Judgment

SUBBA RAO, J. : This appeal raises the question of interpretation of the words " in the interest of public order" in Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.

2. The facts are not in dispute and they lie in a small compass. The respondent, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, is the General Secretary of the Socialist Party of India. The U. P. Government enhanced the irrigation rates for water supplied from canals to cultivators. The party to which the respondent belongs resolved to start an agitation against the said enhancement for the alleged reason that it placed an unbearable burden upon the cultivators. Pursuant to the policy of his party, the respondent visited Farrukhabad and addressed two public meetings wherein he made speeches instigating the audience not to pay enhanced irrigation rates to the Government. On July 4, 1954, at 10. p.m. he was arrested and produced before the City Magistrate, Farrukhabad, who remanded him for two days. After investigation, the Station Officer, Kaimganj, filed a charge-sheet against the respondent before Sri P. R. Gupta, a Judicial Officer at Farrukhabad. On July 6, 1954, the Magistrate went to the jail to try the case against the respondent, but the latter took objection to the trial being held in the jail premises. When the Magistrate insisted upon proceeding with the trial, the respondent obtained an adjournment on the ground that he would like ;to move the High Court for transfer of the case from the file of the said Magistrate. Thereafter the respondent file a petition before the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground, among others, that S.3 of the U. P., Special Powers Act, 1932 (Act No. XIV of 1932) (hereinafter called the Act) was void under the Constitution.

3. In the first instance the petition came up for disposal before a division bench of the High Court at Allahabad consisting of Desai and Chaturvedi, JJ. Elaborate arguments were addressed before them covering a wide field. The learned Judges delivered differing judgments expressing their views on the main points raised before them. They referred the matter to the Chief Justice for obtaining the opinion of a third Judge on the following two points: "(i) Was the provision of S. 3 of the U. P. Special Powers Act of 1932 making it penal for a person by spoken words to instigate a class of persons not to pay dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue, inconsistent with Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution on the 26th of January, 1950?" and "(ii) if so, was it in the interest of public order?" The petition was placed before Agarwala J., as a third Judge, who agreeing with Desai, J., gave the following answers to the questions referred to him:

Question No. (i). "The provision of section 3 of the U. P. Special Powers Act, 1932, making it penal for a person by spoken words to instigate a class of persons not to pay dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue, was inconsistent with Article 19 (1). (a) of the Constitution on the 26th January, 1950."

Question No. (ii). "The restrictions imposed by section 3 of the U. P. Special Powers Act, 1932, were not in the interests of public order."

In the usual course the matter was placed before the two learned Judges who first heard the case and they, on the basis of the majority view, allowed the petition and directed the respondent to be released. The State has preferred the present appeal against the said order of the High Court.

4. The learned Advocate General, appearing for the appellant, stated before us that he did not propose to canvass the correctness of the majority view on one of the important points raised in the case, namely, that the effect of the passing of the Act did not ipso facto deprive a citizen of his freedom of speech guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and its validity should be tested by the provisions of Art. 19(2) thereof. He did not concede the validity of the finding in this regard but assumed its correctness for the purpose of this case. Nothing further,