IMPORTANT POINT
Court while considering the question whether the arbitration award should be set aside, is not empowered to substitute its own view in place of the Arbitrator s view as if it is dealing with an appeal.

JUDGMENT

K. Venkataswami, J.-Leave granted.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The short question that arises for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the award by reducing the amount for the work done as well as allowing the interest only from the date of notice demanding the amount.

3. The appellant contractor undertook the work of transportation of waste and finished products within the plant of the respondent company commencing from 16.4.1982 to 31.3.1983. The agreement in respect of that contract was executed by both the parties on 8.6.1982. As certain disputes arose between the parties in respect of transportation work the appellant issued notices to the respondent calling upon them to settle the bills and claims raised by him. As the respondent failed to settle the bills, the appellant moved the City Civil Court, Hyderabad under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. Mr. Justice K. Punnayya (retired Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh) was appointed as Sole Arbitrator by order dated 31.10.1985. The learned Arbitrator by the award dated 1.8.1986, after giving opportunity to both the parties, determined the amount of Rs. 5,29,864.55 as payable by the respondent Company to the appellant. In addition to that the Arbitrator also awarded interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum on the said amount from 1.4.1983 till the date of award being made the rule of Court.

4. The appellant moved the City Civil Court, Hyderabad by filing O.S. No. 1027 of 1986 for making the award of the Arbitrator as rule of the Court and also prayed for the grant of interest at the rate of 21 per cent per annum from the date of decree till the date of realisation of the amount. The respondent Company, on the other hand, filed O.P. No. 349/86 challenging the award. The learned Judge City Civil Court by a common judgment dated 30.8.1988 decreed the suit filed by the appellant for making the award as rule of the Court by awarding 20% interest from the date of decree till the date of realisation of the amount and dismissed the O.P. filed by the respondent challenging the award.

5. Aggrieved by the common judgment and order of the City Civil Court, the respondent Company moved the High Court in C.M.A. No. 1277/88 and C.R.P. No. 3695/88 against O.P. No. 349/86 and O.S. No. 1027/86 respectively.

6. The Division Bench of the High Court, by a common judgment dated 29.9.1995, partly allowed the appeal as well as the Revision Petition by reducing the amount from Rs. 5,29,864.55 to Rs. 1,72,347/- and interest at 18% from 14.6.1984 instead of from 1.4.1983. The appellant is aggrieved by the said judgment of the High Court.

7. Mr. K. Madhava Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the well considered award of the arbitrator by examining the matter as a regular appellate court. Learned counsel also invited out attention to the discussion made by the Arbitrator as well as by the High Court regarding the relevant clause in the agreement and in particular to the expression one kilometre lead . We find from the Award that the Arbitrator has taken into account the oral evidence of both the parties and also the documentary evidence placed before him to come to the conclusion that the version of the respondent Company one kilometre lead means one kilometre by one side is not correct by way of understanding it.

8. This finding of the Arbitrator was upset by the High Court by going into the question as if sitting in a appeal to render a contrary view. This, according to the learned counsel, is not the jurisdiction of the High Court as this as not an error apparent on the face of the record. He further argued that it is settled law that the Court while exercising power und