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MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Sanjay Yadav, J.
Amolak Singh Tuteja —Petitioner
versus
Munni Bai Sharma —Respondent
Writ Petition No.10734 of 2012
Decided on 11.4.2017

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner: Shri Ashok Lalwani, learned counsel
For the Respondent: None

IMPORTANT POINT
Relief for permanent injunction does not flow from relief for specific performance and it is to be separately valued for the purpose of Court fees.

Headnote:Court Fees Act, 1870—Section 7(iv)(d)—Valuation of court-fee—Since petitioner seeks permanent injunction along with specific performance of contract and declaration, he ought to have valued suit for the purpose of injunction because relief for injunction is independent of relief of specific performance—As relief for permanent injunction does not flow from relief for specific performance, it is to be separately valued and Court fees under Section 7(iv)(d) of Court Fees Act, 1870 is payable. (Paras 4 and 9)

       Result: Writ Petition dismissed.

       

JUDGMENT

Sanjay Yadav, J.—Petitioner/plaintiff takes exception to order-dated 14.5.2012 passed in Civil Suit No.204-A/2011 whereby, trial Court has directed the plaintiff to value the relief of injunction and pay the fixed Court fees thereon as per Section 7(iv)(d) of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

2. The suit is for specific performance of contract and for declaration of sale deed dated 10.2.2000 executed by respondent No.3 in favour of respondent No.2 as null and void and for permanent injunction for restraining the respondents from dispossessing the petitioner from suit property.

3. As to the relief for specific performance, petitioner valued the suit for Rs.5,50,000/- and paid ad-valoram Court fees of Rs.36,000/-. As to declaration for the sale deed dated 10.2.2010 to be null and void, as the petitioner is not the executant and is in possession of suit property, the trial Court is justified in not calling upon the petitioner to have paid the ad-valoram Court fees in view of the decision in Suhrid Singh v. Randhir Singh (2010) 12 SCC 112: [2010] 2 Supreme 670.

4. As regard to direction to value the suit for the relief of injunction. Since the petitioner seeks permanent injunction along with the specific performance of contract and the declaration, he ought to have valued the suit for the purpose of injunction because the relief for injunction is independent of the relief of specific performance.

5. The question, however, is whether the plaintiff is required to pay fixed Court fee on the relief of permanent injunction, when he has already paid the ad valorem Court fee for specific performance of contract. Petitioner relies upon the decision in Mulla Maqbool Husain v. Seth Chandmal 1959 MPLJ 649, wherein in respect of the suit for specific performance of a contract to lease and also delivery of possession of certain premises belonging to defendant No.1 therein and held by the defendants No.2 and 3 as lessees; it was in this factual background which gave rise to the verdict in paragraph 10 of said judgment that “... a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell where the plaintiff seeks to force the vendor to execute the sale deed and also hand over possession of the property should be stamped under Section 7(x)(a) of the Act”. On the same reasoning, a suit for specific performance of the demised premises would fall under sub-clause (c) of clause (x).

6. Present, however, is not the case wherein possession is sought. Rather with the decree for specific performance of contract, the plaintiff seeks declaration and permanent injunction that his possession over suit property be not interfered, which attracts the provisions of Section 7(iv)(d) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as it is a relief independent to the main relief sought in the suit plaint.

7. In Devaki v. Basu Singh 1971 JLJ-SN 111 wherein the plaintiff claims possession of the disputed property without claiming relief of setting aside the gift deed by which the disputed property was said to have been alienated. In these facts situation, he was held liable to pay Court fees according to Section 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act and not ad-valorem Court fees under Section 7(iv)(c). Thus, the facts and the law laid down in Devaki (supra) is of no assistance in the case at hand.

8. In Subhash Chand Jain v. Chairman, M.P. Electricity Board 2000 (3) MPLJ 522, a Full Bench of our High Court was concerned with the issue as to what form the basis for settling the court-fee payable in the case. Relying on the decisions in Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar AIR 1958 SC 245, Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad, AIR 1973 SC 2384 and Commercial Aviation and Travel Company v. Vimal Pannalal, AIR 1988 SC 1636, their Lordships were pleased to hold :

“6. The suits which are mentioned under Section 7(iv) of the Act of 1870 are of such nature where it is difficult to lay down any standard of valuation. This means that the valuation of the reliefs will have to be made by the plaintiff unde







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