1956 Supreme(SC) 9

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
11th February 1956
S.R. DAS, C.J.I., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA DAS, SINHA AND IMAM, JJ.
Raja Ram Chandra Reddy and another, Appellants
Versus
Rani Shankaramma and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 193 of 1955.
Advocates Appeared
Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Mr. R. B. S. Aravamuda Aiyangar, Sr. Advocate (Mr. M.S.K. Aiyangar and Mr. T. Raghavan, Advocates, with them), (for No. 1) and Mr. P. Ram Reddy and Mr. M.S.K. Aiyangar Advocates (for No. 2) for Appellants : Sir N. P. Engineer and Mr. Akbar Ali Khan, Sr. Advocates (Mr. Sadashiv Rao, Mr. V. J. Taraporevala Mr. Rameshwar Nath and Mr. Rajinder Narain, Advocates, with them (for No. 1) and Mr. N. S. Raghavan Advocate General of Hyderabad, (Mr. R. G. Gokhale, Advocate with him) (for No. 2) for Respondents.

Headnote: Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation (69 of 1358 F.) Section 21(2), Proviso.

       Section 21(2) Proviso-" Pending provisions "-Meaning of- Jurisdiction of Revenue Minister and Chief Minister to decide question of succession to Jagir-Hyderabad Atiyat Enquiries Act (10 of 1952), Section 13(2)-Scope.

       Hyderabad Court of Wards Act (12 of 1350F), Section 53 (c)- Applicability.

       Raja Durga Reddy died on 2-4-1900, possessed of properties including a Jagir Samashtanam, Papannapet. He left behind him surviving his widow, Rani L and a daughter Rani S. On his death management of his entire estate was taken over by the Court of Wards under orders of the Government. Virasat for the Jagir was sanctioned, in the name of S by Firman of 1903. Ss husband also died on 19-3-1928 leaving no issue. On 22-7-1929 both S and L filed a joint application for taking a boy in adoption. Differences, however, arose between the two ladies and between the years 1929 to 1934 there was conflict between them as to who was to obtain the permission to adopt and as to whether the adoption made was to be recognised and confirmed by the Nizam. Ultimately by a Firman dated 26-8-1934, the adoption of R appellant No. 1 by L appellant No.2 was sanctioned by the Nizam as regards Gram Grant Maash. The conflict between S on one side and Land R on the other side, however, continued without any change in the management by the Court of Wards or in Ss enjoyment of the Jagir.

       The Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 F (Regulation No. LXIX of 1358 F) came into force on 15-8-1949. By this Regulation, broadly speaking, all Jagir lands were incorporated into -State lands as from the appointed day and the administration of all the Jagirs was to stand transferred to a Jagir Administrator to be appointed by the Government. From that date the Jagirdars or Hissedars or Maintenance holders were only to get cash payments out of the net annual income of the Jagirs worked out in accordance with the provisions of that Regulation. This was to be by way of interim maintenance allowance until commutation for Jagirs was determined (S. 14). It was specially provided that if a Jagirdar or Hissedar dies, his share in the net income shall devolve in accordance with his personal law [So 6 (8)] abrogating thereby the previous law that the succession to the Jagir right depended entirely on the recognition or regnant thereof by the Nizam. Such share however was not alienable without sanction of Government. It was also provided that after the commencement of the Regulation no person shall be appointed to be or be recognised as, a Jagirdar whether in succession to a deceased Jagirdar or otherwise (S. 4). This was followed a few months later by the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation, 1359 F. (Regulation No. XXV of 1359 F.) which became law on 25-1-1950. This provided for payment of compensation by way of the commuted value of the Jagir to be determined by the Jagir Administration in accordance with certain provisions of the said Regulation.

       Anticipating these statutory measures which, presumably were in the offing from after the police action, R made two applications dated 24•3•1949 and 26-4-1949, to the Revenue Member of the State, asserting recognition of his exclusive right to compensation and sanctioning of Virasat of Raja. Durga Reddy in his name. Meanwhile, S also filed an application to the Revenue Member of the 8tate praying that the estate may be released from the Court of Wards and that the samashtan of Papannapet be released in her possession forthwith. The application of R dated 24-3-1949 was rejected by the Revenue Member on the ground that the matter was for decision by the Atiyat department. Thereupon R filed a formal plaint in the Court Nazm Atiyat, describing himself as the plaintiff and S as the defendant and mentioning his claim to the Virasat of the late Raja Durga Reddy. The application was decided against him. R then filed two identical appeals one to the Atiyat Committee and the other to the Revenue Minister, Atiyat-Intezami. In the meantime the question for release of the estate from the Court of Wards in favour of S also came up before the Revenue Member of the State. At some intermediate date, the Revenue Membership ceased and Revenue Minister came in his place by constitutional changes. The Revenue Minister rejected Ss petition requesting for the release of the estate in her favour, and accepting Rs appeal. The Chief Minister confirmed the order of the Revenue Minister. S challenged the decision of the Revenue Minister as being entirely beyond his jurisdiction and applied to the High Court for a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the Revenue Ministers order and to issue a mandamus for release of the property in her favour. The High Court quashed the order of the Revenue Minister and issued a direction to the Court of Wards to release the entire estate in favour of S.

