1998(3) Supreme 555
Supreme Court of India
(From Calcutta High Court)
M.M. Punchhi, CJI, K.T. Thomas and S. Rajendra Babu, JJ.
Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. -Appellant
versus
Rajiv Trust & Anr. -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 1835 of 1998
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9930 of 1997)
Decided on 31-3-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Kapil Sibal, and Arun Jaitley, Sr. Advocates, Utpal Majmudar, Ms. Sarla Chandra, Advocates.
For the Respondents : S.S. Ray, Sr. Advocate, Rana Mukherjee, Ms. Sumita Mukherjee, Goodwill Indeevar, Ranjan Mukherjee, Advocates.
Held : it is difficult to agree with the High Court that resistance or obstructions made by a third party to the decree of execution cannot be gone into under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code. Rule 97 specifically provides that when the holder of a decree for possession of immovable property is resisted or obstructed by “any person” in obtaining possession of the property such decree-holder has to make an application complaining of the resistance or obstruction. Sub-rule (2) makes it incumbent on the court to proceed to adjudicate upon such complaint in accordance with the procedure laid down. (Para 9)
Rule 101 stipulates that all questions “arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99” shall be determined by the executing court, if such questions are “relevant to the adjudication of the application”. A third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. (Para 10)
When a decree-holder complains of resistance to the execution of a decree it is incumbent on the execution court to adjudicate upon it. But while making adjudication, the court is obliged to determine only such question as may be arising between the parties to a proceeding on such complaint and that such questions must be relevant to the adjudication of the complaint. The words “all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97” would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resistor raised it. The questions which executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g. if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resistor or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree-holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code, execution court can decide whether the question raised by a resistor or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section. (Paras 11 & 12)
It is clear that executing court can decide whether the resistor or obstructor is a person bound by the decree and he refuses to vacate the property. That question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. Court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resistor. Of course the Court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination if the Court deems it necessary. (Para 13)
Consequently held : We, therefore, agree with the contention of Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray, learned senior counsel for the second respondent that the High Court went wrong in holding that the contention of second respondent cannot be considered under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code. But the aforesaid finding is not sufficient to dispose of this appeal. (Para 16)
(ii) W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956-Sections 13 and 16(1)- Suit for ejectment-Eviction decree -Execution proceedings-Resisted by second sub-tenant on ground that decree for eviction was passed without making him a party-Provisions of Section 16(1) of the Act-Not-complied with by second sub-tenant-Second sub-tenant also not covered by Section 13(2) or 13(4) of the Act-Non impleadment of second sub-tenant-Does not invalidate eviction proceedings-Previous consent of landlord to his tenant for creation of sub-tenancy-Is valid only between the landlord and his tenant-It is not valid between sub-tenant and his tenant so as to bind landlord-Landlord entitled to delivery of possession by removing resistance made by second sub-tenant. (Paras 22, 24, 27 & 28)
Judgment
Thomas, J.-Special leave granted.
2. A sub-tenant, who was not party to a decree for eviction, resisted execution of the decree and the court ordered an inquiry under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘Code’ for short). The High Court of Calcutta upheld that order and that is challenged in this appeal.
3. The suit property is a flat in “Harrington Mansion” situated on an important road at Calcutta. It was in the ownership of one Arun Kumar Jalan. He tenanted the premises to Rajiv Trust (first respondent) on 15.5.1975, who sublet the building to a company M/s. Accounting and Secretarial Service Private Limited (which will hereinafter be referred to as “the first sub-tenant”). Subsequently the first sub-tenant created another sub-tenancy under it in favour of second respondent M/s. Capstain Shipping Estate Private Limited.
4. Ownership of the building changed from Arun Kumar Jalan and it now vests with the Silverline Forum Private Limited, (the appellant herein) as per registered conveyance deed dated 24.1.1995. Appellant filed a suit for ejectment of the tenant against first respondent under the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the “W.B. Act”) on two grounds. First is that the tenant respondent had sublet the building without the consent of the landlord and second is that the tenant used it in such a manner as to impair its condition. A decree for ejectment was passed ex-parte on 12.12.1995. Before appellant set out with execution proceedings second respondent-sub-tenant filed a suit (O.S. No. 2997/95) against appellant and some others for a declaration and consequential injunction orders. Though initially second respondent got an interim order injuncting against ejectment it was subsequently vacated on 15.12.1995, but that suit is still pending.
5. In the meanwhile appellant moved for execution of the decree of ejectment. On 20.3.1996, bailiff of the court went to the premises for effecting delivery of possession, but he was resisted by the representatives of the second respondent and he reported the matter to the court. When he was again directed by the court to effect delivery of possession with police help, he was unable to dispossess second respondent as the execution court has stayed dispossession in the meantime. Second respondent filed Miscellaneous Case 556 of 1996 before the execution court quoting Order 21 Rule 101 and Section 151 of the Code, raising a contention that the decree was passed without making him a party and alleging that the decree was obtained in collusion between appellant and first respondent Rajiv Trust. Execution court, however, held that second respondent being a third party resistor cannot avail himself of the remedy provided in Order 21 Rule 101 of the Code. Nevertheless the court ordered an inquiry to be conducted under Section 151 of the Code into the allegations made by the second respondent, as per its order dated 26.4.1976. Both sides, appellant and second respondent, were aggrieved by that order and hence both of them challenged it in revision before the High Court.
6. A learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court concurred with the view of the execution court that grievances of the second respondent cannot be canalised through Order 21 Rule 101 presumably because the decree-holder has not moved the application for police help to remove the resistance under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code. Nonetheless, learned Single Judge observed that the application of second respondent could be gone into by the court in accordance with the inherent powers of the court as recognised in Section 151 of the Code. On the said view of the matter both revisions were dismissed by the order which is under challenge now.
7. Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray, learned senior counsel who argued for the contesting parties, did not choose to defend the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court regarding non-availability of the remedy under
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