IMPORTANT POINT
Delay cannot be condoned on fanciful grounds.

Dr. A.K. Rath, J.—This appeal challenges the correctness of the order dated 26.3.1998 passed by the learned District Judge, Khurda, Bhubaneswar in Title Appeal No.84/33 of 1997/1995 refusing to condone the delay and thereby dismissing the appeal.

2. The appellant as plaintiff instituted Title Suit No.264 of 1998 for declaration of title in the court of the learned Additional Civil Judge (Jr.Division), Bhubaneswar impleading the respondents as defendants. The suit was dismissed. Assailing the judgment and decree dated 25.9.1993 and 9.10.1993 respectively passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Jr.Division), Bhubaneswar, he filed Title Appeal No.84/33 of 1997/1995 before the learned District Judge, Bhubaneswar. Since there was delay of 657 days, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed to condone the delay. By order dated 26.3.1998, the learned appellate court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and, consequently the appeal was dismissed.

3. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law :

“Whether the learned District Judge, Khurda, Bhubaneswar was justified in rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellant for condonation of delay?”

4. Mr.Panda, learned Advocate for the appellant, submitted that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in not filing the appeal in time. In the application for condonation of delay, the appellant had vividly described the cause of delay, but then the learned appellate court without considering the matter in its proper perspective, rejected the application for condonation of delay.

5. Per contra, Ms.Mishra, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the respondents, supported the order passed by the learned appellate court.

6. The apex Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 enunciated the principles to be taken into account while considering the application for codnonation of delay. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the report are quoted hereunder:-

“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are :

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental princip