2003 Supreme(SC) 761

2003(6) Supreme 107
Supreme Court of India
(From Kerala High Court)
V.N. Khare, CJI., S.B. Sinha and G.P. Mathur, JJ.
Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee & Anr. —Appellants
versus
C.K. Rajan & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 2148 of 1994
With
C.A. Nos. 2149/1994, 2150/1994 and 2151/1994
Decided on 14-8-2003
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appearing Parties : K.K. Venugopal, V.R. Reddy, Sr. Advocates, E.M.S. Anam, Fazlin Anam, Krishnan Venugopal, M.K.D. Namboodari, K.R. Sasiprabhu, John Mathew, K.R. Nambiar, M.P. Vinod, Advocate (NP), A. Subba Rao, A.D. Sikri, A. Raghunath, Roy Abraham, Dr. Seema Jain, M.M. Kashyap, Sudarsh Menon, Advocate (NP), N. Sudhakaran, Advocate (NP), C.N. Sreekumar, Advocate (NP), Ms. Malini Poduval, Advocate (NP), Aruneshwar Gupta, Advocate (NP)/Advocates.

Very Important Point
The Court should be circumspect in entertaining public interest litigation in the matter of management of a temple which is being governed by the provisions of a statutory enactment and the State takes over the management.

Headnote:Constitution of India—Articles 32 and 226—Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1976—Sections 5C, 5(3)(c), 5(4), 6, 13, 23, 25, 26, 33 and 38—Guru­vayoor Devaswom Rules, 1980—Rules 10 and 17—Public Interest Litigation in matter of management of a temple governed by a statute—Scope and ambit—Sree Krishna Temple in Kerala, ancient temple of unique importance—Letter addressed to High Court bringing to their notice purported serious irregularities, corrupt practices, mal-administration and mismanagement prevailing in the temple—High Court appointed District Judge as Commissioner to make a general enquiry—Commissioner seized all the records of the temple—Recommendations made for better administration of Devaswom—Objections—Whether High Court was justified in entertaining letter of 5th respondent as a public interest litigation and then appointing a Commissioner—(No)—Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952—Section 3.

       Held : We have not come across any case so far where the functions required to be performed by statutory functionaries had been rendered redundant by a Court by issuing directions upon usurpation of statutory power. The right of a person belonging to a particular religious denominations may sometimes fall foul of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Only whence the fundamental right of a person is infringed by the State an action in relation thereto may be justified. Any right other than the fundamental rights contained in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India may either flow from a statute or from the customary laws. Indisputably a devotee will have a cause of action to initiate an action before the High Court when his right under statutory law is violated. He may also have a cause of action by reason of action or inaction on the part of the State, or a statutory authority; an appropriate order is required to be passed or a direction is required to be issued by the High Court. In some cases, a person may feel aggrieved in his individual capacity, but the public at large may not. (Para 57)

       The Act is a self-contained Code. ­Duties and functions are prescribed in the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Forums have been created thereunder for ventilation of the grievances of the affected persons. Ordinarily, therefore, such forums should be moved at the first instance. The State should be asked to look into the grievances of the aggrieved devotees, both as parens patriae as also in discharge of its statutory duties. (Para 59)

       For any court of law including this Court, it is difficult to draw a strict line of demarcation as to which matters and to what extent a public interest litigation should be entertained but, as noticed hereinbefore, the decisions of this Court render broad guidelines. This Court and the High Court should, unless there exists strong reasons to deviate or depart therefrom, not undertake an unnecessary journey through the public interest litigation path. The High Court should not have proceeded simply to supplant, ignore or by-pass the statute. The High Court has not shown any strong and cogent reasons for an Administrator to continue in an office even after expiry of his tenure. It appears from the orders dated 7th February, 1993 that the High Court without cogent and sufficient reason allowed Administrator to continue in office although his term was over and he was posted elsewhere. He also could not have been conferred powers wider than Section 17 of the Act. The High Court took over the power of appointment of the Commissioner bypassing the procedure set out in the Act by calling upon the Government to furnish the names of 5 IAS Officers to the Court so that it could exercise the power of appointment of the Commissioner. (Paras 61 and 62)

       Administration of temple by entertaining complaints does not lead to a happy state of affairs. Roving enquiry is not contemplated. Principles of natural justice and fair play ought to be followed even in the pro bono public proceedings. The Courts undoubtedly would be parens patriae in relation to idols, but when the statute governs the field and the State takes over the management, ordinarily the Courts would not step in. (Para 64)

       The very fact that our attention has been drawn that the State in a given situation can take recourse to the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 for the purpose of enquiring into the alleged irregularities in the matter of management of temple is itself a pointer to the fact that the State may take recourse thereto if such a course of action may be found to be necessary by the State itself. (Para 73)

       The administration of the temple, it is stated, has been taken over by the State and the other statutory functionaries. They shall, we have no doubt in our mind, having regard to the fact that special treatment has been accorded to the temple by the State Legislature, carry out its activities in true letter and spirit thereof. The State and the statutory functionaries would be well advised to give full credence to the tenets and practices subject of course to the provisions of the statute. The State should furthermore make all endeavours to see that the sentiments of the devotees are respected. In view of our findings aforementioned, the adverse remarks made in the impugned judgment against the appellant in C.A. No. 2151/1994 shall stand expunged. Before parting with this case, however, we must complement the High Court about the gigantic task undertaken by it leading to discovery of a number of irregularities in the matter of management of temple detected in the process. We hope and trust that the judgment of the High Court would prove to be an eye-opener to the State and now onwards it will be able to fulfill the hopes and aspirations of millions of devotees of Lord Krishna. (Paras 89 & 90)