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DELHI HIGH COURT
S. Ravindra Bhat and Prateek Jalan, JJ.
Nutan Batra —Appellant
versus
M/s Buniyaad Associates —Respondent
FAO (OS) (COMM) 42 of 2018 and CM No. 9553 of 2018
Decided on 14.12.2018

Counsel for the Parties:
For the Appellant:Ms. Leena Tuteja, Ms. Diksha Bhati & Mr. Ishaan Chawla, Advocates
For the Respondent:Mr. Ramesh Singh, Standing Counsel GNCTD with Mr. Chirayu Jain & Mr. Nikita Goyal, Advocate

IMPORTANT POINT
Court-fee can be refunded only when parties are able to reach settlement after reference to ADR under Section 89 of CPC.

Headnote:Court-Fees Act, 1870—Section 16—Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Section 89—Refund of Court-fee—Purpose of refunding court fees is to encourage parties to resort to means of dispute resolution other than adjudication by courts, even after civil courts have been approached for relief—Section 16 can be made applicable only when parties are able to reach a settlement after a reference to ADR under Section 89 of CPC—If a plaintiff is able to demonstrate that case falls within requirements of Section 16, refund of full amount of court-fee ought to be granted—However, if elements of the provision are not satisfied, then refund in terms thereof cannot be granted. (Paras 12 and 20)

       Result: Appeal allowed.

       

JUDGMENT

Prateek Jalan, J.—This appeal is directed against an order dated 09.02.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A. No. 1650/2018 in C.S.(Comm.) 1464/2016. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the appellant’s application for refund of the entire court fees paid in the suit in terms of Section 16 of the Court-Fees Act, 1870 (hereafter referred to as “the Act”).

2. The appellant filed the suit in question against the respondents claiming infringement of certain intellectual property rights. The paragraph of the plaint dealing with valuation alone is relevant for the purpose of this appeal. It is as follows:—

“That the suit is valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction in the following manner:

i) For a decree for permanent injunction restraining infringement of trade mark, this relief is valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 200 and court fee of Rs. 20/- is affixed hereto;

ii) For a decree for permanent injunction restraining acts of passing off, this relief is valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 200/- and court fee of Rs. 20/- is affixed hereto;

iii) For a decree of delivery up of infringing brochures, print outs and other articles, this relief is valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 200/- and court fee of Rs. 20/- is affixed thereto.

iv) For an order for rendition of account of profits illegally earned by the Defendants and/or damages claimed in the alternative, this relief is valued for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction at Rs. 1,10,00,000/- and court fees of Rs. 1,10,000/- is paid thereon.

Thus the suit is valued for purposes of court fees and jurisdiction at Rs. 1,10,00,000/- and court fees of Rs. 1,10,000/- is paid thereon. The subject matter of the Suit is a commercial dispute as defined in section 2(1) (c) of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellant Division of High Courts Ordinance, 2015.”

3. By an order dated 08.09.2017, the suit was referred for mediation before the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre which resulted in settlement of all the disputes and differences and recording of a Settlement Agreement dated 17.11.2017. By an Order dated 13.12.2017, the suit was consequently disposed of in terms of the Settlement Agreement, and it was directed that the plaintiff (appellant herein) would be entitled to refund of 50% of the court fee paid, in terms of Section 16A of the Act (as applicable in Delhi). I.A. No. 1650/2018 was thereafter filed by the appellant, for modification of the order dated 13.12.2017 to the effect that the appellant was entitled to the refund of the entire court fees. She invoked Section 16 of the Act read with Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereafter referred to as “the CPC”).

4. This application was dismissed by the impugned order of the learned Single Judge wherein it has been held as follows:—

“This application is misconceived and dismissed because the provisions of Section 16 and 16-A of the Courts-fees Act, 1870 (as applicable to Delhi) have to be read together. Section 16-A of the Court-fees Act has been specifically added for Delhi and which provides that only 50% of the Court fee is refundable and that too if the case is compromised before commencement of evidence in the suit. The compromise which is subject matter of Section 16-A of the Court-fees Act (as applicable to Delhi) will include compromise before the Mediation & Conciliation Centre and it cannot be that if a matter is compromised before the Mediation Centre, then, the entire court fee will be refunded as per Section 16. To take such an interpretation will be to wipe off Section 16-A from the statute book and which specifically is applicable for Delhi.”

5. Although the respondent has not been represented in the appeal, we had issued notice to the Standing Counsel for the Govt. of NCT of Delhi to assist the Court with respect to interpretation of Sect










































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