Judgment

Patanjali Sastri, C.J.I. - This is an appeal by the State of West Bengal from a judgement of a Full Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta quashing the conviction of the respondent by the Special Court established under S. 3 of the West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinance III (3) of 1949) which was replaced in March 1950 by the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 (West Bengal Act X [10] of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

2. The respondent and 49 other persons were charged with various offences alleged to have been committed by them in the course of their raid as an armed gang on a certain factory known as the Jessop factory at Dum Dum, and they were convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment by the Special Court to which the case was sent for trial by the Governor of West Bengal by a notification dated 26-1-1950 in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 5(1) of the Act. Thereupon the respondent applied to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the conviction and sentence on the ground that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try the case inasmuch as S. 5(1), under which it was sent to the Court for trial was unconstitutional and void under Art. 13 (2) as it denied to the respondent the equal protection of the laws enjoined by Art. 14. The High Court by a Full Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and four other Judges quashed the conviction and directed the trial of the respondent and the other accused persons according to law. Hence the appeal.

3. The Act is instituted "An Act to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences", and the preamble declares that it is expedient to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences". Section 3 empowers the State Government by notification in the official gazette to constitute special Courts, and S. 4 provides for the appointment of special Judges to preside over such Courts. Section 5, whose constitutionality is impugned, runs thus :

"5(1) A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may by general or special order in writing, direct.

(2) No direction shall be made under sub-s. (1) for the trial of an offence for which an accused person was being tried at the commencement of this Act before any Court but, save as aforesaid, such direction may be made in respect of an offence, whether such offence was committed before or after the commencement of this Act."

4. Section 6 to 15 prescribe the special procedure which the Court has to follow in the trial of the cases referred to it. The main features of such procedure which mark a departure from the established procedure for criminal trials under the Code of Criminal Procedure are the elimination of the committal procedure in sessions cases and the substitution of the procedure laid down in the Code for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate, trial without jury or assessors, restriction of the Court s power in granting adjournments, special powers of deal with refractory accused and dispensation of de navo trial on transfer of a case from one special Court to another. While some of these departures from the normal procedure might, in practice, operate in some respects to the disadvantage of persons tried before the special Court, it cannot be said that they derogate from the essential requirements of a fair and impartial trial, so as to give rise, from their very nature, to an inference of a discriminatory design. In other words, it cannot be said that the special procedure provided in the Act is, on its face, calculated to prejudice the fair trial of persons subjected to it. The departure in each case is plainly calculated to shorten the trial and thus to attain the declared objective of the statute.

5. Harries C. J. who delivered the leading judgement, in which Das and Benerjee JJ. concurred, applied the test of what may be called "reasonab