ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Anil Kumar, J.
Shital Deen —Petitioner
versus
State of U.P. and Ors. —Respondents
W.P. No. 4802 (M/S) of 2009
Decided on 1.9.2009
(ii) Limitation Act, 1963—Section 5—Condonation of delay—Litigant does not stand to benefit by filing an appeal beyond prescribed time—“Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made—If delay is condoned cause would be decided on merit—Substantial justice need to be preferred—No presumption that delay occasioned deliberately—Judiciary is respected because it is capable of removing injustice. (Para 7)
Result: Petition allowed.
Anil Kumar, J.— By means of present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 4.3.2009 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow contained in Annexure No.1 to the writ petition.
2. In brief the facts of the case is to the effect that the controversy involved in the present case relates to the plot No.85 situated at Village Baraipur, Pargana and Tehsil Sadar, District Raibareli. In respect to the said plot and order dated 7.2.1998 was passed by the Tehsildar, Sadar, District Raibareli thereby expunging the name of the revisionist from the plot in question.
3. Aggrieved by the said order dated 7.2.1998 passed by the Tehsildar Sadar, District Raibareli the petitioner filed a revision before the respondent No.1 Additional Commissioner (judicial), Lucknow Division, Lucknow, which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 15.3.2004. As such the petitioner moved an application for recalling of the said order dated 15.3.2004.
4. By means of order dated 4.3.2009 the respondent No.1 has rejected the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay. Aggrieved by the said order the present writ petition has been filed.
5. I heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties the present writ petition is disposed of.
6. From perusal of the impugned order dated 4.3.2009 passed by the respondent No.1 it is evident that the respondent No.1 has dismissed the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay on the ground that the petitioner has not explained the day to day delay in moving the said application.
7. In the matter of condonation of delay the Apex Court has constantly held that the pragmatic view should be taken. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and others, 1987(13) ALR 306 (SC) held as follows:
“The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy.
And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very .threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by restoring to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
7. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998(7) SCC 133 the Apex Court explained
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