Judgment

SUBBA RAO, J.: This appeal by special leave raises the question of the scope of Art. 132(2) of the Constitution.

2. The first respondent is one of the shareholders of the second respondent M/s. Jammu Kashmir Mechanics And Transport Workers Co-operative Society Limited, Jammu (hereinafter called the Society). The Society was registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Co-operative Societies Act No. 6 of 1993 (Vikrimi). They put in a number of applications before the third appellant for the grant of stage carriage and public carrier permits to them for various routes in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, but no permits were granted to them on the ground that under R. 4-47 of the Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules (hereinafter called the Rules), service licence could only be issued to a person or a company registered under the Partnership Act and that, as the Society was neither a person nor a partnership, it was not entitled to a licence under the Rules. The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir under S. 103 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir challenging the vires of R. 4-47 of the Rules. To that petition the appellants herein, viz., the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State, the Transport Minister, the Registering Authority and the Traffic Superintendent, were made party-respondents. The High Court held that the said rule was ultra vires as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution, and, on that finding, directed a writ of mandamus to issue against the appellants herein from enforcing the provisions of the said rule. The appellants filed an application in the High Court for a certificate under Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution, but the High Court rejected it on the ground that no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case. Thereafter the appellants applied for special leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution and this court granted the same. The order giving the special leave expressly granted liberty to the respondents herein to raise the question of the maintainability of the appeal at its final hearing.

3. Learned Counsel for the respondents raises a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. Shortly stated his objection is that under Art. 132 (2) of the Constitution special leave can be given only if the SC is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution, that in the present case the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution has been well settled and put beyond dispute by a series of decisions of this court, that, therefore, no question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, much less a substantial question of law in regard to that matter, arises for consideration and that, therefore, no special leave can be granted under the said Article.

4. This argument is sought to be met by the learned Additional Solicitor-General in the following manner: Whenever a question of classification is raised, it involves the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution with reference to the classification impugned. To state it differently, the argument is that the question in each case is whether the classification offends the principle of equality enshrined in Art. 14. Therefore, whether a registered firm, a limited company and a person have equal attributes is a question of interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

5. Before considering the validity of the rival contentions it would be convenient to ascertain precisely what was the question raised in the High Court and what was the decision given thereon by it. The argument advanced before the High Court on behalf of the Society was that under R. 4-47 a licence can be issued only to a person or a firm registered under the Partnership Act and not to a corporation registered under the Co-operative Societies act or otherwise, and, therefore, the said rule, being discriminatory in nature, offends Art. 1