The court established that the exercise of suo motu powers must occur within a reasonable time, which is context-dependent and cannot be universally defined.

JUDGMENT :

SUNITA AGARWAL, J.

1. This civil reference has come up before this Bench on a reference made by the learned Single Judge as per the provisions of Rule 5(1) of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993 (in short as 'the High Court Rules'), with the reasons in the referral order that an authoritative pronouncement to provide a guidance to the subordinate authorities as to what would be a reasonable time in a given case for exercise of suo motu power, is needed.

2. A perusal of the referral order indicates that the learned Single Judge has proceeded to note the facts culled out from the record and then noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suo motu power could not have been exercised after a period of 27 years from the date of the alleged dispossession of the tenant, i.e. father of the respondent no.3. It was also noted that there are judgements of the Apex Court wherein it has been observed that where no period of limitation is provided in exercising suo motu power, the authority would be obliged to exercise the power within a reasonable period.

3. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner therein was that if the delay of 27 years in exercise of suo motu power is not taken to be unreasonable time, somebody may come after 100 years and say that he be conferred rights under Section 32 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and the possession be restored to him. In light of these arguments, it was opined by the learned Single Judge that the judgment of a Single bench of this Court in the matter of Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan vs. Ismail Gafurbhai Vora [1989(1) GLR 392] deserves to be reconsidered in light of the decision of the Apex Court that the suo motu power of review or revision or reopening the proceedings should be exercised within a reasonable time.

4. Taking note of the above, we have gone through the record of the Writ petition and the judgment of this Court in Bhaikha Umravkha Pathan (supra), which in the opinion of the learned Single Judge requires consideration. The learned Single Judge was facing a conflicting opinion which impelled him to make the reference.

5. To understand the conflict, the facts as noted by the learned Single Judge and reflected from the record of the Writ petition are considered. The original petitioner before the learned Single Judge claims to be the purchaser of the land by registered sale deed executed in the year 1982 from the owner impleaded as respondent no.4 therein. The entry of the sale was mutated in the revenue record on 01.08.1982 and, thereafter, it was certified. It is stated that there was no tenant in the said land and the respondent no.4, viz. the owner sold his land without any tenancy right with the assurance to the petitioner that the land was never given to anyone for cultivation either by collecting any rent or any share. Since after sale, the petitioner is personally cultivating the land in question. The proceeding under Section 32(1)(b) vide Tenancy Case No. 32/(1)(b)/170 was initiated, but was dropped by order dated 17.09.1984 by holding that there was no tenant on the land and that the deceased Rama Deva had notbeen cultivating the said land as tenant, but he was cultivating for few years from 1952-1954 as a mortgagee.

6. It seems that in a suo motu revision, while exercising the power under Section 76, the Deputy Collector by the order dated 01.09.1986 remanded the matter back to the Mamlatdar & ALT with a direction to decide the same. Thereafter, the dispossession of the heirs of the deceased Rama Deva was recorded even from the deposition recorded earlier in the original proceeding under Se