Important points
1. Section 306 is applicable in a case where the order of commitment has not been passed and Section 307 would be applicable after commitment of the case but before the judgment is pronounced. Section 307 - in its present form-does not contemplate the recording of the statement of the approver twice.
2. There is no legal obligation on the Trial Court or a right in favour of the accused to insist for the compliance with the requirement of Section 306(4) of the Cr.P.C.
3. There is no time limit under Sections 306 and 307 Cr.P.C. for recording statement of approver and as such mere delay in recording statement cannot itself be ground to reject testimony of accomplice.

Headnote:(i) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 306 and 307-Tender of pardon to accomplice-By trial Court-Procedure for-Distinction between Sections 306 and 307-Plea that statement of accomplice is required to be recorded firstly in Court of Magistrate and subsequently in trial Court-Not tenable-Section 306 applicable where order of commitment has not been passed-Section 307 applicable to cases after commitment of case but before judgment is pronounced-After commitment pardon is to be granted by trial Court-Section 307 does not contemplate recording of statement of approver twice-Section 306(4) not required to be complied with when pardon is tendered by trial Court.
       Section 306 is applicable in a case where the order of commitment has not been passed and Section 307 would be applicable after commitment of the case but before the judgment is pronounced. The provisions of sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 would be attracted only at a stage when the case is not committed to the court of Sessions. After the commitment, the pardon is to be granted by the Trial Court subject to the conditions specified in sub-section (1) of Section 306, i.e. approver making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal, or abettor, in the commission thereof. It may be noticed that under the old Code, only the District Magistrate had the power to tender pardon, at any stage of the investigation, enquiry or trial even though he himself might not be holding such enquiry or trial. Pardon could be granted by the District Magistrate even during the pendency of the trial in the Sessions Court. By Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, old Sections 337 to 339 were substituted by Sections 306 to 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure conferring the power to tender pardon only to Judicial Magistrates and the Trial Court. Section 307 - in its present form - does not contemplate the recording of the statement of the approver twice. Acceptance of the argument that the statement of every accomplice is required to be recorded firstly in the Court of Magistrate and subsequently in the trial Court would amount to legislate something in Section 307 which the Legislature appears to have intentionally omitted. There is no legal obligation on the Trial Court or a right in favour of the accused to insist for the compliance with the requirement of Section 306(4) of the Cr.P.C. Section 307 provides a complete procedure for recording the statement of an accomplice subject only to the compliance of conditions specified in sub-section (1) of Section 306. The law mandates the satisfaction of the Court granting pardon, that the accused would make a full and true disclosure of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. It is not necessary to comply with the requirement of Section 306(4) when the pardon is tendered by the Trial Court. (Paras 25 and 27)
       (ii) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 306 and 307-Tender of pardon to accomplice-Delay in recording approver’s statement-Cannot by itself be ground to reject testimony of accomplice-No time limit for recording statement of accomplice.
       The words of the section "at any time after commitment of the case but before judgment is passed" are clearly indicative of the legal position which the Legislature intended. No time limit is provided for recording such a statement and delay by itself is no ground to reject the testimony of the accomplice. Delay may be one of the circumstances to be kept in mind as a measure of caution for appreciating the evidence of the accomplice. Human mind cannot be expected to be reacting in a similar manner under different, situations. Any person accused of an offence, may, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, repent for his action and volunteer to disclose the truth in the Court. Repentance is a condition of mind differing from person to person and from situation to situation. (Para 29)
       (iii) Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Section 133-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 306 and 307-Evidence of approver/accomplice-Corroboration of-Corroboration need not be in the form of occular testimony and may be even in the form of circumstantial evidence-Must be independent and not vague or unreliable.
       Section 133 of the Evidence Act provides that an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person and the conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice. No distinction is made between an accomplice who is or is not an Approver. As both have been treated alike, the rule of corroboration applies to both. Accomplice’s evidence is taken on record as a matter of necessity in cases where it is impossible to get sufficient evidence of a heinous crime unless one of the participators in the crime is disposed to disclose the circumstances within his knowledge on account of tender of pardon. (Para 30)
       For corroborative evidence the court must look at the broad spectrum of the Approver’s version and then find out whether there is other evidence to corroborate and lend assurance to that version. The nature and extent of such corroboration may depend upon the facts of different cases. Corroboration need not be in the form of ocular testimony of witnesses and may be even in the form of circumstantial evidence. Corroborative evidence must be independent and not vague or unreliable. (Para 34)
       In the instant case the statement of PW2 is vivid in explanation and inspires full confidence of the court to pass the conviction on the appellants for the offences with which they were charged. The corroborative evidence to the aforesaid statement leaves no doubt in the mind of the court regarding the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the crime for which they have been convicted and sentenced. (Para 37)
       (iv) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 161 and 162-examination of witness by police-Statement recorded under Section 161-What amounts to-Substance of interrogation recorded by investigation officer which was not in terms of Section 161-Cannot be regarded as statement under Section 161-Same cannot be used for contradiction under Section 162 Cr.P.C. (Para 38)
       (vi) Criminal trial-Appreciation of evidence-Improvements of witness in trial-Improvements which are details of narrations extracted by Public Prosecutor and defence counsel in course of examination-in-Chief and cross-examination-Cannot be termed as material improvement so as to discard evidence. (Para 40)
       (vii) Criminal trial-Appreciation of evidence-Discrediting testimony of witness-Omissions-Only such omissions which amount to contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit testimony-Omission in police statement-By itself would not necessarily render testimony unreliable-Minor contradictions are bound to appear in statement of truthful witnesses-Even if there is contradiction on any material point, that is no ground to reject whole testimony of such witness.
       Only such omissions which amount to contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the Court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution become doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false and the sense of observation differ from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW2. Even if there is contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness. (Para 39)
       (viii) Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 302 r/w Section 120-Murder-Death sentence-Justification for-Murder of five women including a pregnant woman and two children of 1-1/2 and 2-1/2 years-Murder calculated plan of committing robbery and to do away with witnesses-Case rarest of rare cases warranting extreme penalty imposable by law-Death sentence awarded by trial Court as confirmed by High Court justified. (Paras 41 and 42)

