Judgment

SHINGHAL, J.:- These appeals by special leave arise out of a common judgment of the Rajasthan High Court dated Oct. 10, 1968, by which the suits which were filed by the present appellants were dismissed in pursuance of the earlier judgment of the same court dated Nov. 9. 1964, on the ground that they were governed by S. 179 (2) of the Rajasthan Town Municipalities Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and were barred by limitation.

2. The facts giving rise to the appeals were different in details, but they were examined in the High Court with reference to the common questions of law which arose in all of them and formed the basis of that Courts decision against the plaintiffs. We have heard these as companion appeals, and will decide them by a common judgment.

3. It is not necessary to give the detailed facts of all the cases as it will be enough to refer to the suit which was filed by M/s. Surajmal Banshidhar and the developments connected with it, in order to appreciate the controversy.

4. The plaintiff firm referred to above carried on business in "pakka arat" and exported goods of various kinds from Ganganagar. The Municipal Board of Ganganagar realised "export duty", by way of terminal tax, on the exported goods. The plaintiff therefore raised a suit on Oct. 19, 1957, challenging the Boards right to "impose or to realise" any export duty during the period June 5, 1954 to March 10, 1957, amounting to Rs. 10,729/-. It however confined the suit to the recovery of Rs. 10,000/- along with interest and gave up the balance. The Board denied the claim in the suit and pleaded, inter alia, that the levy of the terminal tax was in accordance with the law and the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court rejected the defence and decreed the suit, and its defence was upheld by the District Judge on appeal. Similar decrees were passed in the other suits, for various sums of money. The Board took the matter to the High Court in second appeals. The appeals were heard by a Single Judge who, while deciding that the suits were governed by S. 179 (2) of the Act, referred the question of the legality of the levy to a larger Bench. A Full Bench of the High Court held that the levy of the terminal tax was illegal, and sent the cases back to the Single Judge who allowed the appeals only for those amounts which were found to be within limitation under S. 179 (2) of the Act and dismissed the other suits. The plaintiffs obtained special leave and have come up to this Court in these circumstances.

5. The question which arises for consideration is whether the suits fell within the purview of S. 179 (2) of the Act. The first two sub-sections of Sec. 179 which bear on the controversy read as follows,-

"179. Limitation of suits, etc.- (1) No suit shall be instituted against any municipal board, president, member, officer, servant or any person acting under the direction of such municipal board, chairman, member, officer or servant for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing, stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been, in the case of a municipal board, delivered or left at its office, and, in case of a chairman, member, officer, or servant, or person as aforesaid, delivered to him or left at his office or usual place of abode; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.

(2) Every such suit shall, unless it is a suit for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be dismissed if it is not instituted within six months after the accrual of the alleged cause of action."

The question therefore is whether the illegal levy of terminal tax (assuming that it was illegal as held by the High Court) could be said to be a thing "done or purporting to be done" under the Act. A similar question arose for the consideration