SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1988 Supreme(SC) 391

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. PATHAK, CJI., M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, J.
Mohar Singh (Dead by L.Rs), Appellant
Versus
Devi Charan and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 485 of 1982, D/- 9-5-1988.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M.S. Gupta, Advocate, for Appellant; Mr. Uma Dutta, Advocate, for Respondents.

Advocates:
M.S.Gupta, Uma Datta

Headnote:Landlord cannot split the unity and integrity of the tenancy and recover possession of a part of demised premises from the tenant but section 109 of the act is exception to this rule - Partition not actually a transfer of property - partition not actually a transfer of property – which enables an assignee of a part of the reversion to exercise all the rights of the landlord in respect of the portion respecting which the reversion is so assigned subject, of course, to the other covenant running with land – See decision in Mohar Singh v. Devi Charan, AIR 1988 SC 1365, relying on the decision in Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh, AIR 1951 SC 186 = 1951 SCR 153.

Judgment

VENKATACHALIAH, J. :- This appeal, by special leave, is by the landlord preferred against the judgment and order dated 28-3-1980 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ No. 2280 of 1979* setting aside, at the instance of the first respondent-tenant, the concurrent orders of the Courts below granting possession to the appellant.

* Reported in 1980 All Rent Cas 381 : 1980 UPLT NOC 143.

2. The first respondent was a tenant Of two adjacent shops, under a single lease, obtained from two co-owners Shri Jado Ram and Asha Ram who had respectively 3/8th and 5/8th shares in the property. Appellant, Mohar Singh became the transferee of the 3/8th share of Jadoram. Similarly, Asha Ram 5/8th interest came to be transferred through an. intermediary alienation to a certain Gyan Chand. Pursuant to a decree in a civil suit for partition between Gyan Chand and the appellant, the co-ownership came to an end and towards his share appellant was allotted, and became the exclusive owner of one of the shops. That is the subject-matter of the present proceedings.

3. Appellant instituted proceedings for eviction against respondent 1 under S. 21, U.P. Act, XIII of 1972, before the prescribed authority on the ground of his own bona fide need. The prescribed authority ordered release of the premises and made an order granting possession. The appeal preferred by respondent 1 before the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar was dismissed. First respondent then moved the High Court in Writ No. 2280 of 1979.

The findings as to the bona fides and reasonableness of the requirement of the appellant stand concluded by the concurrent findings of the statutory authorities. Indeed that was not also the ground on which the order of eviction was assailed before the High Court in the writ petition.

4. Before the High Court what was urged by respondent 1 and accepted by the High Court was the contention that the severance of the reversion and assignment of that part of the reversion in respect of the suit shop in favour of the appellant did not clothe the appellant with the right to seek eviction without the other lessor joining in the action, and that in claiming possession of a part of the subject matter of the original lease the appellant was seeking to split the integrity and unity of the tenancy, which according to respondent 1 was impermissible in law.

The High Court does not appear to have considered the effect of the partition decree between erstwhile co-owners and of the appellant, consequently, having become the exclusive owner of one of the shops. The reasoning that appears to have commended itself to the High Court in setting aside -the order made by the Court below granting possession is somewhat on these lines :

"......But unless such a situation has been created with the consent of all of them, the effect of transfer of a portion of the accommodation would be that in place of one lessor would be substituted two lessors, even though of defined portions of the accommodation let out to the lessee. It cannot be denied that one of the two joint lessors cannot institute a suit for the ejectment or apply for permission to file such a suit in respect of a portion of the accommodation."

....................................................................................................................................

....................................................................................................................................

".............In other words even now as a result of transfer a part of the building under tenancy the splitting up of the tenancy cannot be permitted unless the tenant has agreed to it. On this view of the matter, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed."

5. It is trite proposition that a landlord cannot split the unity and integrity of the tenancy and recover possession of a part of the demised premises from the tenant. But S. 109, T.P. Act, provides a statutory exception to this rule and enables an a











Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top