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:

The applicability of Sections 306 and 307 of the Cr.P.C. depends on the stage of the case, with Section 306 applicable before the order of commitment and Section 307 after commitment but before judgment. The procedures for recording the statement of an approver are different under each section, and the law does not require recording the approver’s statement twice or in a particular sequence (!) (!) .
There is no legal obligation on the court or right in favor of the accused to insist on compliance with Section 306(4) of the Cr.P.C. when tendering pardon, and no specific time limit exists for recording the approver’s statement. Delay alone does not render the testimony of an accomplice inadmissible, but it may be considered as a cautionary factor in assessing credibility (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The evidence of an approver or accomplice is competent but requires corroboration in material particulars to be considered reliable. Corroboration can be in the form of independent, reliable circumstantial evidence and does not necessarily have to be ocular testimony. The nature and extent of corroboration depend on the facts of each case (!) (!) (!) .
Minor discrepancies or omissions in the statement of an approver, which do not amount to contradictions in material particulars, do not necessarily discredit the witness or invalidate the evidence. The court must distinguish between minor discrepancies and material contradictions, and the latter can be used to discredit the testimony (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The court emphasizes that the credibility of an approver’s testimony must be assessed holistically, considering corroborative evidence and the overall reliability of the statement. Even with some inconsistencies, if the evidence is otherwise trustworthy and corroborated, it can form a basis for conviction (!) (!) (!) .
The case involved a detailed analysis of the conduct and acts of the accused, including premeditation, brutal execution, and conspiracy to commit murder and robbery. The evidence demonstrated that the crimes were committed in a calculated, heinous, and brutal manner, which justified the imposition of the maximum penalty, including death, considering the exceptional and depraved nature of the offense (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The court acknowledged the young age of the appellants but found that the brutality, planning, and depravity of the crimes outweighed mitigating factors. The judgment concluded that this was a rarest of the rare case warranting the highest penalty under the law to serve as a deterrent and uphold societal morality (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The appeals filed by the accused were dismissed, and the convictions and sentences, including the death penalty, were upheld. The court appreciated the efforts of the counsel and confirmed that the procedural and evidentiary standards were properly followed (!) .

