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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
UDAY UMESH LALIT, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, VINEET SARAN, JJ.
M. Ravindran - Appellant
Versus
The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence - Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 699 of 2020 (arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 2333 of 2020)
Decided On : 26-10-2020
(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 167(2) – Constitution of India – Article 21 – Default bail (Compulsive bail) – Intent of legislature was to balance need for sufficient time limits to complete investigation with need to protect civil liberties of accused – Section 167(2) provides for a clear mandate that investigative agency must collect required evidence within prescribed time period, failing which accused can no longer be detained – This ensures that investigating officers are compelled to act swiftly and efficiently without misusing prospect of further remand – This also ensures that Court takes cognizance of case without any undue delay from date of giving information of offence, so that society at large does not lose faith and develop cynicism towards criminal justice system – Section 167(2) is integrally linked to constitutional commitment under Article 21 promising protection of life and personal liberty against unlawful and arbitrary detention and must be interpreted in a manner which serves this purpose – Courts cannot adopt a rigid or formalistic approach whilst considering any issue that touches upon the rights contained in Article 21 – Section 167(2) has to be interpreted keeping in mind threefold objectives expressed by legislature namely ensuring a fair trial, expeditious investigation and trial, and setting down a rationalized procedure that protects interests of indigent sections of society – These objects are nothing but subsets of overarching fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21. (Paras 11.5, 11.6 and 11.8)
(B) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 167(2) – Default bail(Compulsive bail) – Court cannot suo motu grant bail without considering whether accused is ready to furnish bail or not – This is an inbuilt safeguard within Section 167(2) to ensure that accused is not automatically released from custody without obtaining satisfaction of Court that he is able to guarantee his presence for further investigation, or for trial – Where accused has promptly exercised his right under Section 167(2) and indicated his willingness to furnish bail, he can be denied bail on account of delay in deciding his application or erroneous rejection of same – Nor can he be kept detained in custody on account of subterfuge of prosecution in filing a police report or additional complaint on the same day that bail application is filed – There could be rare occasions where accused voluntarily forfeits his right to bail on account of threat to his personal security outside of remand or for some other reasons – Once a charge-sheet is filed, such waiver of right by accused becomes final and Section 167(2) ceases to apply – Prosecution would not be allowed to take advantage of its own default of not filing investigation report/complaint against appellant within stipulated period. (Paras 12.4 and 12.5)
(C) Narcotics, Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Section 36A(4) – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 167(2) – Default bail(Compulsive bail) – Non-submission of charge-sheet within stipulated period – Once accused files application for bail under Proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have availed of or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of stipulated time limit for investigation – If accused applies for bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. read with Section 36A (4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or extended period, Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from Public Prosecutor – Such prompt action will restrict prosecution from frustrating legislative mandate to release accused on bail in case of default by investigative agency – Right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of bail application; or subsequent filing of charge-sheet or a report seeking extension of time by prosecution before Court; or filing of charge-sheet during interregnum when challenge to rejection of bail application is pending before a higher Court – However, where accused fails to apply for default bail when right accrues to him, and subsequently charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before Magistrate, right to default bail would be extinguished – Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of case or grant further time for completion of investigation, as the case may be, though accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of Cr.P.C. – Notwithstanding order of default bail passed by Court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), actual release of accused from custody is contingent on directions passed by competent Court granting bail – If accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with terms and conditions of bail order within time stipulated by Court, his continued detention in custody is valid – Final report was required to be filed within 180 days from first date of remand – Public Prosecutor had not filed any such report within 180 days period for seeking extension of time up to one year for filing final report/additional complaint before Trial Court – High Court was not justified in setting aside judgment and order of Trial Court releasing accused on default bail – Impugned judgment of High Court stands set aside and Trial Court judgment confirmed. (Paras 17.1, 18.1 to 19)
(D) Interpretation of Statute – Rules of Construction – In case of any ambiguity in construction of a penal statute, Courts must favour interpretation which leans towards protecting rights of accused, given ubiquitous power disparity between individual accused and State machinery – This is applicable not only in case of substantive penal statutes but also in case of procedures providing for curtailment of liberty of accused – With respect to Cr.P.C. particularly, Statement of Objects and Reasons is an important aid of construction. (Para 11.8)
Facts of the case:
Appellant was arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 04.08.2018 for the alleged offence punishable under Section 8(c) read with Sections 22(c), 23(c), 25A and 29 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. After completion of 180 days from the remand date, that is, 31.01.2019, the Appellant (Accused No.11) filed application for bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on 01.02.2019 before the Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the NDPS Act, Chennai on the ground that the investigation was not complete and charge-sheet had not yet been filed. Accordingly, on 05.02.2019, the Trial Court granted the order of bail in Crl. M.P. No. 131 of 2019 in R.R. No. 09/2017 pending before the said court. Respondent/complainant, i.e. the Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence filed petition before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying to cancel the bail of the Appellant. The High Court, by impugned judgment, allowed the said appeal and consequently cancelled the order of bail granted by the Trial Court.
