1. Public servant convicted under Section 161, Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for accepting illegal gratification. (Para 1 )
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1959 Supreme(SC) 223
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
15th December, 1959.
B.P. SINHA, C.J.I., P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.C. DAS GUPTA AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.
C. I. Emden,. Appellant
Versus
State of U.P., Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 68 of 1958.
Advocates appeared
M/s. Frank Anthony, Udai Pratap Singh and P. C. Agarwala, Advocates for Appellant; M/s. G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, Advocates, for Respondent.
Advocates:
C.P.LAL, FRANK ANTHONY, G.C.MATHUR, P.C.AGRAWAL, Udaipratap Singh
C.P.LAL, FRANK ANTHONY, G.C.MATHUR, P.C.AGRAWAL, Udaipratap Singh
Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is constitutional. The term "gratification" is interpreted literally; receiving any money other than legal remuneration triggers a statutory presumption of bribery, which the accused must rebut by providing a reasonably probable explanation.
Headnote:(A) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Section 4(1) - Constitution of India - Article 14 - Statutory presumption - Challenge to the vires of Section 4(1) on the ground of violation of equality before law - Article 14 does not forbid reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia with a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved - Eradication of corruption among public servants is a rational basis for classification - Section 4(1) is constitutional. (Para 5)
(B) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Section 4(1) - Indian Penal Code - Section 161 - Interpretation of "gratification" - Whether proof that money was paid as a bribe is necessary to raise the statutory presumption - "Gratification" should be construed in its literal dictionary meaning as satisfaction of appetite or desire - Where it is proved that a public servant accepted money which is not legal remuneration, the presumption must be raised - Requiring proof that the money was a bribe would render the statutory presumption superfluous. (Paras 9-10)
(C) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - Section 4(1) - Onus of proof - Rebutting the statutory presumption - The burden of proof required to rebut the presumption is less than that required of the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt - The accused may discharge the burden by evidence satisfying the court of the probability of the explanation. (Paras 11-12)
Facts of the case:
A public servant was convicted for accepting a bribe from a contractor. The prosecution established that the public servant demanded monthly payments to ensure the contractor could carry out the contract without harassment. A trap was laid, and the public servant was caught accepting a sum of money. The public servant claimed the amount was a loan for children's clothing.
Findings of Court:
The court held that the defense's explanation was improbable and unreasonable given the public servant's bank balance, salary, and the nature of the relationship with the contractor. The statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Act was raised and not rebutted.
Issues: Whether Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is unconstitutional under Article 14; whether the term "gratification" requires proof of a bribe to trigger the statutory presumption; and the standard of proof for the accused to rebut the presumption.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that Section 4(1) is constitutional as it serves the legitimate object of rooting out corruption. "Gratification" includes any money received other than legal remuneration, which automatically triggers the statutory presumption. To rebut this, the accused must provide a reasonably probable explanation.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- crime and sentencing
- constitutional law
- practice and procedure
Table of Contents
2. Constitutionality of Section 4(1), Prevention of Corruption Act under Article 14; interpretation of gratification; and the standard of proof required to rebut statutory presumptions. (Para 4 , 6 , 11 )
3. Section 4(1) is constitutional based on reasonable classification; gratification denotes any non-legal remuneration; and the accused may rebut presumptions by showing a reasonably probable explanation. (Para 5 , 9 , 10 , 12 , 13 , 14 )
4. Statutory presumption under Section 4(1), Prevention of Corruption Act is raised upon proof of receipt of gratification other than legal remuneration, regardless of its incriminating character. (Para 9 , 10 )
5. Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence confirmed. (Para 15 )
6. Is the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, constitutional under Article 14?
Yes. The provision is based on a reasonable classification and intelligible differentia, recognizing the difficulty of proving bribery. There is a rational relation between the presumption and the legislative object of eradicating corruption among public servants to ensure clean administration. (Para 5 )
7. What constitutes gratification for the purpose of raising a statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947?
Gratification is interpreted in its literal dictionary meaning. If it is proved that a public servant accepted any gratification or valuable thing other than legal remuneration, the statutory presumption is raised without the prosecution needing to prove the payment was a bribe. (Para 9 , 10 )
8. What is the standard of proof required for an accused to rebut a statutory presumption in a criminal trial?
The burden of proof for the accused is less than the prosecution's requirement to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption may be discharged by evidence satisfying the court of the probability of the accused's explanation. (Para 12 )
Judgment
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. : This appeal by special leave has been filed by C. I. Emden hereinafter called the appellant) who has been convicted under S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and under S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). The case against him was that he had accepted a bribe of Rs. 375 from Sarat Chandra Shukla on January 8, 1953. The appellant was a Loco Foreman at Alambagh Loco Shed, and Shukla had secured a contract at the same place for the removal of cinders from ash pits and for loading coal. This contract had been given to Shukla in June 1952. The prosecution case was that the appellant demanded from Shukla Rs. 400 per month in order that Shukla may be allowed to carry out his contract peacefully without any harassment. Shukla was told by the appellant that he had been receiving a monthly payment from Ram Ratan who had held a similar contract before him and that it would be to his interest to agree to pay the bribe. Shukla, however, refused to accede to this request and that led to many hostile acts on the part of the appellant. On January 3, 1953, the appellant again asked Shukla to pay him the monthly bribe as already suggested; Shukla then requested him to reduce the demand on the ground that the contract given to him was for a much lesser amount than that which had been given to his predecessor Ram Ratan; the appellant thereupon agreed to accept Rs. 375. Shukla had no money at the time and so he asked for time to make the necessary arrangement. The agreement then was that Shukla would pay the money to the appellant on January 8, 1953. Meanwhile Shukla approached the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Corruption Branch, and gave him information about the illegal demand made by the appellant. Shukla s statement was then recorded before a magistrate and it was decided to lay a trap. Accordingly a party consisting of Shukla, the magistrate, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and some other persons went to the Loco Yard. Shukla and Sada Shiv proceeded inside the Yard while the rest of the party stood at the gate. Shukla then met the appellant and informed him that he had brought the money; he was told that the appellant would go out in the Yard and accept the money. At about 3 p.m. the appellant went out to the Yard and, after making a round, came to the place which was comparatively secluded. He then asked Shukla to pay the money and Shukla gave him a bundle containing the marked currency notes of the value of Rs. 375. A signal was then made by Shukla and the raiding party immediately arrived on the scene. The magistrate disclosed his identity to the appellant and asked him to produce the amount paid to him by Shukla. The appellant then took out the currency notes from his pocket and handed them over to the magistrate. It is on these facts that charges under S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 5(2) of the Act were framed against the appellant.
2. The appellant denied the charge. He admitted that he had received Rs. 375 from Shukla but his case was that at his request Shukla had advanced the said amount to him by way of loan for meeting the expenses of the clothing of his children who were studying in school. The appellant alleged that since he had been in need of money he had requested Kishan Chand to arrange for a loan of Rs. 500; but knowing about his need Shukla offered to advance him the loan, and it was as such loan that Shukla paid him Rs. 375 and the appellant accepted the said amount. Both the prosecution and the defence led evidence to support their respective versions.
3. The learned special judge who tried the case believed the evidence given by Shukla, held that it was sufficiently corroborated, and found that the defence story was improbable and untrue. The learned Judge also held that on the evidence led before him the presumption under S. 4 of the Act had to be raised and that the said presumption had not been rebutted by the evidence led by the defe
