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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P. SATHASIVAM, CJI., B.S. CHAUHAN, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, RANJAN GOGOI, S.A. BOBDE, JJ.
Mrs. Sarah Mathew – Appellant
Versus
The Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director – Dr. K.M. Cherian & Ors. – Respondents
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.829 OF 2005
WITH
M/s. HT Media Ltd. & Ors. – Petitioners
Versus
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) – Respondent
Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos.5687-5688 of 2013
WITH
M/s. Hindustan Media Venture Ltd. & Ors. – Petitioners
Versus
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) … Respondent
Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5764 of 2013
Decided On : 26-11-2013
(1993) 3 SCC 4 - Relied upon
(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XXXVI - Sections 468, 469 and 473 - Bar of limitation; exclusion of time and extension of period of limitation - Delay in filing complaint may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in arriving at the final verdict - By itself no ground for dismissing the complaint - Chapter XXXVI inserted to make criminal justice system more orderly, efficient and just by providing period of limitation for certain offences - Strikes a balance between the interest of the complainant and the interest of the accused - Concerning limitation Chapter XXXVI is a Code by itself - Sections 468 and 469 will have to be read with Section 473. (Para 18, 19 and 21)
AIR 1970 SC 962; AIR 1981 SC 1054 - Relied upon
(1992) 1 SCC 225; (1999) 7 SCC 604; (1995) 1 SCC 42; (2008) 13 SCC 229; 1997 Cr.L.J 90 (MP) - Distinguished impliedly
(c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapters XIV, XVI and XXXVI - Taking cognizance - Application of mind or taking judicial notice of offence by Magistrate with a view to initiating proceedings - Entirely an act of the Magistrate (Para 25)
AIR 1964 SC 1541; AIR 1951 SC 207; AIR 1961 SC 986; (2008) 2 SCC 492 - Relied upon
(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 473 r/w sections 468, 469 and 470 - Magistrate can take cognizance only if complaint filed within limitation period - Time excludable should be excluded - Under section 473, court is duty bound to examine plausibility of explanation as also whether such delay should be ignored - Therefore It is the date of filing of the complaint which is material. (Paras 26 and 27)
(1993) 3 SCC 4; (2008) 10 SCC 139; AIR 1959 SC 433 - Relied upon
(1971) 2 SCC 654; (1870-71) VII Moore N.S. 314; (2000) 8 SCC 131; (1997) 2 SCC 397 - Relied upon impliedly
(2013) 2 SCC 435 - Relied upon impliedly
(1995) 1 SCC 42 - Distinguished
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 468 - Relevant date for computing period of limitation - Date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of proceedings - 'Actus curiae neminem gravabit' meaning 'act of court shall prejudice no man'. (Para 30)
(2003) 8 SCC 559, (2007) 7 SCC 394; (1993) 3 SCC 4 - Relied upon
(f) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XXXVI - Section 468 - Rules of limitation - Interpretation - Cognizance not defined in CrPC - Hence for interpreting section 468 rule of purposive interpretation has to be resorted to - Casus Omissus - Not attracted - In such cases rule of reasonable construction has to be preferred over literal construction. (Para 32, 36, 37)
(2007) 3 SCC 700; (2008) 3 SCC 279; 1956 SCR 166; (2007) 7 SCC 394 - Relied upon
AIR 1981 SC 1054; (2007) 2 SCC 230 - Referred
(2003) 6 SCC 659, (2012) 9 SCC 552; (2003) 11 SCC 405 - Distinguished
(g) Interpretation of statutes - Internal Aids - Heading or title prefixed to sections or group of sections - Have a limited role in interpretation - They give a general or broad indication of the nature of subject matter - Do not control meaning of the provision - Contention based on heading of Chapter XXXVI that date of taking cognizance is material - Rejected. (Para 38)
(1990) 1 SCC 400 - Relied upon
(h) Interpretation of statutes - Penal statutes - Must be construed strictly - But there are cases where narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction cannot be accepted - Further there is difference in substantive and procedural law - CrPC being procedural law should be construed liberally so as to serve as handmaid of justice - Section 468 should therefore be construed so as to strike a balance between right of complainant and accused. (Para 39)
(1976) 3 SCC 684; (1977) 1 SCC 300; (2003) 3 SCC 272; (2004) 8 SCC 312; (2005) 4 SCC 480 - Relied upon
1975 (3) SCR 944 - Relied upon impliedly
(2012) 5 SCC 424; 1959 SCR 379; (2000) 1 SCC 230; (1989) 1 SCC 101; AIR 1954 SC 496; (2005) 1 SCC 368; (2004) 6 SCC 672 - Distinguished impliedly
(i) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 468 - Period of limitation - Computation of - Relevant date - Date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution - Not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. (Para 41)
(2003) 8 SCC 559; (2007) 7 SCC 394 - Relied upon
(1990) Supp. SCC 121 - Distinguished
Facts of the case:
The question of correctness of Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, (1990) supp. SCC 121has been referred to the five Judge Bench in this case. The questions raised are:
(a) what would be the relevant date for computing period of limitation u/s 468, CrPC. Whether it is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence?, and,
(b) Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai, (1990) Supp. SCC 12 or Bharat Kale, (2003) 8 SCC 559 (which is followed in Japani Sahoo, (2007) 7 SCC 394) lays down the correct law.
