Judgment

Kania C.J.I. - I have read the judgments prepared by Messrs. Fazl Ali, Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ. in this case. As the views in those judgments in respect of the nature of the duties and functions of the Industrial Tribunal do not show agreement I consider it necessary to add a few words of my own.

2. In my opinion, the functions and duties of the Industrial Tribunal are very much like those of a body discharging judicial junctions, although it is not a Court. The rules framed by the Tribunal require evidence to be taken and witnessess to be examined, cross examined and re-examined. The Act constituting the Tribunal imposes penalties for incorrect statements made before the Tribunal. While the powers of the Industrial Tribunal in some respects are different from these of an ordinary civil Court and it has jurisdiction and powers to give reliefs which a civil Court administering the law of the land (for instance, ordering the reinstatement of a workman) does not passes in the discharge of its duties it is essentially working as a judicial body. The fact that its determination has to be followed by an order of the Government which makes the award binding, or that in cases where Government is a party the Legislature is permitted to rivise the decision, or that the Government is empowered to fix the period of the operation of the award do not, to my mind, alter the nature and character of the functions of the Tribunal. Having considered all the provisions of the Act it seems to me clear that the Tribunal is discharging functions very near those of Court, although it is not a Court in the technical sense of the word.

3. The next question is whether under Art. 136 the Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to appeal against the decision of such a body. It is not disputed that the Court has power to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition in respect of the work on the Tribunal. The only question is whether there is a right of appeal also. In my opinion, the wording of Art. 136 is wide enough to give jurisdiction to the Court to entertain an application for leave to appeal, although it is obvious that having regard to the nature of the functions of the Tribunal this Court will be very reluctant to entertain such an application.

4. As regards the merits, I do not think this is a case in which I would admit the appeal. The safeguard parties may apply for redress by adopting other appropriate proceedings. The appeal therefore should be dismissed with costs.

5. Fazl Ali J.- The important question to be decided in this case is whether the present appeal lies at all to this Court. The question is not free from difficulty, but on the whole I an inclined to think that the appeal does lie. It is fully recognised that the scope of Art.186 of the Constitution is vary wide, but the significance of the language used in the section can be appreciated only by comparing it with the articles which precede it. Article 132 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and the words used in that article are : "appeal... from any judgment, decree or final order." Article 133 deals with special in civil matters and the same words are used here also. Article 134 deals with appeals in criminal matters, and the words used in it are: "appeal.... from any judgment, final order or sentence." In Art. 136, the words "judgment" and "decree", which are used in Art.132 and 133 are retained. Similarly, the word s "judgment" and......"sentence" occurring in Art. 134 are also retained. But the expression "final order" becomes "order", and instead of the High Court, reference is made to "any Court." Certain other words are also used in the article which seen to me to have a special significance, these being "determination," "cause or matter" and "tribunal". It is obvious that these words greatly widen the scope of Art. 136 They show