Judgment

VENKATARAMA AYYAR, J. : The question that arises for our decision in the above writ petitions and appeals is whether certain jagirs in the State of Punjab known as the "Cis-Sutlej" jagirs are liable to be resumed under the provisions of the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957 (Punjab Act, No. 39 of 1957), hereinafter referred to as "the Act". This Act came into force on November 14, 1957, and the respondent State then proceeded to take action thereunder for resuming the Jagirs. A number of petitions were thereupon filed in the High Court of Punjab under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Act, and of the proceedings taken by the respondent State thereunder on the grounds, firstly, that the Act was ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature and that its provisions were unconstitutional and void; and, secondly, that even if the Act was intra vires, the jagirs held by the petitioners were not "jagirs" as defined in the Act, and were therefore not liable to be resumed under its provisions. By their Judgment dated May 25, 1959, the learned Judges held that the legislation was within the competence of the State, and that it did not contravene any of the constitutional provisions. They further held that the jagirs held by the petitioners fell within the definition of "jagir" under the Act, and were liable to be resumed thereunder, and that accordingly no writ could be issued against the State for proceeding under the provisions of the Act. By their Order dated January 27, 1960, the learned Judges granted leave to appeal to this Court under Art. 133 (1)(a), and pursuant to the same, Civil Appeals Nos. 453 to 474 of 1961 have been preferred to this Court. Appeal No. 50 of 1962 by special leave is also directed against the Judgment of the Punjab High Court in a Writ Petition under Art. 226. Some of the jagirdars have also filed petitions in this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution, impugning the Act and the action of the State thereunder on the same grounds as those raised in the appeals. We have accordingly heard arguments of learned Counsel both in the writ petitions and in the appeals, and this Judgment will govern all of them.

2. Though a number of grounds have been taken in the pleadings, impugning the Act as ultra vires and its Provisions as unconstitutional, in the argument before us, the only contention that was pressed was that the Cis-Sutlej jagirs do not fall within the definition of jagirs contained in the Act and that accordingly the State had no authority to resume them under the provisions of the Act. And this contention is sought to be sustained on two grounds: (i) that there was at no time any grant of the Cis-Sutlej jagirs to their holders, much less any assignment of land revenue to them; and (ii) that even if there was such a grant, it was not one made by or on behalf of the State Government as required by S. 2(1). It is argued that if either of these contentions succeeds, the jagirs in question would fall outside the purview of the Act, and the State would have no right under its provisions to resume them.

3. It will be convenient at this state to set out the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(1) defines "jagir" as follows:

" "Jagir" means-

(a) any assignment of land revenue made by or on behalf of the State Government; or

(b) any estate in land created or affirmed by or on behalf of the State Government carrying with it the right of collecting land revenue or receiving any portion of the land revenue; or

(c) any grant of money made or continued by or on behalf of the State Government which purports to be or is expressed to be payable out of the land re- venue; or

(d) any, grant of money including anything payable on the part of the State Government in respect of any right, privilege, perquisite or office; and

includes any such grant or assignment existing in favour of Cis-Sutlej jagirdars."

"jagirdar is defined in S. 2 (2) as meaning the holder of a jagir. Section 2(5)