SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I., J.C. SHAH, S.M. SIKRI, V. RAMASWAMI AND P. SATYANARAYANA RAJU, JJ.
State of Bihar, Appellant
Versus
Rambalak Singh "Balak" and others, Respondents;
Attorney-General, for India, Intervener.
Criminal Appeal No. 200 of 1965.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar and Mr. Bajrang Sahai, Govt. Advocate, (Mr. S. P. Varma, Advocate, with them), for Appellant; M/s. D. Goburdhun and G. N. Sinha, Advocates, for Respondent No. 1, Mr. C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General for India (Mr. B. R. G. K. Achar, Advocate, with him), for Intervener.
Judgement
GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.I.: This appeal by special leave is directed against the order passed by the Patna High Court ordering that the detenu Rambalak Singh be released on bail of Rs. 500 with two sureties of Rs. 250 each to the satisfaction of the Registrar of the High Court. The order further mentions that Mr. Girish Nandan Sinha who appeared for the detenu had given an undertaking to the Court that during the pendency of the proceedings when the petitioner is on bail, the petitioner will not indulge in any prejudicial activity or commit any prejudicial act. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, the Advocate-General of Bihar, has urged on behalf of the appellant, the State of Bihar, that the order under appeal is without jurisdiction; and that raises an important question of law as to whether while entertaining a habeas corpus petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution filed on behalf of a detenu who has been detained under R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules (hereinafter called the "Rules ), the High Court has jurisdiction to release the detenu on bail pending the final disposal of the said habeas corpus petition.
2. The learned Advocate-General stated at the outset that the appellant was not keen on obtaining the reversal of the order of bail which is under appeal; he argued that the appellant wanted the point of law to be decided, because it is necessary that the true legal position in this matter should not be in doubt. That is why we do not propose to deal with the facts leading to the habeas corpus petition on behalf of Rambalak Singh and will not consider the propriety, or the reasonableness of the order under appeal. It is true, as the learned Advocate-General contends, that one rarely comes across a case where the High Court has purported to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 and released a detenu on bail where the order of detention has been passed under R. 30 of the Rules; but that by itself, can afford no assistance in dealing with the question of jurisdiction raised by the present appeal.
3. The learned Advocate-General has fairly invited out attention to the observations recently made by this Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964: 1965-1 SCR 413, which are relevant for the purpose of dealing with the present appeal. In that case, the Legislative Assembly of the State of Uttar Pradesh had committed Keshav Singh, who was not one of its members, to prison for its contempt. Keshav Singh had then moved the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, under Art. 226 of the Constitution and S. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenging his committal as being in breach of his fundamental rights. He had also prayed for interim bail. The learned Judges who entertained his petition admitted him to bail; and one of the points which arose for decision before this Court in the Special Reference was whether the order passed by the High Court admitting Keshav Singh to bail was without jurisdiction.
4. Mr. Seervai, who had appeared for the U. P. Assembly, had strenuously contended that the order passed by the High Court admitting Keshav Singh to bail was without jurisdiction, and in support of his contention, he had relied upon the English practice which seems to recognise that in regard to habeas corpus proceedings commenced against orders of commitment passed by the House of Commons on the ground of its contempt, bail is not granted by courts. This argument, however, was rejected by this Court, because this Court took the view that "if Art. 226 confers jurisdiction on the Court to deal with the validity of the order of commitment even though the commitment has been ordered by the House, how can it be said that the Court has no jurisdiction to make an interim order in such proceedings? (p. 498 of SCR). Reference was also made to an earlier decision of this Court in the State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, 1952 SCR 28, where it was ruled than an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as auxiliary to, the main relief whic
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