2002(1) Supreme 551
Supreme Court of India
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri and S.N. Phukan, JJ.
Konda Lakshmana Bapuji —Appellant
versus
Govt. of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2063 of 1999
Decided on 29-1-2002
Counsel of the Parties :
For the Appellant : K. Parasaran, Senior Advocate, P. Niroop Pavan Kumar, P.R. Tiwari and P. Vinay Kumar, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. K. Amreshwari, Senior Advocate, G. Prabhakar, Advocate, K. Ram Kumar, Advocate (NP).
Held : The upshot of the above discussion is that the Special Court is a Civil Court having original as well as appellate jurisdiction having all the trappings of a Civil Court and also a Criminal Court having powers of the Court of Sessions to which the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the A.P. Civil Courts Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, apply. The Special Court can take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed and determine the ownership, title to, or lawful possession of the land alleged to have been grabbed whose decision will be binding on all the persons interested. Mere allegation of land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court either suo motu or on application by any person including any officer or authority. In this view of the matter, we find no illegality in the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in affirming the finding with regard to the jurisdiction of the Special Court. (Para 27)
(ii) A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982—Section 2(d) and (e)—Land grabbing—Govt. Land grabbing by appellant—Special Court holding that appellant was a land grabber and that he had not perfected his title to the land in dispute by adverse possession—Upheld by High Court—Appeal against— Whether findings of Special Court and High Court are based on relevant material? (Yes)—Whether appellant has satisfied the requirement of title by adverse possession of 30 years? (No)—Result—Appeal dismissed.
Held : On a careful perusal of the judgment of the Special Court on the question of title of the first respondent and that of the appellant and his lessor-Inamdar we are satisfied that neither any relevant material was excluded from consideration nor any irrelevant material was relied upon by the Special Court in recording its finding. There was, therefore, no scope for the High Court to interfere with those findings. In our view, the High Court committed no error of law in not interfering with the findings of the Special Court in regard to the title of the first respondent and absence of title in the appellant to the land in dispute [See : Omar Salay Mohamed Sait vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras [AIR 1959 SC 1238]. On the conclusions arrived at by us no interference is warranted by this Court in this appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [see : Mehar Singh & Ors. vs. Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee [2000 (2) SCC 97]. (Para 45)
In the light of the above discussion we hold that the appellant neither proved factum of possession of the land in dispute for period of 30 years nor succeeded in showing that he had animus possidendi for the whole statutory period. Therefore, we cannot but maintain the confirming view of the High Court that the appellant failed to acquire title to the land in dispute by adverse possession. We may also add that the lessee of a Maqtedar (the Inamdar) cannot acquire title to the demised land by adverse possession either as against the State or the Maqtedar (Inamdar) so long as his possession under the lease continues. (Para 61)
Thus it follows that the appellant has unauthorisedly come into possession of the land in dispute of the first respondent without lawful entitlement. (Para 64)
Held finally : In the light of the above discussion, we have no option but to sustain the view of the High Court in approving the finding of the Special Court on Issue No. 6, that the appellant falls within the mischief of the definition of the expression “land grabber” under the Act. In the result, we uphold the judgment and order of the High Court under challenge declining to interfere with the judgment and decree of the Special Court. The appeal is dismissed; the parties shall bear their own costs. (Paras 73 & 74)
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Judgment
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.—This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad dated October 27, 1998 dismissing Writ Petition No. 5332 of 1993, filed by the appellant assailing the order of the Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, ‘the Act’) in L.G.C. No. 61 of 1990 dated April 16, 1993. The Special Court had upheld the claim of the first respondent (the State of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Chief Secretary) that the appellant was a land grabber of land of an extent of 2 acres 06 guntas, comprised in Survey Nos. 9/15 Paiki, 9/16, and 9/17 of Khairathabad Village, Golconda Mandal, Hyderabad District (for short, ‘the land in dispute’) and directed the appellant to restore possession of that land to the first respondent in terms of the decree.
2. To comprehend the controversy in the appeal it would be appropriate to set out the relevant facts. The appellant traces his title to the land in dispute under an unregistered agreement for perpetual lease executed by one of the successors of the Inamdar, Mohd. Noorudin Asrari, in respect of the Inam land in Survey Nos. 9/15, 9/16, 9/17 and 9/18, on November 28, 1954 (Ex. B-39). Later the said Asrari executed a registered perpetual lease deed in favour of the appellant on December 11,1957 (a certified copy is marked as Ex. B-40). Soon thereafter one Rasheed Shahpurji Chenoy had set up a rival claim to the land in dispute by filing Original Suit No. 13 of 1958, in the Court of the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against the first respondent, the appellant and others praying for declaration of title to and recovery of possession of the said land. In that suit the learned Additional Chief Judge passed an interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo in regard to the land in dispute. However, the appellant having sought permission of the court, constructed a building ‘‘Jala Drushyam’’ on the land in dispute on his giving an undertaking that in the event of the plaintiff therein succeeding in the suit, the building would be vacated by him, leaving the structures intact, without claiming any compensation. On November 11, 1975 the said suit of Rasheed Shahpurji Chenoy was dismissed recording the finding that he did not have any title to the suit land which was the Government land (Ex. A-1).
3. It appears that as a follow up action of the minutes of the committee held in the chamber of the Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the Deputy Secretary, G.A.D. (O.P.LLL) by his letter dated September 14, 1959 (Ex.B-35) asked the Collector, inter alia, to declare the land situated between the Secretariat and the Fisheries Department (which includes the land in dispute) as the Government land. Thereafter on October 5, 1959, the Collector passed order declaring Survey No. 9/15 paiki, 9/16, 9/17, 9/18 and 9/19 admeasuring 19 acres 29 guntas as Government Land and informed the Chief Secretary accordingly on October 20,1959 (Ex.A-14 and Ex. B-34).
4. On February 28, 1976, the Tehsildar, Hyderabad, Urban Taluk, noticing that the appellant was in unauthorised occupation of Government land, issued eviction notice calling upon him to vacate the land comprised in Survey No. 9/15 paiki, 9/16 & 9/17 admeasuring 2 acres 28 guntas (Ex. B-38). Pursuant to the said notice, an order of eviction was passed against the appellant on May 28, 1977 (Ex. B-58). That order was challenged by the appellant in Writ Petition No. 1414 of 1977 in the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. A learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition on January 20, 1978 (Ex.A-3). Questioning that order the first respondent filed W.A.No. 61 of 1978 before the Division Bench. It would be relevant to note here that the Act came into force on September 6, 1982 but that fact was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench
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