ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
Zaheda Begum & Anr. —Appellants
versus
Lal Ahmed Khan & Ors. —Respondents
A.S. No. 22/2007
Decided on 13.8.2009
Held: Settlement in family is not confined to any particular category of people. The medium of settlement is chosen to resolve the disputes among the family members. It is resorted to, not only when the disputes as such exist, but also when there exist a possibility for them to surface. (Para 14)
A family settlement need not be confined to the one, among the legal heirs, or successors. If the aim is only to provide for arrangement in accordance to succession, the whole exercise would be redundant. The reason is that the Law of Succession would take its course. It is only when an arrangement, in slight or major deviation from natural succession, as a price for bringing about comity and harmony is chosen, that a settlement comes into existence. (Para 16)
Such is the importance, accorded, to the family settlements by the courts. Sub-section (24) of Section 2 of the Indian Stamps Act defines that term as under:
“Settlement” means any non-testamentary disposition, in writing, of movable and immovable property made-
a) in consideration of marriage,
(b) for the purpose of distributing property of the settler among his family or those for whom he desires to provide, or for the purpose of providing for some person dependent on him or
(c) for any religious or charitable purpose
From this provision it is clear that the settlement, particularly within a family need not be restricted to the members of the family upto a particular degree. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that a family settlement can be among not only heirs of a particular class, but also can take in its fold, persons outside the purview of succession. (Para 20)
(ii) Family Settlement—Suit for partition on basis of family settlement already arrived and recorded amongst parties—Objection raised by defendants respondent for the document was on ground of non-registration and non-payment of stamp duty—Deed did not provide for an rights in present—It provided for division of shares in scheduled property and divisions was to take place on future date—Document could not be held in admission ground that if was not registered.
Held: Though, the object underlying the settlement is to being about harmony among the parties to it, the legal implication arising out of settlement are not uniform. In some cases, the settlement may bring about transfer or conferment of rights instantly, upon the parties to it, vis a vis movable or immovable properties. If the settlement confers rights upon the individual, vis-a-vis on items of immovable property, which he is not otherwise entitled to under the relevant law of Succession, a transfer comes into existence and thereby the deed of settlement becomes liable to be registered.
It is no uncommon that settlements provide for arrangement, which would materialize at a future date. In such cases, the manner in which the rights are to be conferred on various parties is defined, and the actual transfer of rights would take place at a future date. The situation is comparable broadly, to the one under a preliminary decree. The rights of the parties vis a vis identified items of property are indicated and actual transfer is a take place at a later point of time i.e., as and. when a final decree is passed; to put it in strict legal r terms, no interest ‘in praesenti’ is created in favour of any party, under settlement of such category. (Paras 22 & 23)
From the principles laid in above precedents, it becomes clear that a settlement, which does not create any right ‘in presenti’ can not be treated as inadmissible, on the ground that it is not registered. (Para 27)
(iii) Indian Stamp Act—Section 36—Family Settlement deed—Objection to its admissibility on ground of non-payment of stamp duty—Any objection as to admission of document must be raised before the Court took same on record—Admissibility was a Question which must be decided before the Court admitted document in evidence—Deed was admitted in evidence without objection—Document was liable to be considered.
Held: This Court held that if no final determination as such has taken place in relation to the payment of stamp duty of a document, the bar under Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act does not operate. It was observed that mere identification of a document with marking does not amount to admission in evidence. There is no quarrel with that proposition. However, it must be recognized that any objection as to admission of the document must be raised before the Court takes the same on record. If an objection raised in this regard is negative, the aggrieved party has to pursue the remedy further. The aspect of proof and relevancy of a document can be considered at any stage of the trial. In fact, the finding as to proof can be recorded only after the evidence in relation thereto is complete. Admissibility, however is a question, which must be decided before the Court admits the document into evidence. Under no circumstances, that question can be relegated to a later stage. The reason is that if a document is held to be admissible in evidence, the party who intends to rely upon it, may choose to adduce some other evidence, or may approach a superior forum to establish its admissibility. If the trial takes place on the assumption that the document is admissible and if the finding is recorded at the end of the trial that the document is inadmissible, the whole trial receives a serious set back.
