JUDGMENT

SAWANT, J.:—The petitioner is a diploma-holder in Engineering and holds the post of Executive Engineer in the respondent-Corporation. Till 1974, the promotional post of the Superintending Engineer was available both for diploma-holders and degree-holders according to merit-cum-seniority. This was so according to the practice followed by the Corporation without making any rules or regulations in that behalf. In 1974, the Corporation made regulations by passing a resolution and continued the same practice. Admittedly, the regulations were not made under Section 64 of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) under which the respondent-Corporation was created. Thereafter in 1988, the Corporation passed a resolution, for the first time, making 75 per cent of the posts of Superintending Engineers available to the Executive Engineers holding degrees and 25 per cent to the Executive Engineers who were diploma-holders. This resolution was also admittedly not a regulation made under the said Section 64. But for this resolution, the petitioner who was senior to respondent No. 2 would have been promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer on 31st October, 1990. However, since respondent No. 2 was a degree-holder, he got the benefit of the said resolution and was promoted to the said post on that date. It is this promotion which was challenged by the petitioner by a writ, petition in the High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the said petition.

2. Two contentions were raised before us :

(i) that no classification could be made among the Executive Engineers on the basis of their educational qualifications for the purpose of promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer, since they belong to the same cadre of Executive Engineers and do the same work. There was also a common seniority list of the Executive Engineers maintained. Hence the classification was discriminatory in nature and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

(ii) that if at all such a discrimination was permissible, it could be made only by a statutory rule or regulation framed under Section 64 of the said Act. A mere resolution or an executive instruction could not effect such discrimination.

3. We find no merit in either of the two contentions. It is now well settled that for the purposes of promotion, a valid classification can be made among the members holding the same post on the basis of their qualifications. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, (1974) 1 SCR 771, a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that such a classification is permissible and does not violate Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court has observed there that in State of Mysore v. P. Narasing Rao, (1968) 1 SCR 407 and Union of India v. Dr. (Mrs.) S. B. Kohli, AIR 1973 SC 811, it was already held that classification on the basis of educational qualifications was permissible. The Court then referred to Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185 and distinguished it on the facts by pointing out that it was a case of the direct recruits and promotees integrated into one cadre. Once they were integrated they lost their birth-marks, viz., the different sources from which they were recruited. (Emphasis supplied). The Court pointed out that Roshan Lals case (supra) was thus no authority for the proposition that if direct recruits and promotees are integrated into one class, they cannot be classified for purposes of promotion on a basis other than that they were drawn from different sources. The Court pointed out that in the case before them the classification rested fairly and squarely on the consideration of educational qualifications which was not a discrimination in relation to the source of recruitment. The Court also pointed out that the very Bench which decided Roshan Lals case (supra) held about a fortnight later in Narsingh Raos case (supra) that higher educational quali