1952 Supreme(SC) 71

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
10th November 1952
PATANJALI SASTRI, C.J.I., B.K. MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS, BOSE AND GULAM HASAN, JJ.
Chelloor Manknkal Narayan, Ittirvi Nambudiri, Appellant
Versus
State of Travancore-Cochin.
Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 1952.
Advocates appeared
Shri M. K. Nambiar, Senior Advocate (Shri Ramasheshayya Chaudhury and Shri M. B. Kurup, Advocates, with him) instructed by Shri S. Subramanian, Agent, for Appellant; Shri T. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-General of Travancore Cochin (Shri M. K. Krishna Pillai, Advocate, with him), instructed by Shri P. A. Mehta, Agent for the State.

Headnote:Section 405-Scope and applicability.

       Held: "The other point that requires consideration is, whether on the prosecution evidence as it stands the accused can be held guilty of criminal breach of trust? As laid down in S. 385, Cochin Penal Code, (corresponding to S. 405, Indian Penal Code) to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, it is essential that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some property or with any dominion or power over it. It has to be established further that in respect of the property so entrusted, there was dishonest misappropriation or dishonest conversion or dishonest use or disposal in violation of a direction of law of legal contract, by the accused himself or by someone else which he willingly suffered to do.

       It follows almost axiomatically from this definition that the ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been committed, must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit. In the case before us it is not disputed that if the sum of Rs. 23,100 was paid by P.W.I. to the appellant by way of illegal gratification to induce the latter to make an allotment of cloth in his favour, there could be no question of entrustment in such payment. The payee would then receive the money on his own behalf and not on behalf of or in trust for anybody else. The criminality of an act of this charaoter would consist in illegal receipt of the money and the question of subsequent misappropriation or conversion of the same would not arise at all. - Article 136-Interference by Supreme Court in Criminal appeals.

       Held: "It cannot be disputed that the High Court even though it was hearing an appeal from an order of acquittal, had full powers to review the entire evidence on the record and reach its own conclusion that the acquittal order should be set aside. But as the Privy Council pointed out in-Sheosarup v. Emperor, A.I.R. •1934 P.C. 227 in exercising these powers the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as: (1) the views of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses; (2) presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he had been acquitted at the trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.

       "The High Court, in our opinion, did not clearly keep before it these rules and principles well-known and recognized in the administration of criminal justice. It reversed the decision of the trial court without noticing or giving due weight and consideration to important matters relied upon by that court and its decision has to a large extent been influenced by suspicious circumstances disclosed at the trial which are undoubtedly prejudicial to the accused, but in regard to which no opportunity of explanation was given to him when he was examined under the provisions of the Cochin Criminal Procedure Code which corresponds to S. 342 of the Indian Code. According to the principles which are recognized and acted upon by this court in dealing with criminal appeals coming before it on special leave these would be considered adequate grounds justifying our interference with the decision of the High Court. - Section 423-Appeal from acquittal.

       Held: "It cannot be disputed that the High Court, even though it was hearing an appeal from an order of acquittal, had full powers to review the entire evidence on the record and reach its own conclusion that the acquittal order should be set aside. But as the Privy Council pointed out in " Sheoswarup v. Emperor" A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 227, in exercising these powers the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as: (1) the views of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses: (2) presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he had been acquitted at the trial: (3) the right of accused to the benefit of any doubt: and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.

       The High Court, in our opinion, did not clearly keep before it these rules and principles well-known and recognised in the administration of criminal justice. It reversed the decision of the trial court without noticing or giving due weight and consideration to important matters relied upon by that Court and its decision has to a large extent been influenced by Suspicious circumstances disclosed at the trial which are undoubtedly prejudicial to the accused, but in regard to which no opportunity of explanation was given to him when he was examined under the provisions of the Cochin Criminal Procedure Code which corresponds to S. 342 of the Indian Code. According to the principles which are recognised and acted upon by this court in dealing with criminal appeals coming before it on special leave these would. be considered adequate grounds justifying our interference with the decision of the High Court.