The record in the instant case does not disclose that any serious objection as to the admissibility of Ex.A.6 was either raised or sustained. Therefore, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the second respondent in this regard cannot be accepted. (Paras 28 & 29)
(iv) Family Settlement—Suit for partition on basis of deed of family settlement—Whether relied of partition could be claimed only on basis of pre-existing rights and was liable to be defeated deposit deed of settlement? No
In that case, the Supreme Court held that partition of the property can be only among the parties who have a pre-existing right to a property. In the instant case, the second appellant did not have any pre-existing right de horse Ex.A.6. She has specifically based her claim on that document. Ex.A.6 did not only have the effect of creating aright in the second appellant, but also of re-defining shares or entitlement of the first appellant and respondents 1 to 3 vis-a-vis the property left by Ghouse Khan. A specific issue was framed as to the truth and validity of the document. Even while denying the relief to the appellants, the trial Court held the document to be true and valid. Being a party to the document, the second respondent cannot extricate himself from the consequences that flow out of it. In the absence of Ex.A.6, there would not have been any occasion for the appellants to claim rights, as they did, in relation to the property. Ex.A.6 has created a legal right in the parties and in particular, the second appellant, arid she is certainly entitled to seek partition on the strength of it. Therefore, this question also is answered in favour of the appellants. Before parting with the case, this court places on record, its utmost satisfaction, with the assistance extended by the learned counsel for both the parties.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree in O.S.No.13 of 2000 is set aside; and a preliminary decree is passed in terms of Ex.A.6. (Paras 31 & 32)
Result: Appeal allowed.
L. Narsimha Reddi, J.—Plaintiffs in O.S. No. 13 of 2000 on the file of the VII Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Visakhapatnam, are the appellants. They filed the suit for partition against the respondents, in respect of the schedule property, which is a house at Visakhapatnam.
2. One Mr. Ghouse Khan had three brothers i.e. respondent Nos.1 to 3 and two sisters, the first appellant and late Malika Begum, the mother of the second appellant. Ghouse Khan did not marry and remained as a bachelor. He purchased the suit schedule property through a registered sale deed dated 29.07.1981. After the death of Ghouse Khan, the appellants and the respondents affected a family settlement, through document dated 07.02.1992. According to this, the second appellant was to be given western half of the suit schedule house and the first appellant and respondent Nos.1 to 3 were to be allotted 1/4th share each, in the rest of the property.
3. The appellants pleaded that in spite of repeated demands, the respondents did not agree for partition of the property in accordance with the settlement. Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 remained ex-parte in the trial court and the second respondent alone contested the suit. He pleaded that an open site was purchased by late Ghouse Khan in the year 1981 and thereafter a house was constructed. He is said to have assisted his brother in construction of the building. It was pleaded that the first respondent is settled at Chennai, the third respondent at Jamshedpur and the first appellant is settled with her family at Visakhapatnam, after retirement of her husband. It is stated that the mother of the second appellant died in the year 1964 and she was brought up by the first appellant. It was further pleaded that Ghouse Khan executed a will dated 25.02.1985 bequeathing the entire suit schedule property upon him and that ever since the death of Ghouse Khan, he is residing in the house, as owner. It was urged that he permitted the appellants to reside in a portion of the house, when they came to a Hospital at Vishakhapatnam, for treatment.
4. The trial Court decreed the suit partly, through its Judgment dated 28.12.2005. It was held that the document dated 07.02.1992, marked as Ex.A.6, cannot be acted upon since it is neither registered nor properly stamped. An observation was made to the effect that the second appellant did not become the owner of any part of the ‘property nor she is a successor on par with the other parties. The trial court took the view that partition cannot be effected at her instance. Relief was granted to the 1st appellant alone, to the extent of 1/7th share. The claim of the 2nd. appellant was rejected. Hence this appeal.
5. During the pendency of the appeal, the first respondent died and his legal representatives are brought on record as respondent Nos.4 and 5. The second respondent also died and the respondent Nos.6 to 9 are brought on record as his legal representatives.
6. Sri S. Sriramchander Murthy, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the trial Court recorded a finding to the effect that Ex.A.6 is proved and still refused to enforce the arrangement contained in it. He contends that a family settlement is not required to be registered and the trial Court committed error in taking the view that it cannot be acted upon, for want of registration and deficiency of stamp duty. The learned counsel further submits that being a party to the family settlement, the second respondent cannot disown the implications that arise out of it.
7. The appeal is contested only by respondent Nos.6 to 9. Their counsel Sri S. Rajan submits that not being a recognized legal heir, the second appellant does not have any right to insist on partition of the property. He contends that the only basis, on which the second appellant rested her claim, is Ex.A.6, and that it is not admissible in evidence, on account of the defects as to the registration and stamp duty. He contends that the trial Cour
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