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1978 Supreme(SC) 151

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, CJI., P.N. SHINGHAL AND V.D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.
Gurupad Khandappa Magdum, Appellant
Versus
Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1828 of 1975
Decided on 27-4-1978.
Advocates appeared
 
Mr. R. B. Datar, Advocate, for Appellant; Mr. V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. V. D. Khanna, Advocates, for Respondents.

Advocates:
R.B.DATAR, V.D.KHANNA, V.N.GANPULE

Headnote:Hindu Succession Act, Sec. 6 Proviso Expl. 1-A coparcener dying intestate leaving behind female heirs also specified in class I of the Schedule proviso applies and the property would not devolve on the survivors but as provided in the proviso and explanation 1-Explanation being explanatory to the proviso envisages co-relation of the subject matter which is dealt by the section-Share of the deceased coparcener at the time of his death has to be ascertained as if there had been an actual partition between the coparcener and his sons the widow getting one share being mother of the sons-Explanation assumes a fiction of actual partition of the property having taken place immediately before his death whose property is being claimed-The assumption is irrevocable and one cannot go back while ascertaining the share and ignore without reference to such ascertainment-To such share would be added the share which is capable of being divided out of the share of deceased. (Paras 6, 11, & 14)

       Interpretation of statute-The court will prefer the interpretation which furthers the intention of the legislature and remedy the injustice which the Legislature wanted to remove.

       (68 Bom L.R. 74 & 1975 Bom 257 approved) (Para 14)

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Here are the key points derived from the provided legal document:

  • The case involves the interpretation of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, particularly the proviso and Explanation 1 thereto, concerning the devolution of coparcenary property interests upon the death of a male Hindu (!) (!) .
  • Explanation 1 to Section 6 creates a fiction that the interest of a coparcener is the same as it would have been if a partition had taken place immediately before death, regardless of whether such a partition actually occurred (!) (!) .
  • This fiction is considered irrevocable once established for the purpose of determining the deceased's share, and it must be applied consistently throughout the process of ascertaining heirs' shares (!) (!) .
  • The interpretation of this Explanation should align with legislative intent, which aims to expand and clarify the rights of female heirs and avoid retrogressive interpretations that could undermine social reforms (!) .
  • The legal analysis emphasizes that the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property is to be determined as if a partition had occurred immediately before death, and this share forms the basis for calculating the heirs' respective shares (!) (!) .
  • The judgment underscores that the fiction introduced by the Explanation is a tool to facilitate the equitable distribution of property, reflecting the legislative intent to enlarge female heirs’ rights and ensure social justice (!) .
  • The interpretation adopted promotes the purpose of the law, which is to further social reform by recognizing the equal rights of women in property succession (!) .

Please let me know if you need further analysis or specific legal advice based on this document.


JUDGMENT

CHANDRACHUD, CJI.:— It will be easier, with the help of the following pedigree, to understand the point involved in this appeal:

Khandappa died on June 27, 1960 leaving him surviving his wife Hirabai, who is the plaintiff, two sons Gurupad and Shivpad,. who are defendants 1 and 2 respectively, and three daughters, defendants 3 to 5. On November 6, 1962 Hirabai filed Special Civil Suit No. 26 of 1963 in the court of the Joint Civil judge, Senior Division, Sangli for partition and separate possession of a 7/24th share in two houses, land, two shops and movables on the basis that these properties belonged to the joint family consisting of her husband, herself and their two sons. If a partition were to take place during Khandappas lifetime between himself and his two sons, the plaintiff would have got a 1/4th share in the joint family properties, the other three getting a 1/4 the share each. Khandappas 1/4th share would devolve upon his death on six sharers: the plaintiff and her five children, each having a 1/24th share therein. Adding 1/4th and 1/24th, the plaintiff claims a 7/24th share in the joint family properties. That , in short, is the plaintiffs case.

2. Defendants 2 to 5 admitted the plaintiffs claim, the suit having been contested by defendant 1, Gurupad, only. He contended that the suit properties did not belong to the joint family, that they were Khandappas self-acquisitions and that, on the date of Khandappas death in 1960 there was no joint family in existence. he alleged that Khandappa had effected a partition of the suit properties between himself and his two sons in December 1952 and December 1954 and that, by a family arrangement dated March 31, 1955 he had given directions for disposal of the share which was reserved by him for himself in the earlier partitions. There was, therefore, no question of a fresh partition. That, in short, is the case of defendant 1.

3. The trial court by its judgment dated July 13, 1965 rejected defendant 1s case that the properties were Khandappas self-acquisitions and that he had partitioned them during his lifetime. Upon that finding the plaintiff became indisputably entitled to a share in the joint family properties but, following the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shiramabai v. Kalgonda, 66 Bom LR 351 : (AIR 1964 Bom 263) the learned trial Judge limited that share to 1/24th, refusing to add 1/4th and 1/24th together. As against that decree, defendant 1 filed first appeal No. 524 of 1966 in the Bombay High Court, while the plaintiff filed cross objections. By a judgment dated March 19, 1975 a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed defendant 1s appeal and allowed the plaintiffs cross-objections by holding that the suit properties belonged to the joint family, that there was no prior partition and that the plaintiff is entitled to a 7/24th share. Defendant 1 has filed this appeal against the High Courts judgment by special leave.

4. Another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Rangubai Lalji v. Laxman Lalji, 68 Bom LR 74 had already reconsidered and dissented from the earlier Division Bench judgment in Shiramabai Bhimgonda, (AIR 1964 Bom 263). In these two cases, the judgment of the Bench was delivered by the same learned Judge, Patel J. On further consideration the learned Judge felt that Shiramabai was not fully argued and was incorrectly decided and that on a true view of law, the widows share must be ascertained by adding the share to which she is entitled at a notional partition during her husbands lifetime and the share which she would get in her husbands interest upon his death. In the judgment under appeal, the High Court has based itself on the judgment in Rangubai Lalji endorsing indirectly the view that Shriamabai was incorrectly decided.

5. Since the view of the High Court that the suit properties belonged to the joint family and that there was no prior partition is well-founded and is not seriously disputed, the decision of this appeal rests on the


















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