management and administration of the temple and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking any proceedings in pursuant to the notice dated 29.11.1993. The trial Court by its Judgment and Decree dated 15.02.2003 decreed the suit as prayed for. Therefore, the above appeal was preferred by the H.R. & C.E., department, however with the delay, which was condoned by the appellate Court as stated supra.
2. C.R.P(MD)No.526 of 2007 is filed against the order made in I.A.No.141 of 2005 in A.S(SR)No.1392 of 2005 dated 29.01.2007 on the file of District Court, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, in condoning delay of 403 days in filing an appeal against the Judgment and Decree made in O.S.No.139 of 1997 dated 15.12.2003 on the file of the II Additional District Munsif Court, Nagercoil. The said suit was filed seeking for a decree of declaration, declaring that the Madams described in the plaint schedule are charitable endowments and so they are outside the purview/provisions of the H.R. & C.E Act in the absence of any Notification issued under Section 3 of the said Act and for permanent injunction restraining the H.R & C.E., department from claiming account of the plaint madams or claiming any amounts regarding the same and interfering with the administration of the plaint madams by its trustees. The trial Court by its Judgment and Decree dated 15.02.2003 decreed the suit as prayed for. Challenging the said Judgement and Decree, the H.R. & C.E., department preferred the above appeal, however with the delay, which was condoned by the appellate Court as stated supra.
3. It is to be noted that the trial Court decreed both the suits by a common Judgment. Thus, the above two civil revision petitions are filed by the plaintiffs aggrieved against the order of the lower appellate Court in condoning the delay in filing the appeals.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both these civil revision petitions submitted that the H.R & C.E., department, which filed the appeals before the lower appellate Court, has not explained the delay properly and therefore, the appellate Court is not justified in condoning the delay. It is further argued that the administrative reasons in getting legal opinion, cannot be considered as a sufficient cause in condoning the delay. In support of such contention, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Apex Court reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 (Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.,).
5. Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 and 4 in C.R.P (MD)No.525 of 2007 and respondents 1 and 5 in C.R.P(MD)No.526 of 2007 representing the H.R. & C.E., department, submitted that the department has explained the delay and such explanation was accepted by the lower appellate Court and consequently, by exercising its discretionary power, the lower appellate Court condoned the delay. Therefore, it is argued by the learned Additional Advocate General that such an order passed by the lower appellate Court exercising its discretionary power, need not be interfered wit
