IMPORTANT POINT
When the Supreme Court says the “recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2)” only means that the cross- examination has actually begun. If the complainant is yet to step in the box for the purpose of cross-examination by the accused then those cases according to me are covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court.

J.B. Pardiwala, J.—Since the centripodal issue raised in all the four captioned applications is the same those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.

2. By this writ application under Article-227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner complainant of a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act calls in question the legality and validity of the order dated 26/9/2014 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar in Criminal Case No.6871/2013 by which the learned Judge ordered return of the original complaint and the documents to the complainant for presenting the same before the Court having competent jurisdiction to try the offence within a period of 30 days from the date of return of the complaint. It appears that such order was passed by the learned Judge keeping in mind the mandate issued by the Supreme Court in one of its recent pronouncements in the case of Dashrath Rupsing Rathod Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2014(9) SCC 129: 2014 (3) Crimes 162 (SC): 2014 (5) Supreme 641: 2014(3) CCC 164

3. The brief facts giving rise to this application may be summed-up thus :

The petitioner herein is the original complainant. He filed five complaints against the respondent no.2 -original accused under Section138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonour of five cheques issued by the accused in favour of the complainant. All the five complaints were lodged in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar. It appears that so far as the Criminal Complaint No.6870/2013 is concerned, the same is at the stage of the cross-examination of the complainant. In other words the cross-examination is now on the verge of being completed. So far as the other four complaints are concerned, the complainant has adduced his evidence on affidavit but his cross-examination is yet to commence.

4. During the pendency of the above referred five complaints, the Supreme Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsing (supra.) held that the territorial jurisdiction for filing a complaint for dishonour of a cheque would be restricted to the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offence is committed, which is the location where the cheque is dishonoured i.e. returned unpaid by the Bank on which it is drawn. The Supreme Court held that the place of issuance or delivery of the statutory Notice or where the complainant chooses to present the cheque for encashment by his bank are not relevant for the purpose of determining the territorial jurisdiction for filing of the complaint for dishonor of the cheque.

5. The Supreme Court also issued directions in that regard and the most relevant direction is found in para-22 of the Report. In para-22 of the Judgment the Supreme Court has observed that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place. In all other cases, the complaint shall be returned to the complainant for filing in the proper Court in consonance with the exposition of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further clarified that if such complaints were filed/refiled within thirty days of their return they would be deemed to have been filed within the time prescribed by law, unless the initial or prior filing was itself time barred.

6. It appears that the accused herein placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court noted above, filed an application Exh.20 stating that since the cross-examination was yet to commence, the complaint should be ordered to be transferred to the Court of the competent jurisdiction as explained by the Supreme Court.

7. Such application was heard by the learned Magistrate and vide order dated 26th September,2014 allowed the same. The order below Exh.20 reads thus :

“Read the application. Heard the parties. Kept in view of Secti