Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2026 Supreme(Del) 720

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
Rakesh Kapoor, S/o Late Sh. V.N. Kapoor - Appellant
Versus
Sonia Venugopal, D/o C.P. Venugopal – Respondent
RFA NO. 488 of 2023, CM APPL. 33372 of 2023 (stay), CM APPL. 1917 of 2025, RFA NO. 545 OF 2023, CM APPL. 35535 OF 2023 (stay), CM APPL. 1918 OF 2025
Decided On : 19-05-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant :Mr. Shashank Agrawal, Advocate
For the Respondent:Mr. Kirti Uppal, Sr. Adv., Mr. Kartikeya Rastogi Adv., Ms. Tamanna Kavdia Adv., Mr. Saanil Patnayak, Advocate.

Condonation of delay requires establishing 'sufficient cause'. Allegations of professional negligence are insufficient when the litigant's record reveals active participation in execution proceedings and prior intentional suppression of material facts, such as the withdrawal of previous restoration applications.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - Sufficient cause - Burden of proof rests upon the applicant to provide a plausible and honest explanation for the delay - Allegations of professional negligence against former counsel must be substantiated by records and cannot be used as a routine excuse where litigation history demonstrates active participation by the litigant in related proceedings. (Paras 21, 45, 54)

(B) Practice and Procedure - Suppression of material facts - An applicant seeking equitable relief like condonation of delay must approach the court with clean hands - Concealing the filing and subsequent withdrawal of a restoration application in the same matter is a significant factor weighing against the exercise of judicial discretion. (Paras 23, 41)

(C) Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Decree for Specific Performance - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order 20 Rule 12A - Compliance with time-bound execution of sale deeds - A decree providing for a specific timeframe to execute a sale deed is executable and valid; it cannot be labeled as a nullity simply because the judgment debtor is unsatisfied with the litigation outcomes. (Paras 56, 60)

Facts of the case:
Appellants filed appeals against an ex-parte decree after a delay of nearly seven years, seeking condonation of the delay on the grounds of professional negligence by their counsel. The respondents opposed the applications, pointing out that the appellants had previously filed and withdrawn a restoration application and had been actively participating in execution proceedings for years without raising such objections.

Findings of Court:
The court observed that the record contradicted the claims of attorney negligence. The appellants were represented throughout, and their conduct showed a conscious decision not to challenge the decree until execution proceedings reached an advanced stage. The court held that the delay was not due to any justifiable cause but was a dilatory tactic.

Issues: The primary issue was whether a delay of six years and nine months, attributed to the alleged negligence of legal counsel, constituted 'sufficient cause' for condonation, and whether the underlying decree was a nullity.

Ratio Decidendi: Sufficient cause for condoning delay requires a bona fide explanation not tainted by suppression of facts or prior contradictory conduct. Where a party has been aware of legal proceedings and has actively participated in them, shifting the blame to legal counsel is insufficient to satisfy the requirements for condonation of long, unexplained delays.

Result: Applications for condonation of delay dismissed; appeals dismissed accordingly.

Table of Content
1. overview of the background of the underlying specific performance suits. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9)
2. appellant's assertion regarding counsel negligence as grounds for condonation. (Para 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22)
3. respondent's evidence of dilatory tactics and suppression of material facts. (Para 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44)
4. court's analysis of conduct and rejection of counsel negligence claims. (Para 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54)
5. evaluating validity of decree regarding compliance with order xx rule 12a cpc. (Para 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62)
6. final determination dismissing condonation of delay and the appeals. (Para 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67)

JUDGMENT :

NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

1. By the present Judgment, this Court shall adjudicate upon two Applications, namely CM APPL. NO. 33374/2023 and CM APPL. NO. 35537/2023, preferred by the Appellants, seeking condonation of delay of 6 years and 9 months, in filing the present Appeals bearing no. RFA No. 488/2023 and RFA No. 545/2023, respectively.

CM APPL.NO. 33374/2023 (Condonation of Delay) in RFA No. 488/2023 & CM APPL. NO. 35537/2023 (Condonation of Delay) in RFA No. 545/2023:

2. The Appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) has been filed on behalf of the Appellants against the ex-parte Judgment and decree dated 30.07.2016, which is supported with Applications bearing nos. CM APPL. 33374/2023 and CM APPL.35537/2023 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 151 CPC for condonation of delay of 6 years and 9 months, in preferring the present Appeal.

3. It is submitted in the Application that the Respondents filed two Suits on 31.10.2015, namely Suit No. 583/16/15 and Suit No. 584/16/15, against Appellants Rakesh Kapoor and Veena Khanna, respectively. The Respondents/Plaintiffs filed two Suits for Specific Performance of the Agreements to Sell dated 29.01.2011 and 04.05.2010 in respect of their individual 1/3rd shares in Property No. B-107, Amar Colony, Lajpat Nagar IV, New Delhi, or, in the alternative, a claim for damages.

4. It is pertinent to note that Veena Khanna was being represented in her litigation by Rakesh Kapoor as her POA holder. The Appellants Rakesh Kapoor and Veena Khanna, filed their Written Statement on 19.12.2015, in the respective Suits wherein the Suit of the Plaintiff was contested on various grounds, including that the Suit was barred by limitation.

5. The Appellants, i.e. Rakesh Kapoor and Veena Khanna, was represented by their Advocates, Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma and Mr. Rahul Sharma. He relied totally upon the Counsels, but they did not appear in the Court from 07.01.2016 and the Appellant Rakesh Kapoor was proceeded ex-parte on 02.05.2016. The Appellant, Veena Khanna was proceeded ex-parte on 27.11.2015, in their respective Suits.

6. The Appellant/Sh. Rakesh Kapoor was around 60 years old and suffered from paralysis of left hand and arthritis in the left knee and was, therefore, unable to attend the matter personally.

7. The Appellants were not aware that they had been proceeded ex-parte.

8. The learned Trial Court decreed the Suit of the Plaintiffs vide ex-parte Judgment dated 30.07.2016, thereby directing the Appellants, to execute the Sale Deed in respect of their 1/3rd share of Property bearing No. B-107, Amar Colony, Lajpat Nagar IV, New Delhi, within two months from the date of Judgment.

9. The Respondents/Plaintiffs then filed an Execution Petition bearing No. EX/05/2017 and Execution Petition bearing No. EX/06/2017, against the two decrees.

10. The Appellants were served with the Execution Petitions and they both engaged Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate in the year 2017, for legal representation. The learned Advocate despite knowing full well that it was an ex-parte Judgment against the Appellants, chose not to file an

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2026 Supreme(Del) 720

Cases Referred (4)