In sexual offences against minors, corroboration is not a legal prerequisite for conviction but should be considered judiciously, especially regarding the credibility and reliability of the child’s testimony.

Introduction

[1] The appellant was charged with an offence under s 14(a) read with s 16(1) of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 ("the Act") for the alleged physical sexual assault on his biological daughter, who was at the time only 10 years old.

[2] After a full trial, he was convicted and was sentenced by the Sessions Court to 5 years imprisonment from the date of conviction and 2 strokes of whipping. He was also ordered to be placed under Police Supervision for 3 years under s 27 of the Act after serving sentence and to undergo a rehabilitative counselling within the period of his detention in prison pursuant to s 26 of the Act.

[3] He has appealed against the conviction and sentence to this Court. He was granted a stay of execution by the Sessions Court.

This Court's Decision

[4] The Petition of Appeal consists of several grounds, the main ones attacking the prima facie findings of the Sessions Court. In particular, it was contended that there was no corroboration for the evidence of the child victim (PW1) and that therefore it was unsafe for the Sessions Court to have relied on her testimony.

[5] Corroboration is independent evidence which implicates the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime ( R v. Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658). This may be in the form of independent witnesses or medical evidence (see Syed Abu Tahir Mohamed Esmail v. PP ; [1988] 3 MLJ 485 ) or other scientific evidence such as DNA profiling.

[6] Now, it is not the law that evidence of the complainant in sexual offences must be corroborated - see the statement by Vivian Bose J in Rameswar Kalyan Singh's case AIR 1952 SC 54 : (1952 Cri LJ 547) on this issue where it was pronounced that:

"In my opinion, the true rule is that in every case of this type the rule about the advisability of corroboration should be present to the mind of the judge. The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge,.... before a conviction without corroboration can be sustained. The tender years of the child, coupled with other circumstances appearing in the case, such, for example, as its demeanour, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand."

[7] It is also not the case that a conviction cannot be sustained on the sole evidence of the complainant if the Court is convinced about the truthfulness of the complainant's evidence and there existed no circumstances that would cast a shadow of doubt over his or her veracity - see Ab Malek Atan v. PP ; ; .

[8] Corroboration is, rather, it is a matter of practice, common sense and prudence to convict unless either the evidence of the complainant is unusually convincing or there is some corroboration of the complainant's story - see PP v. Mardai ; . The 'unusually convincing' test was explained in PP v. Moh