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1998(2) Supreme 376
Supreme Court of India
(From Bombay High Court)
M.M. Punchhi, CJI., S. Saghir Ahmad and K.T. Thomas, JJ.
Mrs. Rena Drego -Appellant/Landlady
versus
Lalchand Soni, etc. -Respondents/Tenant
Civil Appeal Nos. 1410-1411 of 1998
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 17711-17712 of 1997)
Decided on 5-3-1998
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : V.N. Ganpule, Sr. Advocate, A.S. Bhasme, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Ms. Indra Jaisingh, Sr. Advocate, T.C. Sharma, Bharat N. Vaishnava, Ajay Sharma, Rupesh Kumar, Advocates.
Held : But a learned single Judge of the High Court was quashed the said decree held the landlady guilty of two wrongs. First is that she did not speak the truth in her evidence that her eldest son (whose name is Giles Drego) has his own flat where he is living with his family (The landlady has admitted in her reply affidavit filed in the High Court, during the pendency of the writ petition, that her son Giles Drego and his wife are joint owners of a flat situate at Vasai in Thane district). Second is that, she failed to specify the plinth area of the apartment in which she is presently living with her family. (Para 3)
According to us, the High Court has traversed far beyond the limit of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution when the learned Single Judge reversed the decree of eviction which was based on findings of facts arrived at by the fact-finding authority upon the evidence on record. It would have been well for the High Court to remind itself that it was not exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution but a supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 which obliges the High Court to confine to the scrutiny of records and proceedings of the lower tribunal. By relying on fresh materials which were not before the tribunal, the High Court should not have disturbed findings of facts in exercise of such supervisory jurisdiction. (Para 4)
(ii) Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947-Section 13(1)(g) r/w 13(2)-Reasonable requirement of landlady and comparative hardship to tenant - Reasonable requirement can be taken as providing an angle which is comfortable or agreeable to reason, having regards to facts of the particular controversy-Landlady’s eldest son having another flat-High Court giving undue prominence to a seeming discrepancy of her need for additional accommodation and flat of eldest son-Whether correct? (No). (Paras 9 & 14)
(iii) Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947-Section 13(1)(g)-Bonafide need of landlady for additional accommodation - Eviction decree passed by appellate Court-High Court upsetting the decree on ground that the landlady did not specify the plinth area of the space which is presently in her occupation -Whether correct? (No)-Result-Appeal allowed.
Held : There is no legal requirement that the person who claims eviction on the ground under Section 13(1)(g) of the Act shall specify the area in his possession. However, if the High Court thought it necessary to know the exact plinth area in the possession of the appellant, she could have been asked to spell it out. (Para 15)
Held also : As a matter of fact, the landlady has mentioned it, which the High Court has overlooked. (Para 16)
Held consequently : We find no justification for the High Court for quashing the decree of eviction passed by a competent court on satisfaction of the ground under Section 13(1)(g) of the Act. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The decree of eviction will stand restored subject to a rider that respondent-tenant can have three months’ time from today for surrendering the premises in question, provided he gives the undertaking on usual terms within four weeks in the Registry of this Court. (Para 17)
Judgment
Thomas, J.-Leave granted.
2. A landlady had rented out her flat situate at Bandra (West) in Bombay (now Mumbai) to a tenant in 1969 for a rent of Rs. 200/- per month. As years passed by, she found it difficult to accommodate her large family in the small residential apartment where she is presently living. So, she moved the Court in 1977 for a decree of eviction of her tenant from her flat at Bandra. Of course, she cast the net very wide covering a variety of grounds to have a decree for eviction, but what ultimately survived among them was the ground envisaged in Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’), i.e., bona fide and reasonable requirement of the tenanted premises for her own occupation. Though, she was non-suited by the trial Court (which is the Small Causes Court, Bombay), she went in appeal to the appellate bench of the Court of Small Causes, where she got a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned above. But the said decree did not enure to her benefit as the same was later upset by the High Court of Bombay when the tenant filed a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution for quashment of the same. This appeal, by special leave, has been filed by the landlady impugning the aforesaid judgment of the Bombay High Court.
3. It is to be pointed out, right now itself, that the need of the landlady for additional accommodation in view of her large family was recognised by the trial Court. Still she was non-suited by the trial Court on the premise that her pleadings on that score were scanty. Appeal Court after concurring with the finding which was favourable to the landlady did not take the inadequacy in the pleadings as capable of fatally affecting her cause. Hence the appeal Court found no hurdle in granting the decree of eviction. But a learned single Judge of the High Court was quashed the said decree held the landlady guilty of two wrongs. First is that she did not speak the truth in her evidence that her eldest son (whose name is Giles Drego) has his own flat where he is living with his family (The landlady has admitted in her reply affidavit filed in the High Court, during the pendency of the writ petition, that her son Giles Drego and his wife are joint owners of a flat situate at Vasai in Thane district). Second is that, she failed to specify the plinth area of the apartment in which she is presently living with her family.
4. According to us, the High Court has traversed far beyond the limit of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution when the learned Single Judge reversed the decree of eviction which was based on findings of facts arrived at by the fact-finding authority upon the evidence on record. It would have been well for the High Court to remind itself that it was not exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution but a supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 which obliges the High Court to confine to the scrutiny of records and proceedings of the lower tribunal. By relying on fresh materials which were not before the tribunal, the High Court should not have disturbed findings of facts in exercise of such supervisory jurisdiction. It is now well nigh settled that power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence which cannot be used to upset conclusions of facts, however erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no court could ever have reached them. Way back in 1954, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh & Anr. v. Amarnath & Anr.1, has pointed out that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 should be exercised “most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.” (emphasis supplied)
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