Findings of Court:
State/investigating agency has, in order to defeat the indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail, filed an additional complaint before the concerned court subsequent to the conclusion of the arguments of the Appellant on the bail application. If such a practice is allowed, the right under Section 167(2) would be rendered nugatory as the investigating officers could drag their heels till the time the accused exercises his right and conveniently files an additional complaint including name of the accused as soon as the application for bail is taken up for disposal.
Result : Appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT :
Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.
Leave granted.
2. The judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed in Crl. O.P. No. 9750 of 2019 by the High Court of Judicature at Madras is called into question in this appeal.
3. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as follows:
3.1 The Appellant was arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 04.08.2018 for the alleged offence punishable under Section 8(c) read with Sections 22(c), 23(c), 25A and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act’). After completion of 180 days from the remand date, that is, 31.01.2019, the Appellant (Accused No.11) filed application for bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) on 01.02.2019 before the Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the NDPS Act, Chennai (‘Trial Court’) on the ground that the investigation was not complete and chargesheet had not yet been filed. Accordingly, on 05.02.2019, the Trial Court granted the order of bail in Crl. M.P. No. 131 of 2019 in R.R. No. 09/2017 pending before the said court.
3.2 The Respondent/complainant, i.e. the Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence filed Crl. O.P. No. 9750 of 2019 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying to cancel the bail of the Appellant. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, allowed the said appeal and consequently cancelled the order of bail granted by the Trial Court. Being aggrieved, the Appellant has approached this Court questioning the judgment of the High Court.
3.3 It is not in dispute that the Appellant was remanded to judicial custody on 04.08.2018 and hence the mandatory period of 180 days prescribed for filing of final report under Section 167(2), CrPC (excluding the date of remand) was completed on 31.01.2019. This is made amply clear by the calculation of days as per the Gregorian calendar as stated below:
| “August 2018 (from 05.08.2018 to 31.08.2018) | 27 days |
| September 2018 | 30 days |
| October 2018 | 31 days |
| November 2018 | 30 days |
| December 2018 | 31 days |
| January 2019 | 31 days |
| Total | 180 days” |
3.4 Accordingly, the Appellant filed his bail application on 01.02.2019 at 10:30 a.m. before the Trial Court. During the course of hearing of the bail application-after completion of the arguments of the counsel for the Appellant, to be precise-the Respondent/complainant filed an additional complaint against the Appellant at 4:25 p.m. on 01.02.2019 and sought for dismissal of the bail petition on the said basis. However, the Trial Court allowed the bail application on the ground that the Court has no power to intervene with the indefeasible right of the Appellant conferred on him by the legislative mandate of Section 167(2).
3.5 The said judgment of the Trial Court was set aside by the High Court on the ground that the additional complaint was filed on 01.02.2019 itself and since the application for bail under Section 167(2), CrPC was not disposed of by the time the additional complaint was filed, the Appellant could not take advantage of the fact that he had filed his bail petition prior in time. The High Court further reasoned that the Court of Session conducts work from the time it sits till the time it rises and hence the Appellant could not avail of any specific benefit for having filed the application at 10:30 a.m. inasmuch as the additional complaint was lodged during the course of hearing of the bail application, before the Court rose for the day.
4. Ms. Arunima Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant, taking us through the material on record and relying heavily on the observations of this Court in the case of Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453, argued that the High Court has misconstrued the mandate of Section 167(2), CrPC and has gravely erred in entering into the merits of
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