Judgment

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I.: These civil appeals and writ petitions have been placed before us for hearing in a group , because all of them raise a common question of law about the validity of S. 34 (IA) of the Income-tax Act (No. XI of 1922) (hereinafter called the Act ). M/s. K. S. Rashid and Son, and its partner, Rashid Ahmad, are the appellants Civil Appeals Nos. 37 to 40/ 1963, and petitioners in W. Ps. Nos. 335-345/1960. The appeals arise out of the four writ petitions (Nos. 870-873 of 1956) filed by the firm and its partner in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the validity of the notices served upon them under S. 34(1A) of the Act in respect of their income for the years 1941-42 to 1946-47. These writ petitions have been dismissed by the said High Court and it is with the certificate issued by it that the firm and its partner have come to this Court in appeal. The writ petitions Nos. 335-345/1960 have been filed by the same parties in this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution in respect of the notices served on them on the 19th March, 1956 and the order of excess profit tax levied on them. In those petitions, the same point is urged by the parties; and that is that the notices are invalid, because S. 34(IA) is itself ultra vires. The respondents to the appeals are: the Commissioner of Income-tax U. P., Lucknow, and the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Delhi. The respondents to the writ petitions are: the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle IV, New Delhi, the Income-tax Officer, A Ward, Meerut, the Commissioner of Income-tax, U. P., Lucknow, and the Central Board of Revenue. New Delhi.

2. Civil Appeal No. 589 of 1963 has been brought to this Court in similar circumstances by the appellant, M/s. Bhawani Prasad Girdharlal. The appellant has challenged the validity of the notices issued against it on the 16th August, 1955 under S. 34(IA) of the Act. The writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the Allahabad High Court and it is with the present appeal has been brought to this court. That is how the only question which arises for our decision in this group of matters relates to the validity of Section 34(IA) of the Act.

3. The argument urged in support of the challenge to the validity of the impugned section is that it suffers from the vice of contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is urged that whereas under S. 34(1) which deals with similar cases of assessees, the remedy by way of appeals and revisions under the relevant provisions of the Act is available to the assessees, that remedy is denied to the assessees against whom proceedings are taken under the impugned section. Section 34(1) thus gives a preferential treatment to the assessees who are similarly placed with the assessees dealt with under S. 34(IA) : and that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. It is also urged that in regard to cases falling under S. 14(1) (a) as it stood at the relevant time, a period of limitation of 8 years had been prescribed beyond which the assessing authority could not act, and this protection of the prescribed period of limitation is not available to the assessees against whom action is taken under the impugned section. It is on these two grounds that the validity of S. 34(IA) is challenged before us.

4. Section 34 deals with income, which has escaped assessment. Section 34(1) (a) deals with cases where income has, inter alia, escaped assessment, owing to the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his income under S. 22 for any year, or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, whereas S. 34(1) (b) refers to cases where income has escaped assessment notwithstanding that there has been no omission or failure as mentioned in cl. (a) on the part of the assessee. In respect of the first category of cases, S. 34(1) had provided at the relevant time that the Income-tax Officer may, in cases falling under cl. (a) at an