IMPORTANT POINT
Accused under TADA, 1987 has a statutory right to be released on bail if there is default on the part of the investigating agency to conclude investigating, within the period prescribed provided an application was moved before submission of charge sheet. But this right cannot be availed after charge sheet has been submitted and cognizance has been taken.

JUDGMENT

N.P. Singh, J.-Leave granted.

2. These appeals have been filed against the orders passed by the Designated Court, Bombay, rejecting the prayer for bail made on behalf of the appellants, who are accused under different sections of the Penal Code including Section 302 read with 149 and under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2)(i) of Section 3 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as TADA ).

3. After the incident relating to the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on 6.12.1992, communal riots flared up in the city of Bombay and its suburbs. On the night of 7.1.1993, around 11.30 P.M., according to the complainant, some unknown miscreants knocked the door of her house. The husband of the complainant sent her and the two children aged about 11 years and 9 years to a nearby house for shelter. In that very house other families had also taken shelter. It is said that around 12.30 in the night, the appellants along with others assembled in front of the said house and poured kerosene oil and set the house on fire. They also threatened and prevented persons from coming to the rescue of the victims by threatening them at the point of deadly weapons. Some inmates managed to come out of the house by opening the tiles of the roof, but many children, ladies and males were burnt to death. It is also the case of the prosecution that door of the house had been bolted from outside so that they may not escape. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and the appellants were put on trial for different offences including under Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(i) of the TADA. The Designated Court constituted under the provisions of the TADA, has rejected the prayer for bail, after discussing the allegations made against different appellants and materials collected during investigation against them including ocular testimony, that appellants put the house in question on fire by locking the doors from outside which resulted in death of several children, ladies and males. In one house itself six people were charred to death. The Designated Court has directed release on bail some of the accused persons, but in respect of the appellants, it has come to the conclusion that primafacie there were materials on the record to show that these appellants purported to strike terror and to create hatred among the two communities by using inflammable substance, that is petrol and kerosene, resulting in death of many of the victims and as such a case under the provisions of Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(i) of the TADA was made out.

4. The learned counsel, perhaps in view of serious allegations made against the appellants, did not press the appeal on merit by contending that if the allegations are considered in a prima-facie manner, no offence under Section 3(1) or Section 3(2)(i) of the TADA was disclosed. He however, took a stand that as the TADA was a temporary Act which has admittedly lapsed, there is no question of the appellants being tried for offences under any of the Sections of the TADA and the conditions prescribed by sub-section (8) of Section 20 of TADA in respect of grant of bail now have to be ignored. In other words, the Designated Court might be justified, according to the learned counsel, when it rejected the prayer for bail of the appellants, on 7th and 8th March 1994, but in view of the lapse of the TADA, now this Court can direct release of the appellants ignoring the provision of sub-section (8) of Section 20, because it will be deemed that after the lapse of TADA, now no prosecution for any offence under Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(i) is pending before the Designated Court.

5. There is no dispute that the TADA being a temporary enactment, its duration was specified in the Act itself, and it has expired on the expiry of the specified time. In such a situation, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 shall be of no help because Section 6 of the aforesaid Act is applicable only when any Central Act is repealed and