       Held: (allowing the appear) : (1) The judgment of the Nizam Atiyat dated 1-2-1950, was given on the footing that it was the petition of 22-6-1949, which was by then treated as pending. An appeal as against the judgment, therefore, to the Revenue Minister would be an appeal in a pending proceeding if the appeal was competent. Thus, there was a pending proceeding falling within the proviso to S. 2] (2) of the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation (69 of 1358 F.) by the time when the Revenue Minister took up the matter in August, 1950, for his consideration.

       (2) Either the wording of the petition filed by R on 22-6-1949, or substance of the claim raised therein and the proceedings following thereon, could not by any logic be said to be for a mere amendment of the Takhta virasat or of the "Muntakhab" falling within item 7 of Schedule A of Gashti 19 of 1332 F. The intention of the circular was that what may be called judicial matters which raise serious issues between parties involving their legal rights were to be taken out of the hands of the mere administrative machinery and had to be dealt with by the directorate of Atiyat under judicial procedure and that it is only what may really be called administrative matters relating to Atiyat grants that could be dealt with as Atiyat Intezami by the ordinary Revenue department machinery.

       What in substance was asked for was the reopening of the virasat proceedings which were originally taken on the death of Raja Durga Reddy and the reconsideration of the same with reference to the subsequent adoption which, it was claimed, dated back to Raja Durga Reddys death and divested the title of S. A careful perusal of the Revenue Ministers order relating to this part of the case clearly shows that this was in fact the contention which was accepted. It cannot therefore be accepted that the question raised before the Revenue Minister was one merely on the administrative side of the Atiyat department so as to vest the jurisdiction in him to deal with it. Consequently

       1. From A. 1. R. 1953 Hyd. 79.

       

       so far as the dispute as to Atiyat property was concerned any determination of the question involved in the case was outside the authority and competence of the Revenue however bona fide his assumption of jurisdiction in this behalf might be.

       (3) The deeming provision in S. 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act is a strong one and invests the orders of the various authorities specified therein with the attributes of competency, validity and finality in cases relating to Atiyat Grants including Jagirs, and expressly provides that they shall not be questioned in any Court of law. The apparent intendment of this provision is not to validate an invalid order of the Revenue Minister as such. The only kind of order of the Revenue Minister which this provision contemplates is that which is passed by him by virtue of powers delegated to him by the Chief Minister. What falls within the ambit of the deeming provision is the Chief Ministers order and not somebody elses order. But what is cured thereby is not merely the incompetence and invalidity, if any, inhering in the Chief Minister to pass such an order. The language used is wide enough and strong enough to cure the incompetence and invalidity arising from similar lacuna in the precedent proceedings of which the Chief Ministers order is the culmination.

       (4) The case was taken up by the Revenue Minister by virtue of S. 21(2) of the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation as being in a pending case. It was to be decided with reference to "the existing law" as defined in that Regulation. Under that law in a case of this

       kind the only effective order would be that of the Nizam himself and not of any subordinate authority. The whole intendment of section 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act was to invest the Chief Ministers order in such cases with the attributes of the Nizams Firman. The Revenue Minister though he considered the matter to be within his jurisdiction or competence for the purposes of the enquiry, was alive to the situation that the effective order in this case could only be that of the Nizam himself before the police action, or of the Chief Minister at the date of the order in question by virtue of what was then assumed to be his validity delegated authority in this behalf. The submission of his order to the Chief Minister was in terms only "for orders" and not for bare confirmation. When, in spite of a request by both the parties for being heard, the Chief Minister confirmed the Revenue Ministers order and specifically said that he saw no reason to interfere, it must be taken that he adopted the Revenue Ministers order as his own. The Chief Ministers order therefore must be taken to be a competent valid and final order in so far as it relates to the Atiyat and Jagir property and in the events that had happened and by virtue of S. 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act, there had emerged a valid and final determination of the respective rights therein of the contending parties.

       (5) The Nizams Firman dated 29-5.1903, specifically committed the care of the property and the person of S to the Court of Wards. Subsequent proceedings have treated the supervision of the Court of Wards over the property as having been established by Firmans of the Nizam. If, therefore, S. 53 of the Hyderabad Court of Wards Act, 1350 F. (Act 12 of 1350 F.) is to be applied to this case it would require another Firman of the Nizam for the supervision of the Court of Wards to be released and the fact that S attained majority would not be enough. It is true that clause (c) of S. 53 is in applicable in the altered circumstances, at any rate after 1950, since admittedly a Firman of Nizam can have now no constitutional validity. But it has not been shown whether S. 53(c) has been adapted or modified by the President under Art. 372 of the Constitution nor has it been urged that in the altered circumstances it can be treated as either abrogated or as suitably adapted. The Court of Wards was thus not shown to be under a statutory obligation in this case to hand over to S possession of the properties which are in their control. - Article 226-Writ of mandamus-Hyderabad Court of Wards Act (12 of 1350 F.), S. 53 (C)-Obligation on part of authority. - Article 226-Mandatnus-OJJligation on part of authority.