Finding of the Court:
Krishna Pillai, (1990) Supp. SCC 12, is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C.
Result : Reference disposed of.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:
The relevant date for calculating the limitation period under Section 468 of the CrPC is the date of filing the complaint or the initiation of prosecution, not the date when the Magistrate takes cognizance (!) .
The interpretation of ‘taking cognizance’ is that it is an act of the court where the Magistrate applies their mind or takes judicial notice of an offence to initiate proceedings. It is a separate and distinct act from the filing of a complaint or charge sheet (!) (!) .
The provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the CrPC, which deals with limitation, are to be read as a whole, and the act of taking cognizance is the critical point for limitation purposes. This chapter aims to balance the interests of the complainant and the accused, allowing for condonation of delays where justified (!) (!) .
The interpretation that the limitation period is linked to the date of filing the complaint or institution of prosecution is supported by the legislative intent and the structure of the relevant provisions, which emphasize the importance of the date of filing rather than the date of cognizance (!) .
Legal maxims, such as ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’ (the act of court shall prejudice no one), support the view that procedural delays caused by the court should not prejudice diligent complainants. Maxims serve as guiding principles but do not override clear statutory language (!) (!) .
The heading or title of the chapter has a limited role in interpretation and does not control the plain meaning of the statutory provisions if they are unambiguous (!) .
Strict construction is generally applied to penal statutes, but procedural laws like the CrPC should be construed liberally to serve justice, especially in the context of limitation provisions (!) (!) .
The doctrine of Casus Omissus (omission of certain provisions) does not justify judicial insertion of words or provisions where the legislature has not provided for them, emphasizing the importance of adherence to the legislative language (!) .
The legislative history and object of Chapter XXXVI reflect its purpose to promote prompt prosecution, prevent unnecessary delays, and balance the rights of both parties. The chapter aims to ensure efficiency and fairness in criminal proceedings (!) .
The interpretation of ‘cognizance’ as a court act of applying its mind is crucial and consistent with the overall scheme of the CrPC, reinforcing that limitation is calculated from the date of filing or institution, not from when cognizance is formally taken (!) (!) .
The right to speedy trial, as a facet of Article 21, underscores that delays attributable to courts should not unjustly prejudice the prosecution or the complainant, and procedural provisions should be interpreted to uphold this fundamental right (!) (!) .
The heading of the chapter serves only as a broad indicator and does not control the interpretation of the provisions, which must be understood in their context and purpose (!) .
These points collectively clarify the legal understanding that the limitation period is centered on the date of filing or institution of prosecution, with the act of the court taking cognizance being a separate procedural step that does not alter this calculation.
Judgment :-
Smt. Ranjana Prakash Desai, J.
1. While dealing with Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005 a two-Judge Bench of this Court noticed a conflict between a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2003) 8 SCC 559] which is followed in another two-Judge Bench decision in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty [(2007) 7 SCC 394] and a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr. [(1990) supp. SCC 121] . In Bharat Kale it was held that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date is the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of a process by court. In Krishna Pillai this Court was concerned with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which stated that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 after the expiry of one year from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. The three-Judge Bench held that since magisterial action in the case before it was beyond the period of one year from the date of commission of the offence, the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance when he did in view of bar under Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. Thus, there was apparent conflict on the question whether for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) in respect of a criminal complaint the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance. The two-Judge Bench, therefore, directed that this case may be put up before a three-Judge Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. When the matter was placed before the three-Judge Bench, the three-Judge Bench doubted the correctness of Krishna Pillai and observed that as a co-ordinate Bench, it cannot declare that Krishna Pillai does not lay down the correct law and, therefore, the matter needs to be referred to a five-Judge Bench to examine the correctness of the view taken in Krishna Pillai. Accordingly, this appeal along with other matters where similar issue is involved is placed before this Constitution Bench.
2. No specific questions have been referred to us. But, in our opinion, the following questions arise for our consideration:
A. Whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence?
B. Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai or Bharat Kale (which is followed in Japani Sahoo) lays down the correct law.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length and carefully read their written submissions. We may give gist of their submissions and then proceed to answer the questions which fall for our consideration.
4. Gist of submissions of Mr. Krishnamurthi Swami, learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005.
a. KrishnaPillai was rendered in the context of Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. There is no reference to either Section 468 or Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in this judgment. This judgment merely focuses on the meaning of the term ‘taking cognizance’ and has accordingly interpreted Section 9 without reference to any provisions of the Cr.P.C. Hence, this judgment cannot be considered authority for the purposes of interpretation of provisions of Chapter XXXVI. On the other hand Bharat Kale considers various provisions of Chapter XXXVI. All the provisions have been cumulatively read to conclude that the limitation prescribed is not for taking cognizance within the period of limitation, but
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