Please let me know if you need further analysis or specific legal advice regarding this case.

JUDGMENT

Sethi, J.-Three desperadoes, the two appellants and one Raju (PW2) who had gone amuck, committed the heinous crime of murders in a most ghastly and shocking manner for which the appellants were charged with various offences punishable under Sections 120B, 302, 34, 342, 392, 297 and 449 of Indian Penal Code. On proof of the charge that the appellants had committed the murder of five innocent women, one of whom was pregnant, and two children of teenage of one and a half years and two and a half years they were convicted and sentenced to death alongwith other sentences, by the Trial Court. The High Court accepted the Reference made for confirmation of the death sentence and dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants for setting aside their convictions.

2. On the date of occurrence the appellants were of 20-22 years of age. The deceased, victims of the crime, included Meerabai Rathi, aged about 45 years, her daughter-in-law Babita @ Nita Rathi, aged about 24 years, her unmarried daughter Preeti aged about 19 years, her married daughter Hemlata aged about 27 years, her maid servant Satyabhamabai Sutar aged about 42 years, Chirag, son of Babita aged two and a half years, Pratik, son of Hemlata aged one and a half years.

3. All women and children were killed one by one by inflicting numerous knife blows on their persons. All the deaths, except of Pratik (child of one and a half years) were actually caused by the brutal knife blows inflicted by Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary (hereinafter referred to as "the accused No. 1"). Pratik was killed by Jitendra @ Jitu Nayansingh Gehlot (hereinafter referred to as "the accused No. 2"). Raju, PW2 actively participated and facilitated the commission of the crime. The murders were apparently committed to wipe out all evidence of robbery and theft committed by the accused persons.

4. The prosecution case, as revealed from the investigation and official report filed in the Court, is that complainant Sanjay Rathi (PW1) along with his father Keshrimal Rathi, his mother deceased Meerabai Rathi, his younger sister deceased Km. Preeti, his wife deceased Babita and his son deceased Chirag were residing in Flat No. 6 on the Second Floor of Himanshu Apartment, Shilavihar Colony, Puad Phata, Kothrud, Pune. One of the daughters of Keshrimal Rathi, deceased Hemlata was married to Shri Shrikant Navandhar PW15 in the year 1992 and had corns to her parents’ house along with her son on the fateful day. Raju Rajpurohit who was Accused No. 3 and later after becoming approver appeared as PW2, a resident of Muklava District, Ganganagar, Rajasthan after passing 11 standard examination in the year 1993-94 came to his elder brother Kalyan Singh at Pune for the purposes of getting further education while working or serving there. He was employed in Bombay Vihar situated at Laxmi Road, Pune since June, 1994. Accused No. 1 and Accused No. 2 were also working at the said Bombay Vihar during the aforesaid period as Cook and Counter Salesman respectively. After being acquainted with each other, all the three became friends. Raju, PW2 was removed from Bombay Vihar on 8th June, 1994 whereafter he got the service at Sagar Sweat Mart owned by Keshrimal Rathi and his son Sanjay Rathi (complainant). In the course of his employment he used to go to the house of Rathis to bring Chappatis for servants of the shop, daily and thus acquainted himself with the family members of the complainant as also their maid-servant. Raju worked with the Rathis for about two to two and a half months. When his request for enhancement of salary was declined by the Rathis, he left their service. At this time Accused No. 2 went to him and informed that he too has left the job at Bombay Vihar and, therefore, Raju should talk to his employer to keep Jeetu in their service. Raju requested Sanjay Rathi to employ Accused No. 2 but as he demanded a salary of Rs.1200/-. Sanjay Rathi expressed his inability to provide him the job. Meanwhile Raju learnt that

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

2000 Supreme(SC) 1462

Cases Referred (11)