IMPORTANT POINT
Being final court of fact, the first appellate court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with Trial court judgment and it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of Trial Court.

Dilip B. Bhosale, J.— This second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is directed against the concurrent judgments of the Courts below whereby a suit bearing OS No. 236 of 1994 filed by the respondents/plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiffs’), stands allowed. The suit was instituted for declaration that the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit properties and for injunction restraining the appellant/defendant (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendant’), from interfering with their possession over the suit property.

2. The facts that are relevant for deciding this appeal are as under:

The plaintiffs are husband and wife. The defendant claims that he had purchased the suit property, under registered sale deed dated 18-1-1993 and since then he is in possession thereof as owner.

It is the case of the plaintiffs that they were not in a position to look after and cultivate their agricultural land i.e., the suit property and hence they had requested the defendant to help them out for managing the same. After the defendant started looking after the suit property, he allegedly took the first plaintiff to the Tahsildar’s Office under the pretext that he needs to execute a power of attorney in his (defendant’s) favour and under that pretext obtained his (plaintiff 1’s) signatures on the sale deed dated 18.1.1993, and thereby practised fraud on him. The defendant on the basis of the sale deed, started claiming right in the suit property and obstructing the plaintiffs’ possession.

3. At the stage of admission of the appeal, the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration:

1. Whether Courts below are justified in not framing proper issues when the suit filed by the plaintiff for cancellation of sale deed dated 18.1.1993 executed by him on the ground that the same is obtained by playing fraud on him?

2. Whether appreciation of evidence by the Courts below is just and proper?

4. Sri Nagabhushana, learned Counsel for the appellant, at the outset, invited my attention to the judgment of the High Court of Bombay, in Smt. Anita M. Harretto v Abdul Wahid Sanaullah, AIR 1985 Bom. 98 to contend that mere statement as to “Whether the judgment of the Trial Court requires consideration?” as a point for determination by the appellate Court is inadequate. He further submitted, as a result of framing of such a point for determination, the Court of appeal misdirected itself and/or failed to consider the real points/issues involved the appeal for determination. In support of his contentions, he took me through the judgments of the Courts below, more particularly, the judgment of the Court of first appeal and submitted that the Appellate Court misdirected itself while deciding the first appeal, merely because no proper points for determination were framed.

5. In Smt. Anita’s case, the situation was somewhat similar. The Court of first appeal in that case had formulated the following point for consideration “whether the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is liable to be set aside?”

The learned Judge in that (Smt. Anita’s) case, after considering the provisions contained in Order 41, Rule 31 of CPC, held thus:

“17. The points which must arise for determination by a Court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. It is a matter of almost text book knowledge that the exact questions which arise in the appeal and require determination must be stated in the judgment. “It is not sufficient to state the point to be determined in appeal whether or not the decision is consistent with the merits of the case”. The point so stated is hardly a point for determination as contemplated in Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code. The learned Judges of the Courts of first appeal should not approach the appeals merely from the point of speedily disposing of the same. The appeals must be also intelligently dispo